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Essay 1: Institutional Investment, Asset Illiquidity, and Post-Crash Housing Market Dynamics
Abstract: I demonstrate that housing’s mildly segmented market structure adds an additional measure of
asset illiquidity risk for owner-occupiers and their lenders by examining the effect of a house’s conversion
from the owner-occupied market to the rental market. From 2012 to 2014, I find that owner-occupied
houses that were purchased by institutional investors and converted to rentals after the real estate crisis sold
for approximately 5% less than similar houses that sold to owner-occupiers. The large discount was in
addition to REO, foreclosure, short sale, and cash purchase discounts which, when combined, highlight the
low liquidation value for owner-occupied housing.

Essay 2: Homeownership: An examination of its effect on house prices
Abstract: Subsidizing homeownership is only justifiable if it increases homeownership attainment and
creates external benefits that outweigh their costs. Using parcel-level panel data I isolate and examine the
effect of homeownership on surrounding house prices. Homeownership has a causal effect on house prices,
but substantial variation exists across quantiles. Changes in homeownership have a lesser (greater) effect on
house prices in the upper (lower) deciles of the conditional house price distribution - despite the fact that
households in the upper deciles are the primary beneficiaries of the federal tax subsidies for
homeownership.

Essay 3: School Quality, Latent Demand, and Bidding Wars for Houses
Abstract: I examine the recent rise of bidding wars and their effectiveness relative to traditional listing
strategies. A simple theoretical model predicts that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war will be
most effective in housing markets with high levels of latent demand. I use school quality as a proxy for
latent demand as households with children naturally want their kids to go to the best school possible. I posit
that the limited supply of housing within high quality school districts creates latent demand for housing
within those districts. Evidence from Atlanta supports the model - I find that underpricing a house to incite
a bidding war is more effective in markets with latent demand. However, underpricing does not outperform
traditional listing strategies.

Institutional Investment, Asset Illiquidity,
and Post-Crash Housing Market Dynamics

Patrick S. Smith
Georgia State University
Real Estate Department
psmith44@gsu.edu

June 21, 2016

Abstract
I demonstrate that housing’s mildly segmented market structure adds an additional measure of
asset illiquidity risk for owner-occupiers and their lenders by examining the effect of a house’s
conversion from the owner-occupied market to the rental market. From 2012 to 2014, I find that
owner-occupied houses that were purchased by institutional investors and converted to rentals
after the real estate crisis sold for approximately 5% less than similar houses that sold to owneroccupiers. The large discount was in addition to REO, foreclosure, short sale, and cash purchase
discounts which, when combined, highlight the low liquidation value for owner-occupied
housing.

1. Introduction
In the United States, there are two housing markets: owner-occupied and rental housing.
Owner-occupied housing, by definition, must be a household’s primary residence to qualify for
preferential tax treatment.1 Thus, owner-occupied housing is not only a consumption good but an
investment as well. In contrast, rental housing is not purchased for personal consumption; it is
viewed solely as an investment. The two housing markets are similar, in that, they provide
housing services. However, comparisons of the two are difficult because of housing’s mildly
segmented market structure.
Liu, Grissom and Hartzell (1990) show that single-family housing has a mildly segmented
market structure.2 Housing is a mildly segmented market because while individuals can invest in
both owner-occupied and rental housing, institutional investors can only invest in rental
housing.3 For individuals, the segmented demand results in an additional measure of risk and
hence a higher return for owner-occupied housing.4 Until recently, institutional investors have
not invested in single-family houses arising in part from high transaction costs, lack of
economies of scale (e.g. buying houses in bulk at a discount and property management issues),
and perceived political implications.5 Adverse political implications include, but are not limited
to, fear of government regulation and negative publicity regarding bidding wars with potential
homeowners given the political focus on subsidizing homeownership. Additionally, buying too
1

Homeowners can deduct property tax and mortgage interest payments for their primary residence and a second
home. However, the overwhelming majority (greater than 90%) of homeowners in the United States only own one
personal residence. A detailed overview of owner-occupied and rental housing’s taxation is provided in Section 3.
2
Liu, Grissom and Hartzell (1990) examine the impact of a mildly segmented housing market in a CAPM context.
The authors segment the housing market into owner-occupied housing and income-producing real estate, but do not
consider taxes in an effort to reduce their model’s complexity.
3
Technically institutional investors can invest in owner-occupied housing in several ways. They can purchase
owner-occupied houses and hold them as dealer (or investment) properties – in which case they cannot depreciate
the asset over time and do not benefit from owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment, so their return is
tied directly to the house’s capital appreciation. Institutional investors can also purchase owner-occupied houses and
convert them rentals – in which case they are no longer owner-occupied housing. Historically, institutional investors
have not invested in the equity of owner-occupied housing and instead chose to lend equity to owner-occupiers. I
discuss the mildly segmented housing market and its impact on institutional investment in owner-occupied housing
in greater detail in Section 2.
4
Stein (1995) shows that an exogenous negative shock to owner-occupied house prices coupled with the market’s
down-payment requirements can have self-reinforcing effects. I show that these self-reinforcing effects coupled with
owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment, high transaction costs, and mildly segmented market structure
can result in low liquidation values.
5
Previous research on institutional trading focuses primarily on stock markets (see, for example, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Chan and Lakonishok, 1993). Institutional investors’ trading behavior is important
because they often take large positions and their continued presence on one side of the market can significantly
affect pricing dynamics (Keim and Madhavan, 1995).

1

many houses in a neighborhood could change quality of life dynamics. However, the financial
crisis created a potential arbitrage opportunity for institutional investors to enter the singlefamily housing market. House price declines, to levels which were significantly below their precrisis levels, together with large scale delinquencies and defaults, an increase in demand for
single-family rental homes arising from these foreclosures, and the tightening of the mortgage
market created a large supply of available owner-occupied housing which made economies of
scale possible.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the nature of the mildly segmented
housing market given the recent entry by institutional investors. Ex-ante, as the single-family
housing market becomes more integrated, the price of single-family homes should be bid up and
returns should fall until no abnormal returns exist if the single-family housing market becomes
fully integrated. However, segmentation might still exist due to, among other things, the
preferential tax treatment associated with owner-occupied housing. As such, I explore how the
entry of institutional investors influenced house prices by comparing the pre- versus post-crisis
period using characteristic and propensity score matched samples in a difference in difference
framework. The price differential I find provides an estimate of the asset illiquidity risk inherent
in the owner-occupied housing market that is a byproduct of the mildly segmented market
structure and the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. I also find that although
institutional investors entrance in the post-crisis period increased prices thereby reducing returns
and lessening the degree of housing market segmentation and asset illiquidity risk, the premium
associated with owner-occupied housing persists.
This study focuses on institutional investment in the Atlanta, Georgia metropolitan
housing market. Atlanta is the ideal setting for this study as it was one of the markets heavily
targeted by institutional investors (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2013; Mills, Milloy, and
Zarutskie 2015). I identify eleven institutional investors that were active in Atlanta from 2012 to
2014 – six of which were private equity firms and five of which were publicly traded
companies.6 The institutional investors that I identify are large “informed” financial entities that
entered the Atlanta housing market, purchased single-family detached houses, and converted the
houses to rentals during the post-crisis period. The institutional investors’ large cash reserves and
access to capital give them an advantage over investors that require mortgage financing in the
6

A detailed overview of the eleven institutional investors is available in Appendix A.
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housing market – especially during times of economy-wide distress. In my model, institutional
investors substitute their investments in rental housing with investments in owner-occupied
housing. However, when institutional investors purchase owner-occupied housing they convert it
to rental housing for the short-term, as they cannot consume its services and can only invest in
income-producing real estate. Although housing stock is generally considered perfectly inelastic
to downward demand shocks, I show that the housing market’s mildly segmented market
structure allows owner-occupied housing to be redeployed as rental housing. In doing so, I
illustrate the impact the mildly segmented market structure has on owner-occupied housing’s
asset illiquidity and the two housing markets’ risk-return equilibrium condition.
The next section of this paper details housing’s mildly segmented market structure.
Section 3 provides an overview of owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment. Section
4 applies Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) asset liquidity framework to the owner-occupied housing
market. Section 5 presents a model of post-crash housing market dynamics, Section 6 provides
an overview of the data, Section 7 presents the empirical methodology and results, and Section 8
concludes.
2. Mildly Segmented Market Structure
There are several factors that contribute to housing’s mildly segmented market structure
including its (1) preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing, (2) dual role as a
consumption and investment good, (3) heterogeneous housing stock, (4) differing economies of
scale, and (5) illiquidity.
The United States government heavily subsidizes and promotes homeownership by
providing preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. Owner-occupiers benefit from
the tax exemption of their implicit rental income and the exclusion of capital gains from the sale
of their house. They can also deduct their mortgage interest, mortgage insurance premium, and
property tax payments when filing their federal income taxes. The preferential tax treatment
promotes homeownership, increases owner-occupier’s consumption demand, and results in
higher house prices. In essence, preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing increases
owner-occupied house prices to a level that is prohibitively high for institutional investors,
thereby restricting them from entering the market.7

This is similar to the notion of restricted marketability presented in Errunza and Losq’s (1985) International
Pricing Model under Mild Segmentation. Errunza and Losq argue that U.S. investors trade primarily in domestic
7

3

Housing has a dual role as both a consumption and investment good. The majority of
owner-occupiers satisfy their consumption and investment demand for housing by owning only
their primary residence without relying on the rental market to disentangle the two. Several
studies show that owner-occupier’s optimal level of housing as a consumption good often differs
from its optimal level as an investment good (Henderson and Ioannides 1983; Brueckner 1997;
Flavin and Yamashita 2002). As a result, owner-occupied housing is often “overdetermined” in
homeowner’s portfolios. The extent to which it is overdetermined is likely exacerbated by its
preferential tax treatment.
Preferential tax treatment coupled with owner-occupied housing’s dual role as a
consumption good results in a heterogeneous housing stock. Housing’s heterogeneous stock adds
to the two markets’ degree of segmentation as owner-occupiers and institutional investors’
property type and size preferences differ according to their prevailing motives (consumption
versus investment). The housing market’s stock can be split into three property types: singlefamily detached, single-family attached, and multi-family housing. In theory, one could argue
that the property types are interchangeable and perfect substitutes, as single-family attached and
multi-family units are adaptive and can be redeployed (i.e. apartment buildings can be converted
into condos and vice-versa), and owner-occupied single-family detached units can easily be
converted into rentals. However, in reality, the motives of the housing market’s participants
(consumption versus investment) result in different property type preferences that are not perfect
substitutes. For example, single-family detached units are usually owner-occupied, while rental
housing is more likely to be a part of a multi-family building.
Previous research on conversion activity in housing markets has focused on condo
conversions. An increase in condo conversions - from rental housing to owner-occupied housing
- has been tied to an increase in the number of households without children (Sternlieb and
Hughes 1975), rent controls (Sternlieb and Hughes 1975; Werczberger 1988), barriers to
ownership in the single-family market (Sternlieb and Hughes 1975), tax considerations
(Whinihan 1984), reduced profitability in the rental market relative to the “for sale” market
(Diskin and Tashchian 1984; Crone 1988; Benjamin et al. 2008; Wiley 2009), low interest rates

stocks because the cost of investing abroad is prohibitively high. I argue that institutional investors trade primarily in
rental housing because, among other things, the cost of owner-occupied housing is prohibitively high due to its
preferential tax treatment. Section 3 compares the tax code for owner-occupied and rental housing and examines its
impact on house prices.

4

(Benjamin et al. 2008; Wiley 2009), and a growing demand for homeownership (Lea and
Wasylenko 1983). The studies show that multi-family properties are valued differently in rental
and owner-occupied housing markets over time and that the property owners maximized their
return by converting rental housing to owner-occupied housing during boom periods. This study
is similar, in that, I examine housing unit conversions. However, this study focuses on
heterogeneous single-family detached houses that were converted from owner-occupied to
rentals during the recent real estate crisis.
Rental housing is more likely to be part of a multi-family building from an institutional
investors’ perspective because they look to create economies of scale. Multi-family housing
offers several advantages over single-family detached housing in this regard. Multi-family
housing, by definition, includes multiple separate housing units within one building or several
buildings in a single complex. Thus, institutional investors can purchase a large number of units
in a single transaction. Multi-family housing units are also spatially concentrated, making them
easier and cost-effective to manage, and typically have similar layouts and components, which
helps minimize repair and replacement costs as parts can be purchased in bulk. Single-family
detached housing units, in contrast, are generally not available for bulk purchase at a cost
effective price point, making it difficult for investors to accumulate a large portfolio of houses in
a short amount of time (i.e. the market has historically lacked economies of scale).8 Singlefamily detached housing units are also spatially dispersed and more likely to have dissimilar
layouts and components.
In addition to the differences between owner-occupiers and institutional investors
highlighted above, clientele effects exist within the two groups. For example, when looking to
purchase a house, local school quality is one of the primary considerations for owner-occupiers
with children. Whereas, owner-occupiers who do not have school age children may not be as
concerned with school quality. The size of the household plays a major role in the type of

8

Block trades (i.e. bulk purchases) by institutional investors have been thoroughly examined in the general finance
literature (see, for example: Kraus and Stoll 1972; Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers 1987; Saar 2001). The studies
find that block trades by institutional investors impact the efficiency of the stock market and that block purchases
have a longer permanent impact than block sales. We examine block trades by institutional investors in owneroccupied housing and note that there are several key differences between the two markets (heterogeneous versus
homogeneous assets, passive versus active investments, and high versus low transaction costs - to name a few). In
addition, institutional investors may shy away from block trades of single-family detached housing if they are
targeting houses with specific characteristics in a limited number of concentrated geographical areas.
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property owner-occupiers purchase. Single-family detached housing generally offers more living
area and bedrooms, so it attracts large households.
Real estate is notoriously illiquid. In this paper I consider two types of illiquidity in owneroccupied housing markets: market illiquidity and asset illiquidity. I define market illiquidity as
the inability to sell an owner-occupied house quickly at its full market value. Market illiquidity
in housing, similar to most real estate, is a product of the market’s high transaction costs, search
costs, and down-payment requirements. Grossman and Laroque (1990) illustrate the impact of
transaction costs on the liquidity of durable goods. In their model, households continuously
consider whether to reoptimize their level of housing consumption in relation to changes in their
wealth. They find that small transaction costs can make consumption changes occur very
infrequently.9 Stein (1995) develops a model which illustrates the self-reinforcing effect of
down-payment requirements on falling house prices. He shows that a decrease in house price
reduces homeowner’s equity; thereby reducing the amount of money the homeowner has for a
down-payment should they sell their current house. 10 A reduction in down-payment reserves
reduces household mobility and the demand for owner-occupied housing. The reduced demand
reinforces the decrease in house prices and explains housing’s illiquidity in down markets.
Housing’s degree of illiquidity varies across housing submarkets and property types, as
only the capital appreciation component of housing, and not the income producing component, is
subject to the illiquid nature of the market. The illiquid nature of owner-occupied housing has
historically made rental housing’s income-producing component more attractive to institutional
investors. Additionally, although institutional investors can lend the equity for owner-occupied
housing, they cannot directly invest in owner-occupied housing which provides income in the
form of rental opportunity costs (Liu, Grissom and Hartzell 1990). Thus, market illiquidity
reinforces the mildly segmented market structure.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) define asset illiquidity as the difference between an asset’s
value in best use and its liquidation value. They argue that when firms are in financial distress
their industry peers are likely in a similar situation, which leads to asset sales below their value
in best use. When the housing market is in equilibrium, the best use for owner-occupied housing
9

Using a transaction cost of five percent, Grossman and Laroque estimate the average time between house
purchases is 20 to 30 years. Five percent is a conservative estimate of transaction costs in housing markets as real
estate broker’s commissions usually exceed five percent on their own.
10
Stein (1995) does not include the rental housing market in his primary model.
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is owner-occupancy and institutional investors, who value housing services based on their rental
value, are constrained from investing in owner-occupied housing. The reduced demand results in
an additional measure of risk for owner-occupied housing (Liu, Grissom and Hartzell 1990). In
this paper, I define the additional risk from housing’s mildly segmented market structure as its
asset illiquidity risk.11

3. Taxation of Housing
In the United States, both owner-occupied and rental housing receive preferential tax
treatment. However, the tax code differs for the two types of housing. The dissimilar tax code
creates an environment in which the same house is valued differently by owner-occupiers and
institutional investors. Using the break-even rental rate and user cost of housing approaches I
examine the impact of the dissimilar tax treatment for owner-occupied and rental housing on
housing values across the two markets.
3.1 Break-even Rental Rate
The break-even rental rate calculates the rate necessary to set the net present value of an
investment opportunity equal to zero. In doing so, it allows us to evaluate the impact of the
dissimilar tax code on house values across the two housing markets. Using a standard present
value approach one can estimate the break-even rental rate β in housing market y as:
PV = [-𝑉0 (1-𝑙0 )] + [ ∑𝑇𝑡=1

𝑦

𝛽𝑦 𝑉𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡

𝑦

]+[

(𝑉𝑇 − 𝑉0 (𝑙𝑇 ) − 𝐺𝑇 )
(1+𝑟)𝑇

]

[−𝜏𝑡𝑖 ((𝑚 ∗ 𝑉0 ∗ 𝑙𝑡−1 ) + (ϸ𝑡 𝑉𝑡−1 )) ], 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 − 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑
𝑦
𝑋𝑡 = { 𝑖
𝜏𝑡 [ 𝛽𝑉𝑡−1 – (𝑚 ∗ 𝑉0 ∗ 𝑙𝑡−1 ) − 𝐶𝑡 – (ϸ𝑡 𝑉𝑡−1 ) − 𝑑𝑉0 ], 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙

(1)
(2)

𝑔

𝑦
𝐺𝑇

max[ 0, 𝜏 𝑇 (𝑉𝑇 − 𝑉0 − 𝐴 𝑇 )] , 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 − 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑

={ 𝑔
[𝜏 𝑇 (𝑉𝑇 − 𝑉0 ) + 𝜏 𝑇𝑑 (𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑉0 )], 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙

Where:
𝑉𝑡 is the value of the house at time t
𝑙𝑡 is the loan-to-value ratio at time t
𝛽 𝑦 is a constant break-even rental rate for housing market y
11

I discuss owner-occupied housing’s asset illiquidity risk in greater detail in Section 4.

7

(3)

T is the final time period in which the property is sold
𝐸𝑡 is the mortgage payment and operating expenses at time t
r is the discount rate
𝑦

𝑋𝑡 is the mortgage interest and property tax deduction in the owner-occupied market OR
the income tax on net rental income in the rental market
𝑦
𝐺𝑇

is the capital gains tax paid in housing market y
𝑔

𝜏𝑡 is the income (𝜏𝑡𝑖 ), capital gains (𝜏 𝑇 ), or depreciation recapture (𝜏 𝑇𝑑 ) tax rate at time t
𝑆𝑡 is the standard tax deduction at time t
𝑁𝑡 is the non-housing itemized deductions at time t
𝑚 is the mortgage interest rate
𝐶𝑡 is the operating costs paid during time period t
ϸ𝑡 is the property tax rate at time t
𝐴 𝑇 is the capital gains exemption allowance for owner-occupiers at time T
𝑑 is the rate of accounting depreciation expressed as a fraction of the purchase price

The present value calculation in Equation 1 contains three components that I separate in
brackets. The first component represents the initial down payment that I assume is the same in
the owner-occupied and rental housing markets. The second component represents the sum of the
discounted explicit (implicit) after-tax rental income payments for rental (owner-occupied)
𝑦

housing. The second component includes a subcomponent (𝑋𝑛 ) that varies based on the
𝑦

property’s form of tenure. The third component, which also contains a subcomponent (𝐺𝑛 ) that
varies based on the property’s form of tenure, represents the discounted after-tax capital
appreciation.12
The two subcomponents highlight the key differences between owner-occupied and rental
housing in the tax code. In Equation 2 owner-occupied housing is not taxed on its implicit rental
income and mortgage interest and property tax payments can be deducted.13 Whereas, rental

12

For the sake of brevity I assume that purchasing and selling costs are zero.
Homeowners can deduct their property taxes on any number of houses. However, homeowners can only deduct
interest on the first $1,000,000 in acquisition debt and first $100,000 in home equity debt that is secured by their
primary residence and second home. If a homeowner has a second home and they rent it out for part of the year, they
must use the second home more than 14 days or more than 10% of the number of days during the year that the home
13

8

housing is taxed on its explicit rental income, but mortgage interest, property taxes, operating
costs, and depreciation can be deducted.14 Thus, the true benefit of the deductions for owneroccupiers is derived, in a large part, from the way the tax code treats their imputed rental
income.15
The tax benefit for rental housing in Equation 2 depends on the investor’s ability to claim
passive activity losses. Investors who do not actively participate in their rental property’s
operations can only use the passive activity losses from the rental property to offset gains on
other passive income.16 Investors who actively participate in the operations of the rental
property, and are not real estate professionals, benefit from a special allowance where they can
use up to $25,000 of rental losses to offset their active income.17 These tax benefits are not
applicable to institutional investors. Equation 3 highlights the capital gain tax benefit afforded to
owner-occupied housing. Single (married) owner-occupiers are not taxed on the first $250,000
($500,000) in capital gains, 𝐴 𝑇 , from the sale of their primary residence.18 Whereas, investors
have to pay capital gain and depreciation recapture taxes when they sell their rental property.19
Using Equations 1-3 one could simultaneously determine the break-even rental rate that
(1) an investor would explicitly need to charge to equal their opportunity cost of capital and (2)
an owner-occupier would implicitly need to charge to cover its net costs and opportunity cost of

is rented at a fair market rental rate, whichever is longer. If they do not meet these requirements, the property is
considered a rental and not a second home (IRS Publication 936).
14
The amount of property tax and mortgage interest that an investor can deduct is not capped because they are
expenses that offset the rental income investors are taxed on. Investors use the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (MACRS) to depreciate their residential rental property. The MACRS allows investor to depreciate the basis
of their rental house (excluding land) using a straight-line method of 27.5 years (IRS Publication 527). The rate of
depreciation often exceeds the actual decline in value of the house and allows the investor to defer income taxes
until they sell the property when they have to pay a depreciation recapture tax.
15
Equation 2 assumes that owner-occupiers do not claim the standard deduction. In reality, they only benefit from
the mortgage interest and property tax deductions if they itemized their tax returns. Homeowners would decide
whether to claim the standard deduction based on the following formula: max[𝑆𝑡 , −𝜏𝑡𝑖 ((𝑚 ∗ 𝑉0 ∗ 𝑙𝑡−1 ) +
(ϸ𝑡 𝑉𝑡−1 ) + 𝑁𝑡 ) ]
16
If the investor’s passive losses exceed their passive gains that year they can carry them forward.
17
The special allowance of $25,000 is subject to a phaseout rule in which it is reduced by 50% of the amount of the
investor’s modified adjusted gross income that is more than $100,000. If the investor’s modified adjusted gross
income is $150,000 or more, they generally cannot use the special allowance (IRS Publication 925).
18
Homeowners are not taxed on the sale of their primary residence as long as they lived in the property an aggregate
of two of the last five years and have not claimed the exemption within the past 24 months. Partial exemptions are
possible for less than two years ownership and occupancy (IRS Publication 936).
19
Investors can defer the capital gain and depreciation recapture taxes if they invest in a like-kind exchange.
However, the basis from the rental property the investor sold is transferred to the rental property the investor
purchased plus any additional investment they made in the new rental property.
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capital. In a competitive market, the break-even rental rate for an investor is the market rental
rate and households decide whether to become owner-occupiers by comparing their break-even
rental rates to the market rental rates.
3.2 User Cost of Housing
Another approach to examining the impact of taxes on housing values is the user cost of
housing. The user cost of housing approach focuses on the return to capital and relies on two
conditions. The first condition is that households must be indifferent between owner-occupied
and rental housing. One can evaluate a household’s housing tenure choice by estimating its
annual user cost of housing as an owner-occupier and renter. If the annual cost of housing is the
same for an owner-occupier as a renter, then the household should be indifferent between the
two. Following Poterba (1984) the annual cost of homeownership is:
𝑂𝑡 = [(1-𝜏𝑡 )( ϸ𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 )+ ɸ𝑂 ]𝑃𝑡 – (𝑃𝑡+1 - 𝑃𝑡 )

(4)

In Equation 4, there are five components in the annual cost of owner-occupied housing. The first
component is the cost of forgone interest that the owner-occupier would have earned if they did
not purchase a house. The forgone interest is calculated by multiplying the current market
interest rate 𝑚𝑡 by the house price 𝑃𝑡 . The second component is the annual property taxes
incurred by the owner-occupier, calculated as the property tax rate ϸ𝑡 times the house price 𝑃𝑡 .
The third component is the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes, calculated
as the owner-occupier’s effective tax income rate 𝜏𝑡 times their mortgage and property tax
payments ( ϸ𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 ). The fourth component is the unobserved maintenance costs of owneroccupied housing, calculated as a fraction ɸ𝑂 of the house’s price 𝑃𝑡 . The final component in
Equation 4 is the capital gain (loss) for the year, calculated as the house price one year from
today 𝑃𝑡+1 minus the house price today 𝑃𝑡 .
If an owner-occupier is indifferent between renting and homeownership, then the cost of
renting 𝑅𝑡 should equal the cost of owning (𝑂𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡 ). Substituting 𝑅𝑡 into Equation 4:
𝑅𝑡 = [(1-𝜏𝑡 )( ϸ𝑡 +𝑚𝑡 )+ ɸ𝑂 ]𝑃𝑡 – E[𝑃𝑡+1 - 𝑃𝑡 ]

(5)

Where E[𝑃𝑡+1 - 𝑃𝑡 ] is the expected capital gain on the single-family house at time t. Deriving the
transversality condition for owner-occupied house prices 𝑃𝑡 in Equation 5:
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𝑃𝑡 = ∑∞
𝑛=0 (1+

𝑅𝑡+𝑛

(6)

(1−𝜏𝑡 )(ϸ𝑡 +𝑚𝑡 )+ɸ𝑂 )𝑛+1

The price of a house today 𝑃𝑡 is the present value of expected future rents. Since future rents are
unobservable, Equation 6 is simplified by assuming that future rents will increase at a constant
rate of α which results in the following expression:
𝑃𝑡 = (1−𝜏

𝑅𝑡
)(ϸ
+𝑚
𝑡
𝑡
𝑡 )+ɸ𝑂 −α

(7)

The second condition is that investors must be indifferent between investing in owneroccupied housing and other assets. Thus, the net present value of the investment equals zero:
𝑅𝑡 – (ϸ𝑡 +𝑚𝑡 +ɸ𝐼 )𝑃𝑡 + E[𝑃𝑡+1 - 𝑃𝑡 ] = 0

(8)

Where the property taxes ϸ𝑡 are the same as an owner-occupier, the investor can borrow money
at market interest rate 𝑚𝑡 , and the investor’s unobserved costs of being a landlord are ɸ𝐼 𝑃𝑡 .
Iterating Equation 8 one can derive the following transversality condition for investor house
prices as:
𝑃𝑡 = ∑∞
𝑛=0 (1+ϸ

𝑅𝑡+𝑛

(9)

𝑛+1
𝑡 +𝑚𝑡 +ɸ𝐼 )

Assuming a constant rate of rental growth, similar to Equation 7, then:
𝑃𝑡 =

𝑅𝑡

(10)

ϸ𝑡 +𝑚𝑡 +ɸ𝐼 −α

If the unobserved costs of investors and owner-occupiers are equal (ɸ𝑂 = ɸ𝐼 ), then the rent-price
ratio for owner-occupiers and investors are as follows:
𝑅𝑃𝐻 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡 )(ϸ𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 ) + ɸ𝑂 − α

(11)

𝑅𝑃𝐼 = ϸ𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 + ɸ𝐼 − α

(12)

If owner-occupiers do not deduct interest and taxes, then 𝑅𝑃𝐻 = 𝑅𝑃𝐼 . If owner-occupiers do
deduct interest and taxes, they should be willing to pay more than an investor.
3.3 Preferential Tax Treatment of Owner-occupied Housing
Previous studies that utilize the break-even rental rate and user cost of housing approach
find that owner-occupiers should be willing to pay between 5% to 45% more than investors,
11

depending on their income and corresponding tax bracket, due to the preferential treatment that
owner-occupied housing is afforded in the tax code. Ozanne (2012) finds that the preferential tax
treatment of owner-occupied housing results in a 5.6% savings for households in the 15% tax
bracket using an approach similar to the one presented in Section 3.1. Households in higher tax
brackets fare even better.20 Ozanne estimates that households in the 25% (35%) tax bracket save
approximately 16.3% (26.5%).21 Studies that use the user cost of housing approach estimate that
owner-occupiers should be willing to pay up to 45% more than an investor based on their ability
to deduct interest and tax payments (Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai 2005; Glaeser and Gyourko
2010).22
The preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing discourages institutional
investors from entering owner-occupier’s favored housing markets, increases the degree of
segmentation between the two housing markets, and adds an additional measure of asset
illiquidity risk for owner-occupied housing. Lenders should be particularly concerned because
owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment can raise house prices to a point in which a
20 percent down payment does not cover the price decrease were the owner-occupied house to
be valued in its absence. Thus, when the housing market is in equilibrium, a newly purchased
owner-occupied house may have negative equity when valued as rental housing.
In the next section, I apply Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) asset liquidity framework to the
owner-occupied housing market to illustrate how preferential tax treatment exacerbates the
housing market’s mildly segmented market structure and adds to its asset illiquidity risk.
4. Owner-Occupied Housing’s Asset Illiquidity
When an indebted owner-occupier has trouble making their mortgage payments and their
creditor is unwilling to renegotiate the terms of their loan, they have limited options. The owneroccupier can attempt to quickly sell their house if they have enough equity or strategically
default if they are underwater. Either way, the owner-occupied house is liquidated. If the shock
20

Litzenberger and Sosin (1978) show that a progressive income tax promotes homeownership among middle and
high income households. High income households also purchase rental properties which they rent to low income
households.
21
Not all households benefit from the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. Households in lower
tax brackets may be better off financially if they rent and claim a standard tax deduction. The standard tax deduction
in 2014 for single (married) taxpayers was $6,200 ($12,400).
22
The two studies estimate the 45% premium based on a marginal tax rate of 25%, property tax rate of 1.5%,
interest rate of 5.5%, unobserved costs of 2.5%, and a constant rate of rental growth of 3.8%.
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that caused the owner-occupier’s distress is market- or economy-wide, other households are
likely experiencing the same distress when the house is put up for sale. Households that can
potentially become owner-occupiers (i.e. put the house to its best use) likely have difficulty
securing a loan or don’t have enough money for a down-payment.
The situation is compounded by the fact that owner-occupiers can only own two owneroccupied houses.23 If owner-occupiers purchase a third owner-occupied house they do not
receive preferential tax treatment, even if they personally consume its housing services. Thus,
owner-occupied housing can only be put to its best use if it’s purchased by a household that does
not already own two owner-occupied houses. I assume that the overwhelming majority of
households that want to be owner-occupiers have already become owner-occupiers and in times
of market-wide distress they are unable to trade up or down, which adds illiquidity to the market.
Current owner-occupiers are not restricted from purchasing the liquidated owneroccupied house. However, if they purchase the house I assume they convert it to rental housing,
thereby becoming a landlord. Rental housing is not eligible for the same preferential tax
treatment as owner-occupied housing, so the owner-occupied house would be revalued. Owneroccupiers can pay substantially more for housing services they consume due to their preferential
tax treatment, so the conversion of an owner-occupied house to rental housing results in a large
decrease in value. Landlords have the advantage of knowing the local neighborhood, housing
quality, and being able to manage the property themselves. Therefore, landlords have several
advantages over institutional investors. Competition among landlords would likely result in the
second highest valuation of the owner-occupied house being liquidated. Unfortunately, an
economy-wide distress will make it difficult for landlords attempting to secure a loan. Thus,
owner-occupied housing has a significant amount of asset illiquidity risk as it may not be able to
be put to its second best use.
When the housing market is in equilibrium, institutional investors are restricted to rental
housing. However, when would-be owner-occupiers and landlords are credit constrained and the
housing market is in disequilibrium, owner-occupied housing has to be sold to institutional
investors as they, by definition, have deep pockets and do not require financing to complete the
23

Although the majority of homeowners only own one owner-occupied house, previous research finds that housing
is already “overdetermined” in their portfolios (Flavin and Yamashita 2002).
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purchase. Institutional investors incur an extra set of costs when purchasing owner-occupied
housing due to its lack of spatial concentration (i.e. it is labor intensive) and heterogeneous
housing stock (i.e. lack of economies of scale). To manage their new portfolio of properties
institutional investors have to invest in new technology and hire (train) a specialized local
property management team. Thus, institutional investors incur higher upfront costs and take on
additional risk relative to landlords. As a result, institutional investors demand a higher return
and pay a lower price for owner-occupied housing compared to what a landlord or owneroccupier would pay if they were not credit constrained.
This was the case during the recent real estate crisis when a rash of foreclosures, strategic
defaults, and the tightening of the mortgage market created a large supply of available owneroccupied houses. Figure 1 shows that homeownership rates peaked at 69.2 percent in the fourth
quarter of 2004 and then steadily decreased to 64 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014 (U.S.
Census 2014). The steady decline is significant because a one percent drop in homeownership
represents a change in living situations for approximately 1.1 million households and up to an
additional 1.1 million owner-occupied houses available for sale.
[Insert Figure 1]
An overview of the United States housing market is provided in Table 1 using data from
the 2006 to 2013 American Community Surveys (ACS). Table 1 illustrates the steady decline in
homeownership and rise of rental occupancy. The total number of occupied units increased by
almost 4.7 million between 2006 and 2013. Occupied rentals outpaced the increase in occupied
units with an increase of over 5.9 million units, which represented a 16.2% increase. Whereas,
the number of owner-occupied units decreased by 1.2 million units, or 1.1%, despite the overall
increase in occupied units. The bottom section of Table 1 breaks down the occupied rental
market by property type and clearly illustrates that single-family units were the primary gainers
in rental occupancy. Single-family housing was the only property type that increased its market
share from 2006 (31%) to 2013 (35.1%). Separating single-family housing into attached and
detached units shows that conversions of single-family detached houses into rental properties had
the largest impact. The number of occupied single-family detached rental properties increased by
over 1.27 million units, representing a 13.8% increase over the seven year period.
[Insert Table 1]
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5. Post-Crash Housing Market Dynamics
The recent real estate boom and subsequent crash was the product of overly optimistic
future price expectations for owner-occupied housing (Glaeser et al. 2008; Piazzesi and
Schneider 2009). Liu, Nowak and Rosenthal (2014) show that house price increases during the
real estate boom of the mid-2000s were not justified by fundamentals and incentivized
speculative developers to expand the existing single-family housing stock. When supply exceeds
demand in housing markets, vacancies increase and prices fall (Wheaton 1990). Thus,
oversupplying the housing market during a boom can result in significant economic and social
welfare losses (Glaeser et al. 2008). In my model, I show that large-scale investment and
conversions of owner-occupied housing into rental housing reduces the available owneroccupied housing stock, decreases vacancies, and increases prices.
Figure 2 presents the market equilibrium E, boom B, and post-crash C price dynamics in
the owner-occupied housing market. I assume that pre-boom prices in 2001 were based solely on
the underlying fundamentals of supply and demand. Thus, prices were in equilibrium in Figure 2
at 𝑃𝐸 . Liu et al. (2014) show that house price increases from 2004-2006 were not justified by
fundamentals, and that in response speculative developers expanded the housing stock (from 𝐻 𝐸
to 𝐻 𝐵 ). The housing bubble burst in 2007 and the anticipated demand never materialized, so
prices must eventually fall to 𝑃𝐶 on the demand curve for the market to clear (Glaeser et al.
2008; Liu et al. 2014). The downward price correction is magnified if lending standards are
tightened or unemployment increases as a result of the bubble bursting (Haughwout et al. 2012).
In Figure 2, I also present a model of post-crash housing market dynamics. Unlike
previous research I do not assume that the supply of housing is fixed. Thus, the shift from 𝐻 𝐵
back towards 𝐻 𝐸 represents the reduction in available owner-occupied housing stock. The cost to
convert a property from owner-occupied to a rental is negligible, so institutional investors can
easily convert a house to a rental property, and vice-versa when the market rebounds. However,
when institutional investors purchase and convert houses to rentals they pay cash and no longer
benefit from owner-occupied housing’s preferential tax treatment. As such, institutional investors
pay lower prices relative to homeowners for owner-occupied housing. The difference in price
represents owner-occupied housing’s asset illiquidity risk.
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[Insert Figure 2]
As institutional investors purchase owner-occupied houses and convert them to rental
housing they reduce the available owner-occupied housing stock and push the market back
towards equilibrium. In my model, institutional investors target owner-occupied housing with the
highest anticipated yields based on (1) expectations of mean reversion in prices and (2) rental
income.24 In doing so, institutional investors impose a disciplining effect by reducing the
available housing stock. As the housing stock shifts inward to 𝐻 # , prices move up the demand
curve from C towards 𝐶 # , thereby reducing the relative price divergence.25 Thus, the model
supports institutional investors’ expectations of mean reverting prices.
If the market’s population continues to grow and the single-family housing market begins
to recover, the model predicts that demand will gradually increase. As demand increases, prices
will move up the supply curve from 𝐶 # to 𝐸 # . As prices increase and demand grows, some
institutional investors will convert their properties back to owner-occupied housing by listing
them for sale instead of renting them out. As institutional investors reintroduce the converted
houses back to the owner-occupied housing market they gradually shift the available housing
stock back towards 𝐻 𝐵 . As institutional investors convert and sell their rental properties to
owner-occupiers prices will move up the demand curve from 𝐸 # to B.
6. Data
The analysis in this paper focuses on single-family detached homes in the Atlanta, GA
metropolitan area.26 Atlanta is the ideal setting for this study as it attracted considerable
institutional investment after the real estate crash. In their examination of large “buy-to-rent”
investors, Mills, Molloy and Zarutskie (2015) find that Atlanta had the second highest buy-torent market share in 2012 – only Phoenix, AZ (6.5%) had a higher market share than Atlanta’s
I examine institutional investors’ expected returns in Section 6.
If lending standards are tightened or unemployment increases, the demand for housing will decrease and the
demand curve will shift inwards resulting in lower prices (Haughwout et al. 2012). Regardless, owner-occupied
houses redeployed as rental housing will reduce the available owner-occupied housing stock and prices will increase
up the ‘reduced’ demand curve.
26
I focus on single-family detached housing for several reasons. First, single-family detached housing is the largest
property type in the United States, representing 63.1% of the occupied housing stock (ACS 2006). Second, singlefamily detached housing is synonymous with owner-occupied housing as 86.9% of its stock was owner-occupied
prior to the real estate crisis (ACS 2006). Third, single-family detached housing gained the largest market share after
the real estate crash.
24
25
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6.4%. In 2013, Atlanta (11.6%) had the second highest market share again - Winston-Salem, NC
(12.2%) had the highest market share. In 2014, Atlanta (5.0%) had the fourth highest buy-to-rent
market share - only Charlotte, NC (6.6%), Jacksonville, FL (6.6%), and Memphis, TN (5.1%)
outpaced Atlanta (Mills et. al 2015).27
Atlanta’s housing market is also very similar to the United States market as a whole. As
displayed in Table 2, 36.5% of occupied housing units were rentals in both Atlanta and the
United States in 2013. In addition, prior to the real estate crash single-family detached housing’s
market share in Atlanta and the United States were nearly identical (25.4% in Atlanta versus
25.9% in the United States in 2007). In 2013, single-family detached rental properties accounted
for 31.7% of the Atlanta rental market after experiencing a 25.2% increase in the number of
rental units between 2007 and 2013. Single-family detached rental housing also grew across the
United States, albeit at a slower pace of 11.2% over the same time period, accounting for 28.8%
of the rental market in 2013.
[Insert Table 2]
The data for this study comes from several sources. The first two sources are datasets
compiled by CoreLogic. The first CoreLogic dataset contains county tax assessor records. The
tax assessor dataset includes parcel level information for every property in the eighteen counties
that comprise the Atlanta, Georgia metropolitan market.28 The parcel file specifies whether there
is a structure built on the property and, if so, the type of structure (single-family detached, multifamily, commercial, etc.). The parcel file also includes detailed information about the physical
characteristics of the structure, such as the square feet of living area, number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms, and its lot size.
The second CoreLogic dataset includes every property transaction recorded in the
eighteen counties from January 1st, 2000 through December 31st, 2014. I use several fields in the
dataset to identify and isolate single-family detached sales transactions. After applying several
27

Atlanta was the clear leader in terms of institutional investor purchase volume. Mills et al. (2015) estimate that
institutional investors purchased approximately 17,660 single-family homes in metro-Atlanta from 2012-2014. Of
the other markets listed – institutional investment volume was second highest in Tampa, FL where they purchased
approximately 7,498 single-family homes from 2012-2014 (*Note: only the top 10 markets are listed for each year
so it is possible that a market that was only listed once or twice had a higher volume than Tampa, FL).
28
The counties included in the dataset are Barrow, Bartow, Carroll, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb,
Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, Newton, Paulding, Rockdale, and Walton. A map of the
counties is available in Appendix A.
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filters that remove (i) single-family attached, multi-family, and commercial sales transactions,
(ii) interfamily transactions, and (iii) non-purchase transactions, the final dataset includes
approximately 1.25 million sales transactions. The data is well suited for the issues I address in
this paper as it contains detailed information about the parties involved in the transaction (i.e.
buyer and seller), terms of the transaction, and the type of deed conveyed. Thus, I can determine
whether an owner-occupier or investor purchased the property, it was part of a portfolio sale, or
it was a foreclosure, REO, or short sale.
The third data source I utilize was provided by the Georgia Multiple Listing Service
(GAMLS). The GAMLS dataset includes houses that were listed for sale or rent in the eighteen
counties in and around Atlanta, GA. The GAMLS sales data is available between 2000 and 2014
and the rental data is available between 2003 and 2014. The data collected from the GAMLS
includes detailed property characteristics (bedrooms, baths, etc.), listing information (list date,
sale date, etc.), and sale conditions (foreclosure, REO, etc.). As noted by Levitt and Syverson
(2008), MLS data is manually entered by real estate agents and is prone to error. Thus, I augment
and validate the MLS records with the CoreLogic tax assessor and sales transaction data.
6.1 Repeat Sales House Price Index
I create a quarterly repeat sales housing price index using the CoreLogic sales transaction
data that includes all single-family detached houses that were listed and sold at least twice during
the sample period of 2000 to 2014. The initial dataset contains 1,255,075 sales transactions, over
30% of which are attributable to houses that only sold once during the sample period. After
creating matched pairs, I remove records whose sales transactions occurred within six months of
each other. The final repeat sales sample includes 420,809 records. Following Case and Shiller
(1989) I estimate the index as follows:
Log(

𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑓

) =∑𝑞 𝛽𝑞 𝐷𝑖𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑓 ,

where 𝐷𝑖𝑞 = {

q = 1, 2, … , Q

1, if 𝑞 = 𝑡
−1, if 𝑞 = 𝑓
0, otherwise

𝑃𝑖𝑓 is the price of property i at the time of the first sale f
𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the price of property i at the time of the second sale t
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(13)

𝛽𝑞 is the estimated coefficient for quarter q
Q is the number of quarters in the study period
𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑓 is the error term
I report exponentiated values that are scaled to 100 in relation to the first quarter of 2001. Figure
3 presents the results for Equation 13 in the form of a repeat sales index. House prices in Atlanta
were relatively stable through the early to mid-2000s, increasing an average of 5.8% per year
from 2000 to 2006. Although Atlanta’s prices did not increase as much as other cities during its
boom period, its bust period was equally dramatic. House prices dropped by almost 50% during
the real estate crisis and remained at levels below those experienced in 2001 until the second
quarter of 2014.
[Insert Figure 3]
Single-family detached sales volume mirrored the growth of house prices as displayed in
Figure 4. The total volume of sales in the Atlanta metro area rose steadily from 2000 through the
second quarter of 2006, peaking at 32,831 quarterly sales transactions. Sales volume dropped
dramatically during the real estate crash as the percent of distressed sales rose rapidly, reaching
as high as 74.3% in the fourth quarter of 2010. Both home prices and sales volume increased
after 2012 and were approaching their pre-boom levels in the final quarter of 2014.
[Insert Figure 4]
6.2 Classification of Sales Transactions
Much of the analysis going forward relies on the correct identification and classification
of owner-occupiers and investors. As such, I meticulously identify and assign each transaction as
follows. To identify owner-occupiers I rely on a field provided in the CoreLogic dataset. I also
perform a validation using the legal mailing address of the properties that were flagged by
CoreLogic as owner-occupied (where available). The validation checks whether an owneroccupier’s mailing address is simultaneously used as the legal mailing address for two or more

19

additional properties in the dataset.29 If so, I assume those properties are not owner-occupied. If
the owner-occupier’s legal mailing address does not match any of the property addresses I
assume that the first single-family house purchased by the owner-occupier is their primary
residence and the remaining properties are investments.
All single-family detached housing transactions not attributed to owner-occupiers are
considered investor activity. I segment the investor transactions into two categories using an
indicator variable available in the CoreLogic dataset. The indicator variable identifies all
transactions in which the buyer is a corporate entity. If the indicator variable is 0, the transaction
is assigned to an individual investor. If the indicator variable is 1, I further segment the corporate
entity transactions into one of four investor subcategories: government/non-profit, financial
institution, institutional investor, or corporate investor. Government and non-profit transactions
include all purchases by government entities, such as local city and county governments, as well
as purchases by non-profit groups, such as Habitat for Humanity. Financial institution
transactions include all purchases by credit unions, securitized mortgage trusts, and banks.
To identify institutional investors I take a more granular approach as they are the primary
group of interest in this study. I classify a purchaser as an institutional investor if they (i) entered
the Atlanta housing market after the real estate crash, (ii) raised equity to invest in single-family
detached housing, (iii) purchased 200 or more single-family detached houses, and (iv) had a
publicly stated investment strategy of converting the houses they purchased to rentals.30 After
identifying eleven institutional investors, I associate all their transactions to their parent company
to ensure the classification is comprehensive and accurate.31 If the company is publicly traded, I

The legal mailing address is where the property’s owner receives property tax statements from the county. I
cleanse the legal mailing addresses using an address verification system to remove typos and to ensure consistency
in the dataset.
30
I investigated every company that purchased more than 25 single-family detached houses from 2007 to 2014.
Several companies had more than 200 combined purchases, but were not classified as an institutional investor if
their investment strategy differed. Opportunistic investors that purchased houses and sold them in a short period of
time (i.e. flippers) are not included. In addition, local investors that already had a portfolio of single-family detached
houses prior to the real estate crisis are not included in the classification. Thus, the classification identifies the
institutional investors discussed in section 4.
31
The companies included in the institutional investor classification include American Homes 4 Rent, American
Residential Properties, Colony American Homes (Colony Capital), Invitation Homes (Blackstone Group), Main
Street Revival (Amherst Holdings), Progress Residential, Silver Bay Realty Trust, Starwood Waypoint Residential
Trust, Havenbrook Homes, Residential Capital Management, and Sylvan Road Capital. The first eight companies
listed above match the eight companies identified as “buy-to-rent” investors by Mills, Molloy, and Zarutskie (2015).
29
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identify and search the transaction records for every asset company name listed in their SEC
filings. If the company is private, I search their website for rental properties, look up the
properties’ owner in the CoreLogic dataset, and flag the asset company name as a known
subsidiary of the institutional investor (I also perform this task for institutional investors that are
public companies to ensure I capture all of their transactions). If a transaction is not assigned to
the government/non-profit, financial institution, or institutional investor classifications it is
placed in the corporate investor classification. A breakdown of sales transactions by buyer type
is available in Table 3, which I discuss in detail in the next section.
6.3 Atlanta’s Housing Stock and Investor Activity
Increasing house prices incentivized new development in the Atlanta market during the
early to mid-2000s as displayed in Table 3. The number of new single-family detached houses
introduced to the market remained relatively steady from 2000 to 2006, peaking at 48,245 new
units in 2006. The new houses represented an annual supply growth of approximately 4%, when
compared to Atlanta’s housing stock in 2000, and may explain why Atlanta’s house prices did
not rise as rapidly as other cities during the real estate boom. Development slowed during the
real estate crisis as prices crashed and the number of financial institution transactions nearly
doubled from 2005 to 2007. The number of individual and corporate investor transactions also
increased rapidly after the crash, almost doubling from an average of 6,321 purchases per year
(2000-2006) to 12,370 purchases per year (2012-2014).
[Insert Table 3]
6.3.1 Institutional Investment
Several market factors likely influenced institutional investors’ decision to enter the
single-family detached housing market including declining house prices, decreasing multi-family
vacancy rates, a large number of delinquent borrowers, the capital markets acceptance of
investments in residential Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), the prospect of bulk purchases,
and higher expected returns relative to apartment buildings. The repeat sales price index in
Figure 3 shows that house prices were falling in 2011 and bottomed out in the first quarter of

Appendix A includes a brief description of the institutional investors included in this study and the location of the
houses that they purchased.
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2012 – which corresponds with the entrance of institutional investors.32 Figure 5 shows that
demand for rentals was increasing as multi-family vacancy rates decreased from 13.1% in the
third quarter of 2009 down to 10.3% in the first quarter of 2012. In addition, there was very little
multi-family construction in the pipeline. From 2000 through 2008, approximately 74,000 new
multi-family units were started each quarter. In contrast, approximately 30,000 new multi-family
units were started each quarter from 2009 through 2011.
[Insert Figure 5]
Figure 1 shows that over 10% of homeowners were delinquent in 2011. The increased
demand for rentals was expected to continue because the delinquent homeowners would likely
become renters after they were foreclosed on. The delinquencies also meant that a large supply
of distressed single-family detached housing would be available for purchase in the near future.
The upcoming liquidation of distressed single-family detached housing combined with an
increasing demand for rentals and decreasing rental vacancies offered a unique opportunity for
large scale investment in and conversion of single-family detached housing.
Another potential draw for institutional investors was the capital market’s acceptance of
residential REITS. In January 2007, residential REITs accounted for $67 billion or 16.8% of the
equity REIT market capitalization (NAREIT 2007).33 Prior to the real estate crash, residential
REITs included apartment and manufactured home REITs. There were no single-family rental
REITs, but the market had a history of accepting and investing in new asset classes.34 The
growth and innovation of capital markets may have played a role in institutional investors’
entrance into the owner-occupied housing market in 2012.
Table 3 highlights the entry of institutional investors into the Atlanta owner-occupied
housing market. Over a four year period, 2011 to 2014, institutional investors purchased 21,283
single-family detached houses in the metro Atlanta area. Although institutional investors
purchased a few properties in late 2011, it wasn’t until 2012 when they truly entered the Atlanta
market and accounted for over 5% of all the single-family detached housing transactions. In
32

The repeat sales price index in Figure 3 only includes sales transactions for metro-Atlanta. However, the start of
Atlanta’s housing market recovery coincides with the start of the recovery nationwide
33
In December 2014, residential REITs accounted for $108 billion or 12.9% of the equity REIT market
capitalization (NAREIT 2014).
34
Single-family rental REITs are listed in the ‘diversified’ sector and not the ‘residential’ sector. Additional
information about institutional investors who became single-family rental REITs is available in Appendix A.
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2013, institutional investment in Atlanta more than doubled, accounting for over 13% of all the
sales transactions in the market. Competition among investors and increasing prices curtailed
institutional investment in 2014, although they still accounted for over 8% of all single-family
detached sales transactions.
The publicly stated investment strategy of the institutional investors included in this study
is to purchase single-family detached homes and operate them as rentals.35 Prior to the real estate
crash, it was difficult for institutional investors to amass a portfolio of single-family detached
rental homes – as they usually were only available through one-off sales. Thus, the single-family
rental market remained fragmented in terms of both ownership and operation until after the real
estate crash when institutional investors had several avenues in which they could purchase and
build a portfolio of single-family detach rentals quickly including: individual sales, auctions,
short sales listed on the MLS, trustee sales (foreclosed and tax sale properties), bank-owned
houses listed on the MLS, bank-owned houses purchased directly from banks, and in some cases
bulk sales.36,37
Institutional investors purchased single-family detached houses in Atlanta through
several avenues as displayed in Table 4. Approximately 46.7% of their purchases were
foreclosures, 7.9% were REOs, 7.8% were short sales, and 5.5% were part of a bulk purchase.38
Of the remaining non-distressed transactions approximately 18.8% were purchased directly from
an owner-occupier, 12.7% were purchased from an investor who already converted the property
to a rental, and 0.6% were purchased from investors who owned and rented the house prior to
2007. The largest institutional investor in Atlanta was the Blackstone Group, through their
Invitation Homes subsidiary. The Blackstone Group accounted for over one-third of all
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See, for example, the American Homes 4 Rent website - https://www.americanhomes4rent.com/ - which states
that they are “focused on acquiring, renovating, leasing and operating attractive, single-family homes as rental
properties.”
36
Citing a 1996 Property Owners and Managers Survey, Mills et al. (2015) state that three quarters of the singlefamily detached rental units were owned by individuals or partnerships that owned fewer than 10 units.
37
Auctions, short sales, trustee sales, and bank-owned sales were available prior to the real estate crash – but their
volume paled in comparison to their post-crash volume (see Figure 4).
38
I use the same definition of a bulk sale as Mills et al. (2015). I consider a transaction part of a bulk sale if there are
three or more properties with the exact same transaction price, sales date, and buyer name with a sales amount
greater than $225,000. I modify the sales price of each property that is part of a bulk sale to reflect the average price
paid per house – because the sales price is estimated I remove bulk sales in most of the empirical analysis. If a
property is listed as a bulk sale and a foreclosure it is only displayed in Table 4 as a bulk sale.
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institutional purchases and was the primary bulk purchaser in Atlanta.39 Although bulk sales only
represented 5.5% of institutional investors’ single-family purchases in the Atlanta - the prospect
of bulk purchases may have drawn institutional investors into the market. In February 2012, the
Federal Housing Financing Authority (FHFA) and Fannie Mae announced a REO-to-Rental Pilot
Initiative to determine if bulk sales would generate private investment in single-family rental
housing.40
[Insert Table 4]
6.4 Institutional Investors’ Expected Return
The liquidation of distressed single-family housing may offer a unique investment
opportunity, but institutional investors are rational and will only enter the owner-occupied
market if it offers higher returns than apartment buildings in the rental market. In this section, I
compare institutional investors’ competing investment alternatives in rental housing (apartment
buildings) with owner-occupied housing (single-family detached houses).
6.4.1 Mean Reversion Expectations
To examine institutional investors’ mean reversion expectations I use the same dataset
described in Section 6.2 to create a repeat sales index by investor type. The results displayed in
Figure 6 show that institutional investors were able to identify and purchase single-family
detached houses that offered higher expected mean reverting returns relative to individual
investors and owner-occupiers. Institutional investors place a lower value on owner-occupied
housing because they must convert it to rental housing, so the higher expected mean reverting
returns are a product of, among other things, owner-occupied housing’s asset illiquidity and
preferential tax treatment.
[Insert Figure 6]

The overwhelming majority of Blackstone’s transactions that are flagged as bulk purchases can be attributed to
one deal that they completed in April 2013 with Building and Land Technology’s single-family rental business.
40
Additional information on the REO-to-Rental Pilot Initiative is available on the FHFA website:
http://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Policy/Pages/Real-Estate-Owned-(REO).aspx. Although bulk sales
would allow institutional investors to build a large portfolio of single-family detached homes quickly – investors
may shy away from bulk sales if the properties included in the sale were not in their target markets or if the
properties were spread across large geographical areas - as it would undermine their stated goal of creating
economies of scale.
39
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Figure 7 plots an annual repeat sales index that that has been stratified into twenty home
size segments based on each houses’ square feet of living area. The stratified home size segments
are a proxy for housing quality and that help identify the housing segments that institutional
investors targeted. I stratify the home size segments in ascending order, so the smaller the house
is, the lower the percentile it is segmented into (i.e. 0-5 percentile contains the smallest houses
and 95-100 percentile contains the largest houses). Although the boom period in Atlanta was
relatively mild compared to other cities, Figure 7 suggests that prices in two segments of
Atlanta’s single-family detached housing market, the 0-5 and 5-10 percentile, increased at a rate
much higher than the rest of the market. The same two segments also experienced the largest
decline during the crash.
[Insert Figure 7]
Next, I quantify and compare the mean reversion expectations by home size segment and
buyer type in Table 5. The top section of Table 5 is stratified into the same twenty home size
segments that correspond with Figure 7 – it details each home size segments’ size distribution,
number of properties purchased by institutional investors, and mean reversion expectations.
Although institutional investors were active in every home size segment, the majority (over 85%)
of their purchases fell in the 5-75 percentile range. The top right section of Table 5 provides the
price index levels by home size segment for the pre-boom index level (𝑃𝐸 ) in 2001, the pre-crash
price apex (𝑃𝐵 ) in 2006, the post-crash nadir (𝑃𝐶 ) in 2012, and the recovery price in (𝑃𝑅 ) in
2014. I also calculate each home size segment’s pre-crash price appreciation (𝑃𝐵 - 𝑃𝐸 ), postcrash price depreciation (𝑃𝐶 - 𝑃𝐵 ), and mean reversion expectations in 2012 (𝑃𝐸 - 𝑃𝐶 ) and 2014
(𝑃𝐸 - 𝑃𝑅 ). The last two columns of Table 5 clearly show that smaller houses offered higher
expected mean reversion returns in both 2012 and 2014. The monotonic price declines explain
why institutional investors preferred smaller houses and were not as active in the 75-100
percentile home size segments.
[Insert Table 5]
In the bottom section of Table 5 I create price index levels by buyer type to compare
institutional, corporate, and individual investors. The price index levels correspond with the
repeat sales index in Figure 6. When institutional investors entered the Atlanta market in 2012
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their expected return, based on mean reversion to pre-boom price levels in 2001, was 46% for the
properties they purchased, which outpaced individual investors (36%) and was comparable to
corporate investors (48%). The results support the asset illiquidity framework in Section 4, as
institutional investors paid lower prices and demanded higher expected returns compared to
owner-occupiers and local landlords (i.e. individual investors).
6.4.2 Income-producing Expectations
Although the expectation of large capital gains played a role in institutional investors’
entrance into the owner-occupied housing market, housing’s income-producing component is
equally, if not more, important to institutional investors because, unlike the capital appreciation
component, it is not affected by market illiquidity. To examine the income-producing component
of owner-occupied housing, I calculate its gross rent-price ratio and compare institutional
investors’ competing real estate investment alternatives both before and after the crash. Rentprice ratios are a fundamental component of real estate returns and have a major role in
investor’s portfolio management decisions (Plazzi, Torous and Valkanov 2011). When
comparing rent-price ratios, I restrict the sample to single-family detached houses that were both
sold and rented within six months of each other.41 The approach allows me to compare actual
rent-price ratios over time across investor and property types.
I identify 10,144 single-family detached houses that were both sold and rented within six
months of each other in the MLS rental and CoreLogic sales data. Summary statistics for the
combined dataset and rent-price matches are displayed in Table 6. The median rent for a singlefamily detached house in the matched rental dataset is $1,150, which is identical to the median
rent in the complete rental dataset. The median sales price for the matched dataset is much lower
($109,900) than the median sales price in the entire dataset ($154,670). However, the matched
dataset is heavily weighted towards post-crash prices, whereas, the entire dataset is more evenly
distributed. This is expected as single-family detached houses were not frequently purchased as
rental properties prior to the real estate crash. Table 6 also provides summary statistics by period
for the matched and entire dataset - including the median gross rent-price ratio for the boom,
bust, and recovery time periods. The median rent was relatively flat over the three periods,
41

My approach to calculating rent-price ratio is similar to the approach employed by Bracke (2014) in his study of
the central London Housing market.
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however, house prices declined after the real estate crash. As a result, the median gross rent-price
ratio increased from 10% during the boom to 14% during the recovery.
[Insert Table 6]
Next I compare rent-price ratios for owner-occupied housing (single-family detached)
and rental housing (apartment buildings) over the length of the study. If rents are relatively stable
across the two housing submarkets, the model predicts that as owner-occupied house prices
decrease, institutional investors will substitute some of their investment in rental housing with
single-family detached rentals, thereby determining owner-occupied housing’s liquidation value.
I calculate the gross rent-price ratio for apartment buildings using data from CoStar for the
Atlanta market from 2003 to 2014. Table 7 provides an overview of the gross rent-price ratio for
apartment buildings in the Atlanta market by period. The CoStar data includes a total of 277
transactions over the 12 year period.
[Insert Table 7]
From 2003 to 2006, the median rent-price ratio for apartment buildings was
approximately 15% (compared to 10% for single-family detached housing). After the crash, the
median rent-price ratio dropped to 11%, which was 2% lower than the single-family detached
housing market. During the recovery, 2012 to 2014, the median rent-price ratio rose to 17%,
once again exceeding single-family detached housing. In Figure 8, I plot the rent-price ratios for
the two property types. In the mid-2000s, the rent-price ratios for apartments are clearly superior
to those offered by single-family detached housing. However, after the crash rent-price ratios for
single-family detached houses rose rapidly and exceeded those offered by apartment buildings
until the third quarter of 2013.
[Insert Figure 8]
In Figure 9, I examine the single-family detached gross rent-price ratios by investor type.
In the mid-2000s, prior to the real estate crash, rent-price ratios averaged approximately 10%
regardless of investor type. After the real estate crash, rent-price ratios climbed rapidly and
peaked in 2011 when both corporate and individual investors purchased properties with gross
rent-price ratios above 20%. In 2012, institutional investors entered the market and started to
build their large single-family detached rental portfolios. The introduction of a new market
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participant increased competition and likely contributed to the sharp decline in rent-price ratios
for single-family detached houses.
[Insert Figure 9]
6.4.3 Expected Returns
In Table 8, I provide a rough estimate of institutional investors’ expected return that
includes both their expected rental income and capital appreciation yields. For simplicity’s sake,
I assume that rents will remain the same over time, so an investors’ rental yield equals the
houses’ rent-price ratio when it was purchased. Investors’ capital appreciation yield is calculated
based on the assumption that house prices will revert back to 2001 levels. To allow for a back of
the envelope comparison and keep things simple, I divide the mean reversion expectation by the
investors’ holding period. I estimate the mean reversion return using holding periods of 3, 5, and
10 years. I tabulate the returns for houses purchased in 2012, 2013, and 2014 separately as
market conditions changed over time.
[Insert Table 8]
In 2012, institutional investors’ expected returns were particularly attractive. If
institutional investors hold their purchases until 2017 (5 years) and house prices revert back to
2001 levels, they will receive an annualized gross return of approximately 23.7%. Given the fact
that house prices in some segments have already reverted back to their 2001 levels in the Atlanta
market, I believe this is a reasonable, if not conservative, assumption. If the market returns to its
pre-crash (2006) levels by 2017, institutional investors’ gross return would increase to a 26.6%
annualized return. In 2013 and 2014, the Atlanta market started to recover, so the rental and
capital appreciation returns available to institutional investors in single-family detached housing
decreased. In 2013, single-family detached housing yields were still clearly favorable relative to
the yields offered by apartment buildings in the Atlanta market. However, in 2014 a sharp
increase in apartment building yields combined with the increase in house prices made the two
markets’ returns comparable.42

42

To allow for ease of comparison, I assume that the apartment buildings included in the analysis were operating at
capacity when purchased and their rent-price ratio will stay the same over time. Thus, the rent-price ratio listed
represents the investors’ expected return.
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I recognize that a portion of the higher return offered by single-family detached rental
housing may be offset by higher renovation, maintenance, and operating expenses. However, due
to a lack of available data, I cannot quantify and compare the impact of single-family detached
housing’s higher expenses on its return. Instead, I assume renovation costs of 20% of the
purchase price for single-family detached housing and recalculate institutional investors’
expected income and appreciation yields in Table 8.43 I also assume that the renovation adds no
value and has no impact on the yield – this assumption is made to highlight the attractiveness of
the investment opportunity.44 After adjusting for renovation costs, institutional investors’ returns
still outpace returns offered by apartment buildings in the Atlanta market in 2012 and 2013,
regardless of the holding period chosen.
7. Empirical Methodology and Results
The intuition behind the identification strategy employed in the empirical analysis going
forward can be understood through a simple example. Consider two single-family detached
houses which I will refer to as house A and house B. The two houses have similar physical
characteristics and are located in the same neighborhood. Initially, both houses are owneroccupied and benefit from preferential tax treatment. Then suppose there is a crisis in which
house prices rapidly decline and mortgage defaults increase. As a result of the crisis, demand
simultaneously decreases for owner-occupied housing and increases for rental housing. Next
suppose that house A and house B are both put on the market by their respective homeowners
and are sold around the same time. House A is purchased by an owner-occupier and house B is
purchased by an institutional investor. The institutional investor converts house B to a rental. As
noted in Section 4, institutional investors incur an extra set of costs when investing in singlefamily detached housing and, because they convert the house to a rental, they do not benefit from
the preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. Thus, I expect institutional investors
43

According to their 2014 Annual Report, Starwood Waypoint spent, on average, 17% of the purchase price of a
house on its renovation to ensure it was in “rent ready” condition. In Atlanta, which is Starwood Waypoint’s second
largest market in terms of aggregate investment ($312 mm), they spent 24% of the purchase price, on average, to
renovate their homes (Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust 2014). I use a 20% renovation estimate as I do not
know what other institutional investors’ spent on renovation costs and I am not adjusting the comparison group
(apartment buildings) for renovation costs.
44
Institutional investors would never rationally renovate under these conditions. If institutional investors expect zero
NPV, then the discounted cash flows post-renovation, including price reversion and increased rents, should equal the
cost of renovation – in which case the institutional investor’s return would be similar to their expected return in the
absence of the renovation costs.
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to pay a lower price for owner-occupied housing – in which the pricing differential represents an
estimate of owner-occupied housing’s asset illiquidity risk.
7.1 Single-family Detached Rental Conversions
Prior to running the empirical analysis I identify owner-occupied houses that were
converted to rentals. Several obstacles exist in identifying these conversions. Although I
identified institutional investor transactions and I know that institutional investors plan on
renting the houses they purchase based on their publicly stated investment strategy - I have yet to
determine whether the houses they purchased were conversions. It’s possible that a portion of the
houses institutional investors purchased were rental properties for the entire length of the study.
Another obstacle is determining whether individual and corporate investors convert the houses
they purchase to rental properties because investment strategies vary both across and within the
two groups of investors. Thus, I recognize that the identification and categorization of
conversions in my analysis is not perfect. However, I develop a set of reasonable assumptions to
classify every single-family detached house as either (i) owner-occupied, (ii) rental [Rent], (iii)
owner-occupied to rental [O2R] conversion, or (iv) rental to owner-occupied [R2O] conversion.
I begin the classification process by identifying houses that have no transactions during
the study period. If a house has no transactions and is owner-occupied in 2014, I classify it as
owner-occupied. If a house is investor-owned in 2014, I classify it as a rental. Approximately
51.8%, or 724,060, of the 1,399,067 single-family houses in the Atlanta metro market did not
transact between 2000 and 2014. Of the non-transacting houses, approximately 84.6% are
owner-occupied and 15.4% are rentals. Next I classify houses that only transacted during the precrisis subperiod (2000-2006). Approximately 21.3%, or 297,433 houses transacted during the
pre-crisis subperiod, but did not transact in the post-crisis subperiod (2007-2014). Of these
houses, approximately 82.9% are owner-occupied and 17.1% are rentals.
The remaining 377,574 houses transacted at least once in the post-crisis subperiod and
therefore may be a conversion. Using the CoreLogic tax assessor and transaction data I begin by
identifying the houses’ baseline tenure status in the pre-crisis (2000-2006) subperiod. I classify a
house as pre-crisis owner-occupied if the house was owner-occupied for more than five years
from 2000 to 2006. I classify a house as a pre-crisis rental if it was investor owned for two or
more of the seven years in the pre-crisis subperiod. Each houses’ pre-crisis tenure serves as a
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baseline for the identification strategy where a house is classified as (i) owner-occupied if it was
owner-occupied pre-crisis and post-crisis; (ii) rental if it was a rental pre-crisis and post-crisis; or
(iii) conversion if it was owner-occupied (rental) pre-crisis and converted to rental (owneroccupied) post-crisis.45 I estimate that approximately 76,138 houses, or 5.5% of metro Atlanta’s
single-family detached housing stock, were converted from owner-occupied to rental [O2R] from
2007 to 2014 and 5,328 houses were converted from rental to owner-occupied housing [R2O].
The total number of O2R conversions I identify is comparable to the single-family detached
housing growth highlighted in Table 2. The American Community Survey (ACS) estimates that
the number of occupied single-family detached rental houses in Atlanta increased by
approximately 75,873 between 2007 and 2013.
7.2 Transaction Data and Matched Samples
After classifying every single-family detached house into one of four categories I merge
the classifications with the sales transaction data. When running the empirical analysis in the
following sections I remove records with missing data in a key field. I also remove houses that
have more than six bedrooms or bathrooms, more than five acres of land, and winsorize the top
and bottom .5 percent of sales prices. Select summary statistics for the full sample and two
matched samples are displayed in Table 9 - where the treatment group in columns 1, 4, and 7 of
the top section represent houses classified as owner-occupied to rental [O2R] conversions and the
treatment group in the bottom section of Table 9 identifies houses that were purchased by
institutional investors [Institution]. The control group in column 2 of the top section includes all
sales transactions that were not included in the treatment group. The large t-statistics in column 3
- which compare the difference between the means of the treatment and control groups highlight a potential sample selection issue. To address this potential issue I create matched
samples for houses classified as O2R conversions in the top section of the table and houses
purchased by institutional investors in the bottom section of the table.

45

A pre-crisis owner-occupied house is classified as an O2R Conversion if (i) it was purchased by an investor(s) and
held for a total of at least two years in the post-crisis period, (ii) it was purchased by an investor in 2013 and held
through the end of the study period, or (iii) it was purchased by an institutional investor whose investment strategy is
to buy and rent single-family housing. Thus, if a house was owner-occupied in the pre-crisis period, purchased by an
investor in 2010, held by the investor for six months, and then sold to an owner-occupier – it would not be classified
as a conversion. The number of conversions may be understated as first time non-institutional investor purchases in
2014 are not classified as conversions due to an “unknown” holding period.
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[Insert Table 9]
I create the matched samples using two matching processes. The first process is a
characteristic matching technique that identifies every unique combination of the following
characteristics in the treatment group: transaction year, census block-group, number of bedrooms
and number of bathrooms. I then limit the control sample to only include owner-occupied houses
that match at least one of the records in the treatment group on every characteristic.46 The second
matching process I employ matches each observation in the characteristic matched treatment
group with its nearest neighbor in the control group using a one-to-one propensity score
matching technique with replacement.47 The second matching process requires an exact match on
the census block-group and transaction year fields – if there is no exact match the treatment
record is dropped. If there are multiple exact matches the process then identifies the nearest
neighbor by calculating a propensity score using the following fields: age, living area, lot size,
bedrooms, and bathrooms. The second matching process is executed with replacement, so there
are duplicate observations in the control sample. This approach increases the matching precision,
but results in fewer independent control observations. As noted in Wiley (2014), having fewer
independent control observations reduces the likelihood of finding statistically significant
differences between the two groups (i.e. selection bias), but it does so at the expense of statistical
power. The t-statistics for the matched samples are reported in columns 6 and 9 of Table 9. The
t-statistics are smaller in magnitude which suggests that running the empirical analysis on the
matched samples will help address potential empirical problems that may result from sample
selection bias.
7.3 Transaction Level Analysis of Institutional Investor and Conversion Activity
In this section I examine the transaction-level correlates of institutional investor
purchases and conversion activity using a series of linear probability models (LPM):
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = c + ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡

(14a)

46

Houses purchased in bulk sales were removed from both the treatment and control groups in both the
characteristic and nearest neighbor matching processes. I remove bulk purchases in the majority of the analysis
going forward because their transaction price is estimated and they represent a small fraction of the transactions
during the time period.
47
Propensity score matching techniques (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) have been been employed in residential
(McMillen 2012) and commercial (Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010; Wiley 2014) real estate studies.
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𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = c + ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡

(14b)

𝑂2𝑅𝑖 = c + ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡

(14c)

where 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the house was purchased by an
institutional investor and 0 otherwise, 𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if
the house was purchased by a non-institutional investor and 0 otherwise, and 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the house was pre-crisis owner-occupied and converted to a
rental after the crisis and 0 otherwise. In all three LPM specifications c is a constant, 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
represents a vector of K transaction level characteristics that are potentially related to conversion
activity, 𝐹𝑡 represents year fixed effects, and ε𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The specifications provide
insight into the house characteristics and neighborhood attributes that institutional and noninstitutional investors targeted. Institutional investors entered the Atlanta housing market in late2011, so the correlate estimates displayed in Table 10 only include sales transactions from the
beginning of 2012 through the end of 2014. The results in columns 1 and 3 are based on (14a),
column 2 is based on (14b), and column 4 is based on (14c).
[Insert Table 10]
The property level characteristics in 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 include the house’s age, square feet of living
area, square feet of lot size, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms and indicator variables
for whether the house has a fireplace, garage, carport or pool. The results in column 1 suggest
that institutional investors targeted 3 to 6 bedroom houses with 2 or 3 bathrooms and a garage.
The presence of a carport or pool reduced the probability that the house would be purchased by
an institutional investor. Houses located on larger lots were also less likely to be purchased by
institutional investors. In most cases, non-institutional investors targeted houses with similar
physical characteristics – however, column 2 suggests that they were more likely to purchase
older houses with more bathrooms that do not have a garage.
In addition to the houses’ physical characteristics - 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 includes distressed sales
condition and neighborhood variables. The distressed sale condition variables identify whether
the transaction was a short sale, foreclosure, REO, or part of a bulk sale and include a measure of
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the percent of distressed sales transactions over the past six months.48 The results in column 1
show that a house was more likely to be purchased by an institutional investor if it was a bulk
sale, foreclosure, or short sale. Houses that were REOs were less likely purchased by
institutional investors – although they were more likely to be purchased by non-institutional
investors. Both institutional and non-institutional investors targeted houses located in census
tracts with higher levels of distressed sales transactions – which suggests that they were
providing liquidity to the market.
The following neighborhood controls from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey
are also included in 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 at the census tract level: unemployment rate, percent of household with
kids, median income, median age, percent of population without a high school degree, and
percent of the population with a college degree. The results in column 1 suggest that a house was
more likely to be purchased by an institutional investor if it was located in a census tract with
higher levels of unemployment – which serves as another proxy for distressed market conditions
- and a higher percentage of households with children.
Additional census tract level variables were constructed to examine the neighborhoods
that institutional investors purchased single-family detached houses in. Census tracts’ gross rentprice ratio was calculated as the median census tract rent from 2012 to 2014 divided by the
median census tract transaction price in the year that the house was purchased.49 The results in
column 1 suggest that institutional investors did not purchase houses located in neighborhoods
with the highest rent-price ratios – which collaborates with the transaction-level rent-price
estimates displayed in Figure 9. Attractive rent-price ratios likely attracted institutional investors
into the single-family detached housing market, but it was not the deciding factor in their
purchase decisions. Houses located in zip codes with higher mean reversion expectations were
more likely to be purchased by institutional investors.50 Note, however, that non-institutional
investors were more likely to purchase houses in zip codes with higher mean reversion
The ‘Percent Distressed Prev 6 Months’ variable is measured at the census tract level as the number of distressed
sales transactions over the past six months divided by the total number of transactions over the past six months.
49
The median rent was calculated using three years of data to increase the number of rental transactions at the
census tract level and avoid dropping records. The measure assumes that rents were relatively stable over the three
year period.
50
Mean reversion expectations are estimated using a zip code repeat sales home price index where the mean
reversion estimate equals the difference between the zip code’s index in the year the house was purchased and the
zip codes’ 2001 price index level (the calculation is similar to the calculation employed in Table 5 except its
conducted at the zip code level instead of home size segments).
48
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expectations. These findings suggest that other factors, such geographical location and
economies of scale, likely played a role in institutional investors’ purchasing decisions.51
Pre-crisis rental and market liquidity measures are also included in 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡 at the census tract
level. The pre-crisis rental measure identifies and controls for the percent of single-family
detached houses that were already rentals prior to the crisis (2000-2006). Houses located in
traditional single-family rental markets (i.e. housing markets with a higher fraction of singlefamily detached rental units prior to 2007) were less likely to be purchased by institutional
investors – which suggests that institutional investors were purchasing houses in census tracts
that were traditionally owner-occupied. This finding supports the owner-occupied housing asset
illiquidity framework in section 4 – which states that owner-occupied housing has to be sold to
institutional investors during times of market wide distress because they do not require financing.
Berkovec and Goodman (1996) find that housing turnover is the most appropriate proxy
for housing demand. As such, I include two turnover variables and a time-on-market (TOM)
variable to estimate the market liquidity (i.e. demand for housing) in the census tracts where
institutional investors purchased houses. The first turnover variable estimates market liquidity
prior to the real estate crisis (2000-2006) and the second turnover variable estimates market
liquidity in the two years leading up to the entrance of institutional investors (2010-2011). The
turnover measures are calculated at the census tract level as the average annual number of sales
transactions divided by the tract’s housing stock. The results in column 1 suggest that houses
located in census tracts with lower levels of turnover (i.e. market liquidity) from 2010-2011 were
more likely to be purchased by institutional investors. Similarly, the average time-on-market
(TOM) variable suggests that houses in census tracts with longer average TOM (i.e. less market
liquidity) were more likely to be purchased by institutional investors.
Table 3 documents the large increase in new residential structures in the metro-Atlanta
housing market. From 2000-2006, the supply of single-family detached housing grew
approximately 4% per year relative to Atlanta’s housing stock in 2000. The next measure
examines whether houses located in census tracts that experienced high levels of growth in their
51

The maps in Appendix A suggest that institutional investors tried to concentrate a large portion of their purchases
in a geographical area. Additionally, in an interview with a large scale investor in Fulton County, GA Immergluck
(2013) reports that the investor discussed a “hub and spoke” model of property management, in which the investor
had multiple local offices that serviced rental units within a twenty-mile radius.
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single-family detached housing stock were more likely to be purchased by institutional investors.
In column 1, houses located in census tracts with higher fractions of new residential structures
were more likely to be purchased by institutional investors - which suggests that those markets
were oversupplied in the early to mid-2000s. The final two measures of interest examine
investment in existing single-family detached structures. The first remodel variable identifies
whether the house purchased by the institutional investor was remodeled between 2000 to 2011.
The second remodel measure is a proxy for private investment in residential structures in the
surrounding census tract – which I calculate using the CoreLogic tax assessor records as the
percent of houses in the census tract in 2000 that were remodeled from 2000 to 2011. I create the
two remodel measures using the ‘effective year built’ field in the CoreLogic tax assessor data.52
The results in column 3 suggest that houses that were recently remodeled or were located in
census tracts with a higher fraction of remodeled houses were less likely to be purchased by
institutional investors.
7.4 Owner-occupied to Rental Conversion Pricing Differential
Using a difference in difference framework and the identification strategy described in
the beginning of section 7, I estimate the difference in price paid for house A (control/owneroccupied) and house B (treatment/O2R conversion) using the following specification:
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = c + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅2𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑅2𝑂𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡
(15)

where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is log of the sales price for house i at time t. The sales price is a function of a vector of
the house’s physical characteristics [𝑋𝑖𝑡 ], distressed sale conditions [𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 ], whether the
purchaser financed the purchase or paid cash [𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 ], and the house’s tenure classification
[𝑂2𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅2𝑂𝑖 , 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ].
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The effective year built field identifies the first year the building was assessed with its current components. If a
house was constructed in 1980 and an additional bedroom and bathroom were built in 2005 – then the effective year
built would be 2005 and it would be flagged as a remodeled property. Five counties (Barrow, DeKalb, Fayette,
Forsyth, and Paulding) do not report an effective year built so they are removed in column 3. Smaller remodeling
projects that do not require a permit from the county are not included in the measure. The numerator for the measure
is the number of houses built prior to 2000 that were remodeled from 2000 to 2012 and the denominator is the
number of houses built prior to 2000. I calculate the measure at the census tract level. Approximately 1.3% of the
houses were remodeled in the 13 county subsample displayed in column 3.
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The 𝑋𝑖𝑡 vector of variables includes the house’s age, square feet of living area, lot size,
number of bedrooms, and number of bathrooms. It also includes indicator variables to identify if
the house has a garage, carport, fireplace, and pool. The 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 vector includes indicator
variables that identify whether the transaction was a bulk sale, short sale, foreclosure, or real
estate owned (REO) transaction. The 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 variable identifies houses that were owner-occupied
prior to the crisis (2000 – 2006), but were then converted to rental housing after the crisis (2007
– 2014). The 𝑅2𝑂𝑖 variable identifies houses that were rentals prior to the crisis (2000 – 2006),
but were then converted to owner-occupied housing after the crisis (2007 – 2014). The 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
variable identifies houses that were rentals both before and after the crisis.53 Indicator variables
for quarter and year time fixed effects [𝐹𝑡 ] and post crisis [𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ] are also included. Of particular
interest is the coefficient for the interaction between the post crisis and own-to-rent conversion
variables [𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 ], as it represents an estimate of the asset illiquidity risk inherent in
housing’s mildly segmented market structure.
Next I run a difference in difference model where the treatment groups are delineated by
institutional and non-institutional investor purchases:
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = c + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽7 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡
(16)

where the notation in (16) is similar to (15) expect for the 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 and 𝑁𝑜𝑛⎼𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
variables that identify whether the house was purchased by an institutional investor or noninstitutional investor, respectively. As noted earlier, asset illiquidity is the difference between an
asset’s value in best use and its liquidation value. Thus, the [𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ] interaction
coefficient represents an estimate of the asset illiquidity risk inherent in housing’s mildly
segmented market structure.
I also estimate the pricing differential over time by interacting the 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
variables with annual indicator variables that identify the year the house sold. Ex ante, I expect
houses that were converted after the crisis, as indicated by 𝑂2𝑅𝑖 , to appreciate at a rate similar to
owner-occupied housing prior to the real estate crash, as they were trading in the same housing
53

In subsequent specifications I filter out 𝑅2𝑂𝑖 and 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 properties to isolate the impact of a conversion on owneroccupied house prices.
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market. However, after the real estate crash, when the previously owner-occupied houses were
converted to rental housing, I expect the returns to differ due to, among other things, owneroccupied housing’s preferential tax treatment and the market’s mildly segmented structure.
7.5 Empirical Results
Prior to the real estate crash, O2R conversions were trading in the owner-occupied
market, so I expect them to sell for a price similar to owner-occupied houses. However, after the
crash when the conversions trade in the rental market, I expect them to sell for a discount relative
to owner-occupied houses that were not converted. In column 1 of Table 11, I find that owneroccupied houses that were subsequently converted to rentals [O2R ] sold for approximately 3.2%
more than owner-occupied houses that were not converted. However, after the crash when the
houses were purchased as rental housing, they sold at an 11.2% discount relative to owneroccupied houses that were not converted. Although the post-crash discount was expected
because the house was converted from the owner-occupied market to the rental market, the precrash premium is unexpected. The pre-crash premium suggests that either the O2R conversions
were of superior quality, previous buyers overpaid for them, or there is a sample selection issue
with the full dataset.
[Insert Table 11]
In column 1, the post-crisis and cash purchase interaction variable highlights the
increased discount for cash purchases after the real estate crash. Prior to the real estate crash
(2000 – 2006), houses sold for a 13.3% discount if the buyer paid cash. After the real estate crash
(2007 – 2014), houses sold for a 26.0% discount when the buyer paid cash. The increased
discount represents the value placed on liquidity during the financial crisis when a large
proportion of potential homebuyers were credit constrained. The large discount also highlights
the financial incentive offered to institutional investors, who did not require credit to make their
purchases, when they entered the market in 2012.
In column 1, rental houses that were subsequently converted to owner-occupied houses
[R2O] sold for approximately 2.7% less than owner-occupied houses prior to the crisis. After the
crash when they were purchased as owner-occupied housing, the pricing differential remained
the same. Single-family detached houses that were rentals for the entire study period [Rent] sold
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for a discount relative to owner-occupied housing prior to the real estate crash and, similar to
O2R conversions, dropped significantly relative to owner-occupied houses after the crash. In
column 2, I filter out R2O conversions, rental properties, and bulk sales as I am primarily
interested in estimating the price effect of converting a house from owner-occupied to the
rental.54 The results in column 2 are similar to column 1 - O2R conversions sold for
approximately 3.6% more than owner-occupied houses prior to the crash and a 12.2% discount
after the crash.55
In column 3, indicator variables are included to identify houses purchased by institutional
and non-institutional investors. Houses that were purchased by institutional investors were not
significantly different than owner-occupied houses prior to the real estate crash. However, after
the crash, when the houses were converted to rental properties, they sold for a 14.6% discount
relative to owner-occupied houses that were not converted. In contrast, houses that were
purchased by non-institutional investors sold for a 4.8% premium prior to the real estate crash
and an 11.4% discount after the real estate crash.
Columns 4 and 5 use the same specifications as columns 2 and 3, but are run using the
characteristic matched samples in Table 9. The sign and significance for all of the variables in
column 4 remain the same, but the magnitude of the coefficients decrease. In column 5, the sign
and significance of the institutional investor variable changed from positive and insignificant to
negative and significant. The magnitude of the post-crisis institutional investor interaction
variable decreased but still represents an 11.1% discount. Columns 6 and 7 run the same
specifications using the nearest neighbor matched sample in Table 9. The results in column 6 are
similar to columns 2 and 4 – although the sign on the O2R conversion variable flipped and the
magnitude of the coefficients decreased further. Based on the nearest neighbor matched sample,
O2R conversions sold for a 1.5% discount prior to the crisis and a 6.2% discount after the crisis.
The results in column 7 are similar to columns 3 and 5 – except the post-crash cash discount is
no longer significant. Houses purchased by institutional investors sold for a 2.5% discount prior
to the crash and an 8.5% discount after the crash. The estimated discounts are in addition to the

54

Bulk sales are included in column 1 of Table 11. The coefficient for the bulk sale variable is -0.5844 and it is
significant at the 1% level. The empirical analysis going forward does not include bulk sales transactions.
55
Table B1 in the appendix provides a full set of estimates for columns 1 and 2 in Table 11.
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cash and distressed sale discounts (i.e. REO, foreclosure, and short sale) displayed in Table 11
and highlight the low liquidation values for single-family detached housing.
Table 12 examines the pricing differential on an annual basis. Ex ante, as the singlefamily housing market becomes more integrated, I expect the price of single-family homes to be
bid up and returns to fall until the single-family detached housing market becomes fully
integrated. However, segmentation may still exist due to, among other things, the preferential tax
treatment associated with owner-occupied housing. To test this conjecture I interact the O2R
conversion and Rent variables with annual indicator variables to examine the relationship over
time. The first column of Table 12 examines the degree of segmentation between the owneroccupied and rental property markets. I am particularly interested in the relationship between the
owner-occupied houses that were converted to rentals and the houses that were rentals for the
entire study period. After the crash O2R conversions should sell for the same price as rental
properties unless the buyers value the option to convert the property back to the owner-occupied
market in the future. In which case, O2R conversions will sell for a discount compared to owneroccupied housing, but at a premium compared to rental housing.
[Insert Table 12]
In column 1, the O2R conversion (Rent) interactions are displayed to the left (right) of the
pipe delimiter. Table 12 does not include R20 conversions or bulk sales. The results show that
rental properties sold for a discount relative to both owner-occupied and O2R conversions prior
to crisis (2000-2006). From 2007 to 2011, rentals continued to sell for a discount (25.8%)
relative to O2R conversions (10.4%). Additionally, from 2012 to 2014 the gap widened as rentals
sold for a 43.3% discount relative to owner-occupied houses, compared to O2R conversions’
15.3% discount. Although institutional investors purchased owner-occupied houses and
converted them to rentals they still sold for a premium relative to rental housing. The premium
paid for the O2R conversions - relative to rental housing - is likely a function of the buyer’s
ability to convert the property back and sell it to an owner-occupier when the market recovers.
In column 2 of Table 12 I remove the rental transactions and focus solely on O2R
conversions. The annual interactions in column 2 show that O2R conversions sold for a discount
relative to other owner-occupied houses soon after the real estate crash. From 2007 to 2011 O2R
conversions sold for an average discount of 10.7%. From 2012 to 2014 – which aligns with the
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entrance of institutional investors - the average discount for conversions relative to owneroccupied properties was 15.2%. Columns 3 and 4 run the same specification as column 2 using
the characteristic and nearest neighbor matched samples. Similar to Table 11, the magnitude of
the estimates decreased when using the matched samples. Using the nearest neighbor
(characteristic) matched sample, O2R conversions sold for a 6.5% (8.6%) discount from 20072011 and a 6.7% (11.3%) discount from 2012-2014.
In Figure 10, I plot separate repeat sales price indexes for owner-occupied houses that
were converted to rentals [O2R] and were not converted to rentals after the real estate crisis. I
also include 95 percent confidence intervals for both indexes. The two indexes track each other
closely from 2001 to 2006, but begin to diverge prior to the real estate crash. After the crash,
O2R conversions clearly sell for a discount relative to owner-occupied housing that was not
converted. In 2012, house prices started rising - likely due to increased competition among
institutional investors and owner-occupants - but market segmentation still existed. These results
suggest that the O2R conversions do not fully integrate into the rental housing market, but
instead trade in a new conversion market that resides somewhere between the pre-existing
owner-occupied and rental housing markets.
[Insert Figure 10]
Table 13 examines the pricing differential for houses that institutional and noninstitutional investors purchased on an annual basis. The table does not include R20 conversions,
rentals, or bulk sales. In column 1, the annual institutional (non-institutional) investor
interactions are displayed to the left (right) of the pipe delimiter. Similar to column 3 of Table
11, non-institutional investor properties sold for a premium prior to crisis (2000-2006). From
2007 to 2011, houses that institutional investors eventually purchased sold for a discount
(17.4%) relative to non-institutional investor purchases (9.5%). However, when institutional
investors entered the market in 2012 the discount dropped for the institutional investor houses
(15.9%) and increased for non-institutional investor houses (15.3%).
[Insert Table 13]
Columns 2 to 4 compare houses purchased by institutional investors to owner-occupied
houses that were not converted. Column 2 displays estimates for the full sample, column 3
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displays estimates for the characteristic matched sample, and column 4 displays estimates for the
nearest neighbor matched sample. Summary statistics for each sample are displayed in the
bottom section of Table 9. Based on the nearest neighbor matched sample, houses purchased by
institutional investors sold for, on average, a 5% discount from 2012 to 2014. The discount was
the largest in 2012 (9.9%) and dropped considerably in 2013 (1.9%) and 2014 (3.1%) as
institutional investors competed against each other. The 5% discount was in addition to cash
purchase and distressed sale discount - highlighting owner-occupied housing’s low liquidation
value.
7.4 Alternative Specifications
Although I attribute the results in the previous section to owner-occupied housing’s asset
illiquidity, I examine several alternative specifications to test the robustness of my findings. I
examine whether the O2R conversions were (i) in markets with less historical market liquidity,
(ii) in markets with less current market liquidity, (iii) in markets with higher percentages of
distressed sales, (iv) in markets with less investment in residential structures, (v) of differing
quality, or (vi) a combination of all the above.
If the previously owner-occupied houses that were purchased and converted to rentals are
located in markets that historically have less market liquidity (i.e. lower demand) - I would
expect them to sell for a larger discount during times of distress. To examine the market liquidity
for the houses I calculate the average turnover of existing homes prior to the real estate crisis. I
calculate housing turnover at the census tract level as the average annual number of sales
transactions divided by the tract’s housing stock from 2000 to 2006. Column 1 of Table 14 uses
the nearest neighbor matched dataset and is similar to column 6 of Table 11 except for the
inclusion of the pre-crisis turnover measure and the use of zip code fixed effects. The average
pre-crisis turnover variable is not significant in column 1 and has little impact on the O2R
conversion coefficient. Column 2 includes a rolling 6 month turnover variable as a proxy for the
current market liquidity when the house was purchased and converted. Similar to the turnover
variable in column 1, it is not significant and does not impact the O2R conversion coefficient.
[Insert Table 14]
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Several recent studies document a negative relationship between house sales prices and
the number of nearby foreclosures (e.g. Immergluck and Smith 2006; Lin et al. 2009). Harding,
Rosenblatt and Yao (2009) find a foreclosure contagion discount that reached as high as 1% for
each nearby foreclosed property. If the converted properties in this study were located in areas
with higher percentages of distressed sales I would expect them to sell for considerably less,
which could potentially explain the large discount I find in the previous section. To examine the
impact of nearby foreclosures on house prices I calculate the percent of distressed sales as the
number of distressed sales transactions divided by the total number of sales transactions at the
census tract level. In column 3 of Table 14 I find that a 5% increase in the percentage of
distressed sales results in a 2.2% decrease in house prices. However, an increase in distressed
sales does not explain why conversions sold for a discount after the real estate crash as the O2R
conversion discount increased to 6.2% in the post-crisis period.
Another possible explanation for the O2R conversion discount is that the conversions are
located in previously under-invested housing submarkets. Information on private investment in
residential structures at the submarket level is not available, so I use two proxies available in the
current dataset. The proxies examine private investment in new and existing structures. Column
4 includes a variable that identifies the fraction of the housing stock within the census tract that
was built in 2000 or later. Investment in new housing structures likely creates a positive
externality for the surrounding neighborhood and incentivizes current owners to maintain and
invest in their existing structures. The variable is positive and significant – although it does not
have a material impact on the O2R conversion discount. Column 5 includes a variable that
identifies the percent of the census tract’s existing housing stock in 2000 that were remodeled
from 2000-2014. The variable is not significant and although the O2R conversion coefficient is
smaller – its decrease can be attributed to use of the 13 county subsample.56
Next, I examine whether the O2R conversion discount for previously owner-occupied
houses can be attributed to differences in housing conditions. I use a ‘condition’ variable in the
CoreLogic dataset as a proxy for the house’s condition. The condition variable identifies whether

As noted in Table 10 – five counties do not report the effective year built in the CoreLogic tax assessor data. In
unreported results the coefficient for the O2R conversion variable is -.0373 using the 13 county subsample in the
absence of the ‘Percent Houses Remodeled’ variable. Thus, the inclusion of the variable only increases the
coefficient by .0001.
56
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the house was in excellent, very good, good, average, fair, poor, or unsound condition according to the local county tax assessor’s office – in 2014. The variable is not available for
every parcel and is not populated for every county, so I remove records in which it is missing.
The results in column 6 of Table 14 show that houses in excellent condition sell for a premium
and that, ceteris paribus, house prices decrease as the condition of the house deteriorates.
Additionally, after controlling for house quality the O2R conversion discount remains at 5.7% in
the post-crisis subperiod.57 In column 7 I include the additional controls in a single specification.
Note that the sample size drops due to the missing remodeled and condition fields. The
magnitude and significance of several variables change – although their signs remained the same.
In unreported results the O2R conversion discount for the 126,202 subsample was 5.7% in the
post-crisis subperiod. After including all the controls the discount dropped to 4.7% in column 7.
In the final three columns of Table 14 I run a series of alternative specifications for
houses located in Fulton County. I restrict the nearest neighbor subsample to Fulton County to
further examine the property condition variable in column 6. As noted in the previous paragraph
the property condition variable in the CoreLogic dataset is a static measure as of 2014. Using
property tax assessor records obtained directly from Fulton County tax assessor’s office I
examine whether the O2R conversion discount can be attributed to differences in the condition of
the houses that were converted using a property condition variable that is updated annually.
Column 8 provides a baseline model of the Fulton County subsample and column 9 incorporates
the annual condition variables. The inclusion of the annual property condition variables does
explain a small portion of the O2R conversion discount as it drops from 4.1% in column 8 to
3.6% in column 9. Column 10 incorporates all the controls for Fulton County and the O2R
conversion discount increases to 3.9%.
The results of the alternative specifications – several of which include proxies for
property condition – confirm the earlier results. Although I use a nearest neighbor matched
sample, include distressed sale indicator variables, and include proxies for property condition - I
recognize that the true condition of the property may not be captured in my model. If property
The condition variable may vary across counties as it is populated by the county’s local tax assessors. To address
this potential issue I run a regression that interacts the condition variable with indicator variables for each county.
The results are similar to those reported in Table 14. The condition variable in column 6 is also a static measure of
the house’s condition in 2014. Using a subset of data from Fulton County and annual tax assessor data from 2002 to
2014 I further examine the impact of the condition variable in columns 8-10.
57
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condition is not properly controlled for and is correlated with the O2R conversion or Institution
variable then my estimates may be biased. For example, it may be the case that the properties
purchased by institutional investors require a certain amount of capital expenditure and that the
price they paid was a no-arbitrage price that brought the house’s value to the same level as a
comparable house that did not require the same capital expenditure.
7.5 Impact on Local Markets
In the post-crash housing market model (Section 5), I argue that as institutional investors
purchase owner-occupied houses and convert them to rental housing they reduce the available
owner-occupied housing stock and push the market back towards equilibrium. In this section I
examine whether lagged institutional investor activity had an impact on local house prices from
2012 to 2014. As noted by Mills et al. (2015) it is difficult to test the causal effect of institutional
investor activity on house prices without exogenous variation in the activity of institutional
investors. In addition, I also recognize that it is difficult to estimate the impact of institutional
investor activity while they are still active in the market. Thus, the estimates presented in this
section are meant to provide insight into the likely sign and magnitude of institutional investors’
impact on local housing markets. If the data were available - it would be more appropriate to
estimate the impact of institutional investor activity from 2012 to 2014 on local house prices
from 2015 to 2016.
I examine institutional investors’ impact on local housing markets using two
specifications. The first (second) specification examines whether house prices increase in zip
codes with increased institutional investment (conversion) activity. Both specifications are
conducted at the zip code level by creating a repeat sales home price index for all zip codes that
have a housing stock of at least 10,000 single-family detached houses. As a robustness check I
also run the specifications using house price data from Zillow. The results of the first
specification are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 15 - where the change in a zip code level
home price index from 2012 through 2014 is regressed on the lagged market share of the
following investor types: institutional, corporate, and individual. All zip codes with a singlefamily detached housing stock of 10,000 or more are included in the analysis (61 zip codes in
total). I find that zip codes with increased institutional activity in previous years experienced
higher house price appreciation the following year. Column 1 suggests that a 10% increase in
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institutional investor transaction share results in a .9% increase in house prices the following
year.
[Insert Table 15]
In column 2, I include additional controls for zip code characteristics that may influence
investor activity and have an independent effect on house prices within the zip code. I include
the lagged log of house price and rent, the lagged percent of distressed sales in the zip code, as
well as the following variables obtained from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey:
percent of population without a high school degree, with an associate’s degree or higher, with
income in the first quintile, with income in the fifth quintile, households with kids, the poverty
rate, and unemployment rate. I also include a pre-crisis rental and turnover measure. The precrisis rental measure identifies and controls for the percent of houses that were already rentals
within the zip code and the turnover measure controls for the liquidity of the market prior to the
crisis. The results in column 2 suggest that an increase in institutional investor activity within a
zip code during the previous year increases house prices the following year. Institutional
investors are the only investor type that significantly impact local house prices in the first
specification.58
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 15, I present the results of the first specification using zip
code level house pricing data from the Zillow website. Zillow uses a proprietary formula to
estimate the value for every residential property in their coverage area and provides monthly
averages of their house price estimates on their website. After downloading the monthly data for
the Atlanta metro area at the zip code level I convert it to an annual average and regress the
change in log of house prices from 2012 to 2014. Zillow’s extensive coverage allows the
inclusion of additional zip codes in the analysis (150 compared to 61 in columns 1 and 2).
Similar to columns 1 and 2, I find that zip codes with increased institutional activity in previous
years experienced higher house price appreciation the following year. Unlike the first
specification, I find that individual and corporate investors do have a significant impact on local
house prices. Although the sign for corporate investor changes when I include the control
variables in column 4.
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Coefficient estimates for the control variables are available in Table B2 in the appendix.
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Using the O2R conversions identified in Section 7.1, I aggregate the data at the zip code
level and calculate their market share. I then regress the change in the log of house prices on
lagged conversion market share as I expect an increase in O2R conversion activity in previous
periods will help stabilize the local market and increase prices in subsequent periods. I present
the results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 15.59 The results suggest that a 10% increase in
conversion activity results in a price increase in the range of .8% to 1.2% the following year.
8. Conclusion
House price declines together with large scale foreclosures, an increase in demand for
rental housing resulting from the foreclosures, and the tightening of the mortgage market created
a large supply of available owner-occupied housing. The large supply of available housing made
economies of scale possible and represented a potential arbitrage opportunity. I show that owneroccupied housing offered higher returns than rental housing after the real estate crash. The higher
returns coupled with potential economies of scale attracted institutional investors into the owneroccupied housing market. When institutional investors entered the owner-occupied housing
market they not only increased demand, but also decreased the market’s supply as they converted
the houses they purchased to rentals.
The primary contribution of this study is to empirically isolate the mechanism,
magnitude, and consequence of a single-family detached house’s shift across the mildly
segmented housing market. Although institutional investors entered the owner-occupied housing
market which, in effect, should have decreased the two housing markets’ degree of segmentation,
I show that segmentation still exists. I find that although house prices did increase when
institutional investors’ entered the market, the premium associated with owner-occupied housing
persisted. Using a propensity score nearest neighbor matched sample I estimate that from 2012 to
2012 – when institutional investors were active in the market- owner-occupied housing sold for
6.7% more than similar owner-occupied housing that was converted to rental housing after the
crisis.
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I also ran analysis using a zip code level home price index similar to the first section of Table 15, but did not get
significant results due to the zip code HPI’s limited coverage area.
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Figure 2: Post-Crash House Price Dynamics

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

Appendix A – Institutional Investor Overview
American Homes 4 Rent: www.americanhomes4rent.com
American Homes 4 Rent is an internally managed real estate investment trust (REIT) that is
publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE: AMH). American Homes 4 Rent is
focused on acquiring, renovating, and leasing single-family homes as rental properties. They
recently merged with American Residential Properties (see below) and now own and operate
approximately 47,910 single-family properties in select housing markets across 22 states.
American Homes 4 Rent was originally founded by self-storage (NYSE: PSA) billionaire B.
Wayne Hughes. Its IPO data was August 1st, 2013.
American Residential Properties: www.amresprop.com [redirects to AMH website]
American Residential Properties was a publicly traded REIT (NYSE: ARPI) that acquired,
owned, and managed single-family homes as rental properties. In March 2016, American
Residential Properties merged with American Homes 4 Rent. American Residential Properties
owned and operated approximately 8,938 single-family properties in 12 states when they merged
with American Homes 4 Rent. Its IPO date was May 9th, 2013.
Colony American Homes: www.cah.com [redirects to www.waypointhomes.com]
Colony American Homes merged with Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust (NYSE:SWAY) in
January 2016 to form Colony Starwood Homes. Colony Starwood Homes (NYSE:SFR) acquires,
renovates, leases, maintains and manages single family homes. Prior to the merger Colony
American Homes owned and operated approximately 17,796 single-family homes. After the
merger, Colony Starwood Homes owned and operated approximately 30,667 single-family
homes. Before merging with Starwood Waypoint, the Colony American Homes filed for an IPO
on May 2nd, 2013, but postponed the pricing of its offering in June 2013.
Invitation Homes: www.invitationhomes.com
Invitation Homes is a subsidiary of the Blackstone Group (NYSE: BX). Invitation Homes owns
and operates the largest single-family housing stock – not only in Atlanta, but nationwide.
According to their website Invitation Homes owns over 50,000 single-family homes across 14 of
the country’s most popular cities.
Havenbrook Homes: www.havenbrookhomes.com
Havenbrook Homes owns and operates approximately 4,000 single-family homes in 5 housing
markets that are spread across 4 states. Pacific Investment Management Co. (PIMCO) owns a
controlling stake in Havenbrook Homes and recently bought out Sylvan Road Capital – who had
an 8% stake in Havenbrook Homes.60
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Additional information on the transaction is available in the following article:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-25/pimco-bets-on-rental-homes-in-buyout-of-former-analyst
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Main Street Renewal: www.msrenewal.com
Main Street Renewal is a subsidiary of Amherst Holdings LLC (www.amherst.com). Main Street
Renewal’s investment strategy is focused on acquiring, renovating, leasing, and managing
single-family homes across the United States. Main Street Renewal owns and operates singlefamily housing rentals in 19 major cities across 12 states.
Progress Residential: www.rentprogress.com
Progress Residential focuses on acquiring, renovating, leasing, and managing single-family
rental homes in 20 housing markets across the United States. Progress Residential owns and
leases over 8,000 single-family rental homes. Progress Residential is backed by over $1 billion
of equity capital.
Residential Capital Management: http://www.resicap.com/
Residential Capital Management is a “vertically integrated single source solution for institutional
level single family real estate needs.” Residential Capital Management has acquired, renovated
and manages over 7,700 single family homes. Residential Capital Management operations are
focused in 7 housing markets in the Southeast United States.
Silver Bay Realty Trust: www.silverbayrealtytrustcorp.com
Silver Bay Realty Trust is a publicly traded REIT (NYSE: SBY) that focuses on the acquisition,
renovation, leasing and on-going management of single-family rental properties. Silver Bay
owns and operates approximately 9,000 single-family properties that are spread across 9 states.
Silver Bay was the first single-family rental REIT – its IPO date was December 17th, 2012.
Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust: http://colonystarwood.com/
Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust (NYSE:SWAY) merged with Colony American Homes in
January 2016 to form Colony Starwood Homes. Colony Starwood Homes (NYSE:SFR) acquires,
renovates, leases, maintains and manages single family homes. Prior to the merger Starwood
Waypoint Residential Trust owned and operated approximately 12,881 single-family homes.
Starwood Waypoint’s original IPO date was January 22nd, 2014.
Sylvan Road Capital: https://www.sylvanroad.com/
Sylvan Road Capital is an asset management firm that focuses on the buy-to-rent market in
single family housing. Sylvan Road Capital raised more than $500 million to acquire and
rehabilitate homes in Atlanta and surrounding markets.
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Figure A1: County Map
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Figure A2: American Homes 4 Rent Purchases
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Figure A3: American Residential Purchases
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Figure A4: Colony American Homes Purchases
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Figure A5: Havenbrook Homes Purchases

84

Figure A6: Invitation Homes Purchases
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Figure A7: Main Street Renewal Purchases
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Figure A8: Progress Residential Purchases
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Figure A9: Residential Capital Management Purchases
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Figure A10: Silver Bay Realty Purchases
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Figure A11: Starwood Waypoint Purchases
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Figure A12: Sylvan Road Capital Purchases
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Abstract
Subsidizing homeownership is only justifiable if it increases homeownership attainment and
creates external benefits that outweigh their costs. Using parcel-level panel data I isolate and
examine the effect of homeownership on surrounding house prices. Homeownership has a causal
effect on house prices, but substantial variation exists across quantiles. Changes in
homeownership have a lesser (greater) effect on house prices in the upper (lower) deciles of the
conditional house price distribution - despite the fact that households in the upper deciles are the
primary beneficiaries of the federal tax subsidies for homeownership.

1. Introduction
In the United States, homeownership is often considered the “American Dream” and has
long been a central focus of housing policy. Homeowners benefit from various local, state and
federal programs whose primary purpose is fostering homeownership. In 2014 alone, the federal
government provided over $209 billion in homeownership subsidies (U.S. Department of the
Treasury 2015).1 Justifications for such programs are derived from the belief that
homeownership creates positive externalities. While homeownership may create positive
externalities questions regarding its impact on house prices remain. What is the monetary value
of the positive externalities associated with homeownership? Does the monetary value of the
positive externalities exceed their cost? Are the positive externalities allocated equally?
Although these questions have important policy implications, difficulty in designing and
implementing a study that isolates homeownership’s effect on house prices has limited previous
research on the topic.
This paper provides a framework to address these questions and offers new insight into
the distributional effect of homeownership on house prices. It has two primary goals: (i) to
isolate the effect of homeownership, and changes to homeownership rates, on nearby house
prices and (ii) to examine the effect of homeownership across the full distribution of house
prices. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use parcel-level data to isolate the
effect of homeownership, and changes to homeownership rates, on nearby house prices. Isolating
the extent and nature of price differentials related to homeownership is difficult because a variety
of other factors may be correlated with sales prices and homeownership levels. For example,
house prices in neighborhoods with high homeownership likely vary in quality, both structurally
and in terms of neighborhood amenities, compared to houses in neighborhoods with low
homeownership. Additionally, to properly isolate the effect of homeownership on house price,
one needs to compare the effect homeownership has on prices for identical properties. However,
due to the heterogeneous nature of real estate this is extremely difficult in practice.
I address these concerns and extend the extant literature using a unique dataset that
provides information on sales prices, house characteristics, neighborhood quality, and buyer
To provide a sense of magnitude, the federal government’s subsidy for rental housing was $8.3 billion or just under
4% of the homeownership subsidy.
1

1

attributes. The dataset includes every single-family detached sales transaction that occurred in
Fulton County, Georgia from 2002-2014. For each transaction I observe the sales price, location,
and detailed housing characteristics. I then merge information about the race, sex, mortgage, and
income of the buyer to the sales transactions. The dataset also includes annual panel data for the
entire housing stock, allowing me to isolate homeownership rates while controlling for differing
property type compositions and neighborhood amenities.
High-income households are the primary beneficiaries of the federal government’s
subsidization of homeownership.2 Despite this well documented fact, previous studies tend to
focus on the average causal effect of homeownership on house prices, so little is known about
the relationship over the full distribution of house prices. Understanding the distributional effect
of homeownership is important because promoting homeownership, particularly low and
moderate income as well as first time homeownership, has been a primary focus for
policymakers for several decades.3 Additionally, knowledge of the distributional effect of
homeownership provides a clearer picture of what is driving the mean results and provides
insight into the allocation of the positive externalities associated with homeownership.
The results of this study have several important policy implications. First, using a
research design that explicitly controls for the unobserved quality of the individual house as well
as time-varying neighborhood effects I find that the average causal effect of homeownership on
house prices is much lower than previously reported. I estimate that a 10% increase in
homeownership results in a 2.6% increase in surrounding house prices.4 I also document the
existence of quantile effects. Ex ante, I would expect changes to homeownership rates to have a
greater effect on house prices in the upper deciles of the conditional house price distribution, as
the federal tax subsidies for homeownership combined with a progressive income tax favors high
income households. However, I find that changes in homeownership rates have a lesser (greater)
effect on house prices in the upper (lower) deciles of the conditional house price distribution.
2

Poterba and Sinai (2008) show that the mortgage interest tax deduction saves the average homeowner $1,060.
However, the average savings for households who make more than $250,000 is $5,459, compared to $91 in savings
for households whose annual income is less than $40,000.
3
For example, the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 established
performance standards for the Government Sponsored Enterprises to make homeownership available to a wider
variety of households (Case et al., 2002).
4
Coulson and Li (2013) estimate that a 10% increase in homeownership increases house prices by approximately
6%.

2

The subsidization of homeownership should also, in theory, directly affect a household’s tenure
choice. However, the lesser effect of homeownership on house prices in the higher deciles
suggests that the federal tax subsidies for homeownership, which provide greater benefits to
high-income households, are ineffective. Thus, if promoting homeownership is one of the
primary goals of the federal tax subsidies, they are, at a minimum, poorly allocated.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I provide a survey
of the related literature. The paper then proceeds with a detailed overview of the dataset and
homeownership measures used in this study. I then present the paper’s methodology and
empirical results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the potential implications of the
findings.
2. External Benefits of Homeownership
Homeownership is heavily subsidized in the United States. Owner-occupiers benefit from
the tax exemption of their implicit rental income and the exclusion of capital gains from the sale
of their house. Owner-occupiers can also deduct their mortgage interest and property tax
payments from their federal income taxes. In addition to the federal government’s preferential
tax treatment of owner-occupied housing, there are numerous state and local programs designed
to promote homeownership.5
Several studies offer justifications for subsidizing homeownership by showing that the
actions of homeowners create positive external benefits for their surrounding neighborhoods.
Green and White (1997) find that children who grow up in owner-occupied housing, especially
those in low-income households, have higher high school graduation rates. However, Aaronson
(2000) notes that owner-occupiers have longer tenure than renters, so the positive effect may not
be a result of the type of housing and instead a result of the length of tenure. Haurin et al. (2002)
find that owning a house, compared to renting, results in greater cognitive ability and fewer child
behavior problems; although follow-up studies by Barker and Miller (2009) and Holupka and
Newman (2012) contradict Haurin et al.’s (2002) findings. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) argue
that homeowners, who are less mobile, have an incentive to invest more social capital in their
5

For example, in the Atlanta market that this study focuses on the Georgia Dream Homeownership Program
provides first mortgage loans and down payment assistance to low income home buyers. To be eligible for the
program the borrower must meet income and purchase price limits, have limited assets, and invest at least $1,000
into the sales transaction.

3

neighborhoods. Thus, they are more likely to get involved with local organizations and vote. In
contrast, Engelhardt et al. (2010) find little evidence that homeowners are more involved in
neighborhood organizations and Hilber and Mayer (2009) find that the positive externalities
related to homeownership are likely confined to places with an inelastic supply of housing.
Additionally, Hilber and Turner (2014) show that in areas with an inelastic housing supply the
federal tax subsidies, the MID specifically are often capitalized into house prices, adding costs
rather than boosting homeownership attainment. In addition to the conflicting results above, the
studies are unable to quantify the monetary value of the external benefits.
The use of microdata allows me to estimate the monetary value of the positive
externalities created by homeownership. Similar to Coulson and Li (2013), I argue that the
subsidization of homeownership is only justifiable if the external benefits created as a result of
the subsidies exceed their cost (i.e. forgone tax revenue). Coulson and Li (2013) measure the
external benefits of homeownership in the form of higher house prices using data from the
American Housing Survey. Using neighborhood clusters ranging in size from 4 to 11 units,
Coulson and Li (2013) estimate the average causal effect of homeownership on house prices.
The authors find that a transition in housing tenure from renting to owning creates positive
external benefits (i.e. increases nearby house prices). This study is similar, in that, I measure the
external benefit of homeownership in terms of higher house prices. However, this study differs in
several key ways. First, I use negotiated sales transactions, instead of self-reported value
estimates from homeowners. Second, the use of microdata allows me to examine the sensitivity
of the empirical results to the areal unit (i.e. scale) at which homeownership is measured. I use
both predefined geographical units and continuous spatial measures to estimate homeownership,
which allows me to examine how house prices are affected by the overall tenure composition of
a neighborhood, in addition to the tenure status of properties in the immediate vicinity of a
house.6 The comprehensive dataset allows me to employ a research design that explicitly
controls for the unobserved quality of the individual house as well as time-varying neighborhood
effects. I also show that homeownership’s effect on house prices varies across the house price

6

The American Housing Survey data used in Coulson and Li (2013) includes neighborhood clusters that range in
size from 4 to 11 units. If house prices are affected by the tenure composition of the surrounding neighborhood
(outside the neighborhood clusters) then the coefficient estimates may be biased.

4

distribution and, as such, the effectiveness of programs that promote homeownership among
targeted groups, such as low and moderate income households, will vary as well.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Homeownership Distributions
When examining the external benefits of homeownership, I argue that the distributional
effect should be estimated to provide a clearer picture of what is driving the mean results. To
support this conjecture I tabulate homeownership levels based on income and home value
deciles. Table 1 displays homeownership rates by median income deciles. Median income is
assigned at the block-group level using five year estimates from the 2013 American Community
Survey (ACS). As expected, homeownership rates rise as the median income of the census
block-group increases. The relationship is clearly displayed in the top section of Table 1 as
homeownership rates monotonically decline from 91.8% (91.0%) for the tenth decile to 69.9%
(56.0%) for the first decile in 2002 (2014). The upward sloping relationship holds over the entire
length of the study regardless of market conditions (i.e. pre- and post-crisis).
[Insert Table 1]
In the middle and bottom sections of Table 1 I partition the data based on the property
type composition of the census block in which the house is located. The middle section includes
homogeneous census blocks that contain only single-family detached housing. Whereas, the
bottom section of the table includes census blocks that contain a mix of single-family detached,
single-family attached and multi-family housing units. I separate the data in this manner as
previous research has shown that homeownership is strongly associated with single-family
detached housing structures (Glaeser and Shapiro 2003) and including multiple structure types
complicates the analysis (Coulson and Li 2013). Although the relationship between income and
homeownership remains in both sections, homeownership rates are noticeably lower in the lower
income deciles of the heterogeneous housing stock sample.

5

Table 2 presents homeownership rates by assessed value deciles.7 The assessed value
deciles are assigned based on the house’s assessed value in 2002 or the year in which it was built
if after 2002. The assessed value represents the houses’ value prior to the real estate boom. Table
2 shows that a house’s tenure status is highly correlated with its assessed value. Similar to the
median income deciles, the relationship between assessed value and homeownership rate is
upward sloping. In 2002 (2014) the homeownership rate in the first decile was 62.3% (49.1%)
compared to 90.5% (90.3%) in the tenth decile. Table 3 displays the average assessed values for
the median income deciles presented in Table 1. As expected, the average assessed value of a
neighborhood increases as the median income of the census block-group in which the house is
located increases.
[Insert Table 2]
The stylized facts presented in this section set the stage for the analysis going forward.
The summary statistics show that homeownership increases as the average assessed value and
income of the neighborhood increases. Although the summary statistics do not show that
homeownership has an effect on house prices, they do suggest that a relationship exists and that
it may vary across the distribution of house prices.
[Insert Table 3]
3.2 Data Overview
The Fulton County Tax Assessor’s office provided two complementary datasets. Fulton
County is the most populous county in the state of Georgia and includes the city of Atlanta. The
assessment dataset includes property-level information for every parcel in Fulton County on an
annual basis from 2002 to 2014. The dataset includes detailed information about the parcel itself,
such as lot size and land use codes, as well as the physical characteristics of the dwelling unit(s)
built on it. The transaction dataset includes every real estate transaction that was recorded from
2002 to 2014. The sales transaction file includes information about the buyer and seller, such as
their name and address, which I use to identify owner-occupiers. It also includes, among other
things, the sales date, purchase price, and the type of deed that was conveyed.
7

I use assessed values, instead of sales price, to create the deciles because they are available on an annual basis for
every house in the study. Whereas, sales price (i.e. transaction value) is only available when and if a house is sold.
51.9% of the single-family detached houses did not transact from 2002 – 2014.
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Later in this study I use a subset of the Fulton County Tax Assessor data that has been
merged with publicly available loan application registry data gathered under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA). The subset is created by merging the Fulton County data with
proprietary transaction data obtained from CoreLogic. The CoreLogic data includes additional
loan level information such as the lender name and loan amount. I then match the combined
transaction dataset with the HMDA dataset based on each transaction’s (i) census tract, (ii) year
of the transaction, (iii) lender name, and (iii) loan amount. The HMDA dataset provides detailed
demographic and economic information about the buyer.
3.3 Measuring Homeownership
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to use parcel-level data to isolate the
effect of homeownership, and changes to homeownership rates, on nearby house prices. The use
of microdata allows the examination of the external benefits of homeownership over time across
areal units of differing size, as I expect the external benefits of homeownership to depend not
only on the tenure status of the house itself, but also on the overall tenure composition of its
surrounding neighborhood. If homeowners create positive external benefits for their surrounding
neighborhoods then households should be willing to pay more to live near other homeowners;
thereby allowing me to quantify the monetary value of homeownership by examining whether
households are willing to pay more to live in neighborhoods with higher homeownership levels.
One of the primary goals of this paper is to isolate the effect of homeownership, and
changes to homeownership rates, on nearby house prices. To achieve this goal I create a series of
variables that measure homeownership rates at several areal units of differing size. I estimate
homeownership rates over time using predefined geographical groupings based on the United
States Census Bureau’s census tract, block-group, and block levels.8 I also estimate
homeownership rates by neighborhood based on geographical groupings designated by the
Fulton County Tax Assessor’s office. I use several measures as previous research shows that the
results of linear regressions are sensitive to the areal unit chosen (Openshaw and Taylor 1979;
Fotheringham and Wong 1991). In addition to the predefined geographical groupings I create
continuous spatial measures of homeownership.

8

I associate every housing unit in Fulton County to its 2010 census tract, block-group, and block.
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I use the annual tax assessment datasets that contain Fulton County’s entire housing stock
to estimate the homeownership rate measures. For each single-family detached record in the
dataset, I observe the property’s address and the mailing address where the county sends the
property’s tax bill. If the mailing address matches the property’s address I assume the property is
owner-occupied. If the mailing address does not match the property’s address, but the mailing
address is a local post office box – I then examine if the post office box is associated with
multiple single-family detached houses. If the post office box is only associated with one singlefamily detached house I consider that house owner-occupied. If the mailing address does not
match the property’s address, the post office box is not local, or the post office box is associated
with multiple single-family detached houses I assume the property is not owner-occupied. The
annual homeownership measures represent the homeownership rate at the beginning of the year
(i.e. January). I then create monthly homeownership measures by merging and incorporating the
transaction data. If a property was owner-occupied in the annual file, but then was sold to an
investor between January 1st and January 31st, the house’s change in tenure would be included in
February’s homeownership measure.9
Table 4 provides an overview of the average size of the housing stock and
homeownership rate for each predefined areal unit that contains a minimum of five single-family
detached houses for the entire length of the study. The first column of each section in Table 4
presents a summary of the housing stock and homeownership rate for the complete data sample
in four year increments using the annual parcel files. As displayed in the first column of 2002,
census tracts represent the largest areal unit with an average housing stock of approximately 856
units. Census block-group is the second largest (~335 units), tax assessor neighborhood is the
third largest (~160 units), and census blocks are the smallest (~29 units).10 The second column of

9

When merging the homeownership measures with the transaction data I associate each transaction with the
previous month’s homeownership measure for each predefined areal unit grouping. This ensures that a change in
tenure status of the house in the current transaction is not included in the homeownership measure used in the
analysis. The approach also aligns the homeownership measure so it reflects the market conditions when the sales
contract was signed (instead of when the sale was closed). I also associated the homeownership measures using a
two month lag. The results are similar to those reported using a one month lag. They are not reported in this paper,
but are available upon request from the authors.
10
Census blocks are the smallest geographic area at which the Census Bureau collects data. According to the census
website (www.census.gov), census blocks are “formed by streets, roads, railroads, bodies of water, other visible
physical and cultural features, and the legal boundaries shown on Census Bureau maps.” Census block-groups
consist of a cluster of census blocks and generally contain between 600 and 3,000 people. Block-groups can contain
up to 999 unique census blocks.
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each section contains areal units that only include single-family detached housing (i.e. there are
no single-family attached or multi-family housing units in the areal unit) for the length of the
study. As expected, as the size of the areal unit increases, there are fewer observations that
include only single-family detached housing. The third column of each section contains areal
units that include a mix of single-family detached, single-family attached and multi-family
housing.
[Insert Table 4]
A comparison of the April 2010 block-group homeownership rates to the census 2010
SF1 homeownership rates shows that the two measures are highly correlated (~.96). A direct
comparison for every block-group is not possible because the census homeownership rates are
based on housing units - whereas the homeownership rate in this study is based on single-family
detached houses only.11 Additionally, the census homeownership rate only includes occupied
housing units – whereas this study includes every single-family detached house regardless of
occupancy.12 Thus, when comparing the two homeownership rate measures I limited the
comparison to the 46 census block-groups that contain only single-family detached housing in
April 2010.
The use of predefined areal units is a convenient way to aggregate and estimate
homeownership measures. However, the size and shape of census blocks, block-groups and
tracts vary within and between areas. Additionally, the location of a house within the areal unit
may potentially bias the effect of homeownership on its price. For example, the census block
homeownership rate measure is likely more appropriate for a house centrally located within the
census block compared to a house located on its border. As a robustness check - I create monthly
spatial homeownership measures using radiuses of 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, and 1.00 mile.13 In
addition to accurately estimating the homeownership rate, the continuous spatial measures allow

The census bureau defines a housing unit as “a house, apartment, mobile home or trailer, group of rooms, or a
single room that is occupied, or, if vacant, is intended for occupancy as separate living quarters.”
12
The census bureau defines an occupied housing unit as a housing unit where someone was staying or living on
Census Day (April 1, 2016) and the unit was their usual residence (i.e. they stayed their most of the time).
13
The .05 mile radius represents a radius of approximately 264 feet, .10 mile radius = 528 feet, .25 mile radius =
1320 feet, .5 mile radius = 2640 feet, and 1.0 mile radius = 5,280 feet. See Figure A1 for a visualization of the
radiuses employed in this study.
11
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me to precisely partition the data into subsamples based on surrounding property type
compositions.
Table 5 provides an overview of the average size of the housing stock and
homeownership rate for each radius distance. A house is only included if there are five singlefamily detached houses within the given radius distance. The summary statistics presented in
Table 5 are cumulative, so the .10 mile radius for each house includes the housing stock in the
.05 mile radius measure. The first column of each section presents a summary of the housing
stock and homeownership rate for the entire housing stock, regardless of the property type
composition, in four year increments. As displayed in the first column of 2002, the 1.00 mile
radius represents the largest continuous spatial measure with an average housing stock of
approximately 1,771 units, which is approximately twice the size of a census tract in Table 4.
The half mile radius measure averages 533 single-family detached housing units placing it
somewhere between the average size of a census tract and a block-group. The quarter mile radius
averages 167 units making it comparable in size to the tax assessor neighborhood grouping
(~160 units). The second column of each section contains houses in which the radius specified
only contains single-family detached housing. Similar to the areal units in Table 4, as the size of
the radius increases, there are fewer observations that contain only single-family detached
housing. The third column of each section contains houses in which the radius specified contains
a mix of single-family detached, single-family attached and multi-family housing.
[Insert Table 5]
In Table 6, I present changes in homeownership rates at the block, neighborhood, and
block-group levels on an annual basis for the length of the study. As the size of the areal unit
increases, the range of the change in homeownership rates contracts. The likelihood that an areal
unit experiences no change in homeownership increases as the size of the areal unit decreases.
This represents a classic case of the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) in which the effect of
homeownership on house prices may be sensitive to the scale at which the analysis is run (i.e. the
spatial size of the areal unit). Openshaw and Taylor (1979) empirically show that changing the
scale of an areal unit alters the findings in statistical tests. As such, I run the analysis using
multiple areal units of differing sizes to demonstrate the sensitivity of the homeownership
measure and the robustness of my findings.
10

[Insert Table 6]
Fulton County was created in 1853 from the western half of DeKalb County and grew
into a “strange, elongated shape by absorbing the counties of Milton (to the north) and Campbell
(to the south) during the Great Depression.”14 Figure 1 provides a rough outline of Fulton County
and displays the change in homeownership rates at the census block level for the entire study
period (2002 to 2014). The change in homeownership rate is only plotted for homogeneous
census blocks that contain only single-family detached housing for the entire study period. In the
appendix Figure A2, A3, and A4 provide similar information for changes in homeownership
rates from 2002 to 2006, 2006 to 2010, and 2010 to 2014, respectively.15
[Insert Figure 1]
3.3 Sales Transactions
After merging the two Fulton County tax assessor datasets, I remove sales transactions
that had empty key fields (such as number of bathrooms or square feet of living area), were
located in census blocks with less than five single-family detached houses, or included multiple
parcels. I also filter out all records that had more than six bedrooms, six bathrooms, lot size
greater than five acres, or that was in “unsound” physical condition. Finally, I winsorize the data
to remove transactions with sales prices in the 1st and 99th percentile. The final cleansed full
dataset contains 1119,793 sales transactions. Table 7 displays the means and standard deviations
for the variables used in the analysis.
[Insert Table 7]
A change in a house’s tenure from owner-occupied (rental) to a rental (owner-occupied)
is often associated with a sales transaction. If an increase in transaction volume coincides with
the change in homeownership, then a portion of the effect on house prices may be the result of a
liquidity shock. To disentangle changes in homeownership and market liquidity I include a
turnover variable that measures the number of sales transactions over the past six months divided

Additional information on Fulton County’s history is available on Georgia’s website: https://georgia.gov/citiescounties/fulton-county
15
The time periods in Figures A2, A3, and A4 align with the data presented in Table 4.
14
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by the housing stock within the areal unit.16 I also include two proxies for private investment in
new and existing structures. An increase in the number of new houses or investment in existing
structures likely creates positive externalities that increase surrounding home values. As such, I
include two variables that identify the fraction of the housing stock that was (i) built within the
last three years or (ii) remodeled within the last three years. I identify whether a house was
remodeled using the ‘effective year built’ field in the Fulton County tax assessor data. The
‘effective year built’ field identifies the year in which the house underwent a major addition, but
does not identify minor remodeling projects that do not require a permit.17
In addition to the market liquidity and private investment variables I control for several
additional neighborhood characteristics. Given the time period of the study, house prices may be
influenced by distressed sales of surrounding properties (Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao 2009). To
address this potential concern, I include a distressed turnover variable that I calculate as the
number of distressed sales over the past six months divided by the housing stock within the areal
unit. I also include a school test score variable that represents the average elementary school test
score on the annual state administered Criterion-Referenced Competency Test (CRCT). The
remaining neighborhood variables (median income, percent poverty, percent white, percent with
less than a high school education, and percent with college degree) are all gathered at the census
block-group level from the 2010 census.
The first section of Table 7 displays summary statistics for the complete cleansed dataset.
The second (columns 3 and 4) and third (columns 5 and 6) sections are partitioned by buyer type.
If an owner-occupier purchased the house it is included in columns 3 and 4, otherwise the sales
transaction is included in columns 5 and 6. The average sales price over the length of the study is
just over $261,000 – although the average sales price for houses purchased by owner-occupiers
($312,547) was considerably higher than investors ($161,414). This is not surprising because, on
average, the owner-occupied houses are, among other things, more expensive, larger, in better
condition, and less likely to be part of a distressed sales transaction. Of the 119,793 sales

16

I append transaction data from CoreLogic that extends back to 2000 to the Fulton County transaction data to
create the turnover variable, so that no records are dropped.
17
If a house was built in 1985 and had a major addition in 2004 (i.e. an additional bedroom and bathroom were
added to the structure) then the house’s ‘effective year built’ in the Fulton County tax assessor data would be 2004.
The house would be included in the remodeled variable for the next three years.
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transactions in the cleansed dataset, 79,104 were owner-occupied sales transactions and 40,689
were investor sales transactions.
Table 8 stratifies the owner-occupied transactions into two property composition
subgroupings by time period. Columns 1 to 4 include summary statistics for sales transactions
that took place in homogeneous census blocks that do not contain single-family attached or
multi-family housing and columns 5 to 6 include summary statistics for sales transactions that
took place in heterogeneous census blocks that contain a mix of property types. The property
type composition subgroupings show that houses in homogeneous census blocks are, on average,
more expensive, younger, bigger, and in better condition.
[Insert Table 8]
4. Methodology and Results
4.1 Average Effect of Homeownership
Using parcel-level data that includes individual property characteristics and
homeownership information for every single-family house allows me to employ a hedonic
pricing method, similar to the method popularized by Rosen (1974), to examine households’
valuation of nearby homeownership levels. I begin with a log-linear hedonic model of house
prices:
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑡 + ɣ𝑖𝑡 + ф𝑗𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑡

(1)

where 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of the sales price for house i in areal unit j at time t. Sales price is a function
of a vector of the house’s physical characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , sales conditions 𝑆𝑖𝑡 , neighborhood
characteristics 𝑁𝑗𝑡 , and nearby homeownership levels 𝐻𝑡 . Unobserved characteristics of the
house and areal unit are represented by ɣ𝑖𝑡 and ф𝑗𝑡 , and ε𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a random error term. I recognize
that variations in homeownership may be correlated with unobservable factors, so Equation 1
controls for spatial heterogeneity using a standard fixed effects approach at various levels
(census tract, census block-group, and tax assessor neighborhood). I further allow error terms to
be clustered at the census tract, block-group, and neighborhood level, respectively. Indicator
variables are also included to control for quarterly time fixed effects.
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The 𝑋𝑖𝑡 vector includes the house’s age, square feet of living area, lot size, number of
bedrooms, and number of bathrooms. It also includes indicator variables to identify if the house
has a fireplace, garage, carport, fireplace, pool, and the condition of the house. The 𝑆𝑖𝑡 vector
includes indicator variables that identify whether the transaction was a cash purchase, short sale,
foreclosure, or real estate owned (REO) transaction. The 𝑁𝑗𝑡 vector includes market liquidity,
private investment, percent of distressed sales, and census variables discussed in the data section.
Table 9 presents estimation results for the mean effect of homeownership on house prices
using several specifications of Equation 1. The estimates reported represent a total of 47
regressions that differ only in the combination of the areal unit or radius distance in which
homeownership is measured, the neighborhood’s property type composition, and the location
fixed effect used. Homeownership is measured at the census block, tax assessor neighborhood,
and census block-group levels as well as several continuous radius distances as denoted by the
row names. I run the regression analysis on the entire transaction sample in the first section, and
then partition the data in the second and third section based on the property type composition
within the homeownership measure. I control for location fixed effects at several levels. The first
column of each section (columns 1, 4, and 7) controls for spatial heterogeneity at the census tract
level. The second and third column of each section controls at the census block-group and tax
assessor neighborhood levels, respectively. The dependent variable in every column is log of
sales price.
[Insert Table 9]
In Table 9 the coefficient on the key variable of interest, homeownership rate, is positive
and significant regardless of the measure used. 18 The homeownership rate is a decimal in the
dataset, so the coefficients in Table 9 can be interpreted as the percentage change in house prices
as homeownership rates move from 0% to 100%. The coefficient in the first row of Column 1
can be interpreted such that a 10% increase in homeownership results in a 4.7% increase in sales
price. The coefficients for the census block homeownership measure in the first row are
relatively similar across each column, ranging from 4.1% to 4.9% (based on a 10% increase in
homeownership rates).
18

Table A1 in the appendix presents results for all the variables in the block level regressions using data from the
entire study period.
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The results for the homeownership rates measured at the tax assessor neighborhood and
census block-group level are displayed in the second and third row, respectively. As the size of
the areal unit at which homeownership is measured increases, the magnitude of its coefficient
increases in the regression results. This is expected because the results of spatial analysis are
sensitive to the scale at which they measured. The range of coefficients in the second row, where
homeownership is measured at the tax assessor neighborhood level, is wide compared to the first
row. When homeownership is measured at the tax assessor neighborhood level, a 10% increase
in homeownership results in an increase in sales price from 6.9% (column 5) to 17.1% (column
8). Note that the coefficients in homogeneous neighborhoods, where the entire housing stock is
single-family detached, are more comparable to the first row. However, the coefficients in
neighborhoods with a heterogeneous housing stock are much higher which suggests that
including neighborhoods with multiple structure types complicates the analysis. When
homeownership is measured at the census block-group level, a 10% increase in homeownership
results in an increase in sales price ranging from 17.4% (column 7) to 31.1% (column 6). The
larger coefficients are now in the homogeneous neighborhoods.19
The results for the continuous homeownership radius measures are similar to the
predefined areal units, in that, as the size of the radius increases, the magnitude of the
homeownership coefficient increases. At first glance, the results suggest that the value of a house
is impacted not only by the properties that immediately surround it (census block), but also by
the ownership composition of the surrounding area (census block-group). However, when
interpreting the results it’s important to keep the scale of the homeownership measure in mind, as
a 10% increase in homeownership in a census block-group is less likely to occur compared to a
10% increase in a census block. For example, a 10% decrease in homeownership rate at the
block-group level in 2014 would, on average, represent a change in tenure status of 49 houses.
Whereas, a 10% decrease in homeownership at the block level would, on average, only represent
a change in tenure status of 3 houses.
In Table 10 I further partition the dataset into pre-crisis (2002-2006) and post-crisis
(2007-2014) time period subsamples. The subsamples only include areal units that have a
homogeneous housing stock (i.e. single-family detached housing only). I re-estimate the mean
19

As displayed in Table 4, only 9.2% (46 of the 501) of the block-groups have a homogeneous housing stock (i.e.
100% single-family detached).
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effect of homeownership on house prices using several specifications of Equation 1. The
estimates reported represent a total of 38 regressions that differ only in the combination of the
homeownership measure, neighborhood property type composition, and location fixed effects
used. The pre-crisis subperiod represents an up market in Atlanta; whereas the post-crisis market
represents a down market. The results highlight the impact homeownership rates have on house
prices across housing market cycles and suggest that market conditions differed in the pre- and
post-crisis subperiods. Thus, the use of individual time and location fixed effects in Equation 1
may not be optimal.
[Insert Table 10]
The estimates reported in Tables 9 and 10 may also suffer from an omitted variable bias
as the standard fixed effects approach using in Equation 1 assumes that the unobservable house
(ɣ𝑖𝑡 ) and areal unit (ф𝑗𝑡 ) characteristics are constant over time. However, if ɣ𝑖𝑡 and ф𝑗𝑡 are
changing over time and their change is correlated with changes to homeownership then the fixed
effect coefficient estimates will be inconsistent. In the next step of the analysis I address these
concerns by explicitly controlling for the unobserved quality of the individual house and
neighborhood. To do so, I capitalize on the extended timeframe of the study using a repeat-sales
specification with time-varying census tract effects. Equation 2 is a repeat sales specification that
includes house fixed effects:
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑡 + µ𝑖 + 𝛺𝑗𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑡

(2)

where 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of the sales price for house i in areal unit j at time t. Sales price is a function
of a vector of variables that include the house’s physical characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , neighborhood
characteristics 𝑁𝑗𝑡 , and the surrounding homeownership rate 𝐻𝑡 .20 House-specific fixed effects
and a set of tract-by-time fixed effects are denoted by µ𝑖 and 𝛺𝑗𝑡 , respectively.21 The inclusion of
house fixed effects ensure that the homeownership coefficient is estimated by comparing
identical houses, while the tract-by-time fixed effects ensure that the comparisons are made
20

The majority of the house and neighborhood variables do not change over time, so they are differenced out (see
Equation 3). Thus, in Equation 2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents the physical condition of the house and 𝑁𝑗𝑡 represents the distressed
contagion variables.
21
The house fixed effects variables assume that the house characteristics and quality remain constant over the study
period. I include the tax assessor house condition variables to control for changes in the condition of the house over
time.
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within the same areal unit during the same time period. To demonstrate how the effect of
homeownership is identified in Equation 2 I rewrite the equation by differencing observations for
consecutive pair of repeat transactions for house i at times t and 𝑡 ′ :
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 - 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 ′ = 𝛽1 (𝑋𝑖𝑡 - 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ′ ) + 𝛽2 (𝑆𝑖𝑡 - 𝑆𝑖𝑡 ′ ) + 𝛽3 (𝑁𝑗𝑡 - 𝑁𝑗𝑡 ′ ) + 𝛽4 (𝐻𝑡 - 𝐻𝑡 ′ ) + (𝛺𝑗𝑡 - 𝛺𝑗𝑡 ′ ) + ᴓ𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3)
The house fixed effect and physical characteristics of the house drop out of Equation 3 because
the same house is being compared.22 One drawback of the repeat sales model is that it requires a
minimum of two sales transactions for a house. Thus, if a house only sold once during the study
period (2002-2014) it is not included in the analysis.
In the first row of Table 11, I estimate the effect of homeownership at the census block
level. The results are relatively stable regardless of the time period chosen - a 10% increase in
homeownership increases house prices between 2.6 to 2.9%. The results are similar, although the
magnitude of the coefficient decreases, when I estimate the impact of homeownership on house
prices using a 0.10 mile radius measure.
[Insert Table 11]
The relationship between household income, house values and homeownership displayed
in Tables 1 to 3 shows that as income and house value increase, homeownership increases and
rentership decreases. This is problematic, because it suggests that homeownership is endogenous
and correlated with household income and house prices. To address this concern, I merge the
Fulton County Tax Assessor datasets with HMDA data. The HMDA dataset includes
demographic information about the buyer, allowing me to instrument for the decision to become
a homeowner using the homebuyer’s demographic information 𝐷𝑖𝑡 .
∗
𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 𝛽1 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(4)

∗
Equation 4 estimates a bivariate probit model where 𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡
represents the likelihood that a house i

in census tract j at time t will be purchased by an owner-occupier. I use the estimated parameters

22

To ensure the house fixed effect represents the same quality house (i.e. constant-quality model) I filter out repeat
sales transactions in which I have reason to believe the house has undergone a major renovation between sales
transactions. I also filter out repeat sales transactions that have an exceptionally high rate of appreciation (greater
than 10% per quarter) as they likely underwent major renovations to justify the extraordinarily high rate of
appreciation.
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from Equation 4 to calculate an inverse Mills ratio, which I include as an additional explanatory
variable in Equation 1.
The results reported in Table 12 are comparable to the results reported in Tables 9 and
23

10. Note that the results in Table 12 are the product of specifications that include an inverse
Mills ratio and the truncated HMDA data subset.24 The inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio for
homeownership does not change the relationship between homeownership and house prices.
Thus, I conclude that an increase in surrounding homeownership rates causes an increase in
house price, regardless of the specification, homeownership measure, or one’s treatment of
potential endogeneity issue. The initial estimates were relatively unstable across the housing
market cycle (i.e. pre-crisis vs. post-crisis), however after controlling for time-varying census
tract effects I find that a 10% increase in homeownership results in a 2.6% increase in house
prices on average.
[Insert Table 12]
I find that the magnitude of the homeownership coefficient increases as the scale of its
measure increases, so I would expect the estimate to be greater than or equal to previous
estimates that used a smaller scale. However, the estimates are considerably lower than the 6%
estimate reported in Coulson and Li (2013) despite the fact that the average size of the measures
are, in terms of housing stock, nearly three times as big as the clusters used in their study. In the
next section, I move beyond estimating the average effect of homeownership on house prices and
instead test for the existence of quantile effects.
4.2 Distributional Effect of Homeownership
Koenker and Bassett (1978) originally proposed the quantile regression approach.25
Quantile regression estimates a conditional quantile function in which a quantile of the
dependent variable’s conditional distribution is expressed as a function of covariates. Thus,
quantile regressions differ from hedonic regressions that estimate a mean conditional function as
23

Column 1 of Table 12 is similar to the specification used to estimate the first row of Column 4 in Table 9. Column
2 (3) of Table 12 is similar to the specification used to estimate the first row of Column 1 (4) in Table 10.
24
The HMDA data does not include cash purchases, private party loans, unmatched records, or matched records
with blank demographic fields. For example, the sample size for Column 4 of Table 9 is larger (N = 47,570)
compared to Column 1 of Table 12 (N = 23,111).
25
Several real estate studies have used quantile regression including, but not limited to Gyourko and Tracy (1999),
McMillen and Thorsnes (2006), Coulson and McMillen (2007), and McMillen (2008).
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they allow their estimates to vary with the corresponding quantile, so they are particularly useful
when quantile effects exist. The primary difference between ordinary least squares regression
and quantile regression is that quantile regression minimizes the weighted sum of absolute
residuals instead of the sum of squared residuals. The quantile minimization procedure can be
expressed as:
̂θ = arg min ∑𝐴𝑎=1 |𝑝𝑎 − 𝑥𝑎 𝛽θ | 𝑤𝑎
𝛽

(5)

𝛽θ ∈𝑅𝐾

̂θ is a vector of coefficient estimates, 𝑝 denotes
where A is the complete sample of transactions, 𝛽
a vector of A house prices, X denotes an A × K matrix in which the first column is all ones and
the rest of the columns record the values of K - 1 independent variables, and θ ∈ (0,1) denotes
the quantile estimated. Thus, 𝑝𝑎 is the 𝑎𝑡ℎ entry of p, 𝑥𝑎 is the 𝑎𝑡ℎ entry of X, and 𝑤𝑎 is the 𝑎𝑡ℎ
observation’s weight that can be expressed as:
𝑤𝑎 = {

2θ, if 𝑝𝑎 − 𝑥𝑎 𝛽θ > 0
2(1 − θ), otherwise

(6)

At the median (θ = .5) equal weight is given to positive and negative residuals. Whereas, when
examining the 80th percentile (θ = .8), 2θ = 1.6 and 2(1-θ) = .4, so more weight is given to
positive residuals. I estimate the standard errors of the coefficient estimates using a bootstrap
method that retains the assumption of independent errors but relaxes the assumption of
identically distributed errors, which makes the bootstrapped standard errors equivalent to robust
standard errors in linear regressions. One of the primary benefits of quantile regression is that it
uses the full sample and avoids the truncation problem inherent in subsample hedonic regression
analysis.26 The quantile regression takes the following form:
𝑝it = 𝛽1(θ) 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(θ) 𝑁𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3(θ) 𝐻𝑗𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑗𝑡,θ

(7)

where the housing characteristic, neighborhood characteristic, and homeownership rate
coefficients vary by quantile θ. Similar to Equation 1, sales price is a function of a vector of the
house’s physical characteristics𝑋𝑖𝑡 , neighborhood characteristics 𝑁𝑗𝑡 , and nearby homeownership
levels 𝐻𝑗𝑡 .

26

Some studies subdivide their sample according to the unconditional distribution of their dependent variable and
then run a hedonic regression for each subsample.
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Ex ante, I expect that higher (lower) priced houses would be more (less) sensitive to
changes in homeownership rates as the current federal tax subsidy for owner-occupied housing is
directly related to the price of the house and indirectly, positively related to the owner occupier’s
income.27 As an owner-occupier’s house price and income increases the tax subsidy for
homeownership increases.28 Although previous research shows that high income households
benefit the most from the owner-occupier tax subsidies (Poterba and Sinai, 2008) little is known
about whether the subsidies promote homeownership. Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) argue that the
federal tax policies appear to increase the amount spent on housing, but have almost no effect on
the homeownership rate. They posit that the mortgage interest deduction (MID) is ineffective as
it benefits wealthy households, who would likely be homeowners in its absence. In this section I
run a series of quantile regressions to examine the effect of homeownership rates over the full
distribution of house prices. I argue that if the tax subsidies for owner-occupied housing are
effective instruments, house prices in the upper deciles will be more sensitive to changes in
homeownership rates as they are the primary beneficiaries.
Table 13 includes quantile regression estimates for census blocks and 0.10 mile radiuses
that contain only single-family detached housing. The dependent variable in every column is the
log of sales price. The first column of Table 13 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) results that
are comparable to Tables 9 and 10. Results for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles are
presented in order in columns 2 to 6. The results are displayed for the entire study period in the
first (fourth) row for the block-level (.10 mile radius) homeownership measure. An increase
(decrease) in homeownership has a positive (negative) effect in every quantile. The
homeownership estimates exhibit a quantile effect as the magnitude of homeownership’s effect
on house prices is greater (lesser) in the lower (upper) deciles of the conditional house price
distribution. Scatter plots of select explanatory variable coefficients by quantile are displayed in
Figure 2. The scatter plots are available for several structural variables, property conditions, and
neighborhood controls. Figure 3 displays a larger, isolated scatter plot of the homeownership rate
Assuming that the owner-occupier’s marginal tax rate increases with their income.
The tax subsidy is not directly proportional to an owner-occupier’s income because homeowners can only deduct
interest on the first $1,000,000 in acquisition debt and first $100,000 in home equity debt that is secured by their
primary residence and second home. If a homeowner has a second home and they rent it out for part of the year, they
must use the second home more than 14 days or more than 10% of the number of days during the year that the home
is rented at a fair market rental rate, whichever is longer. If they do not meet these requirements, the property is
considered a rental and not a second home (IRS Publication 936).
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coefficients by quantile with a 95% confidence interval. The figure shows that the magnitude of
the homeownership’s effect decreases from the lower to the upper deciles of the conditional
house price distribution.
[Insert Table 13]
Two subperiods are created to examine the effect of homeownership on house prices
across market conditions. The data is partitioned so that the subperiods represent the pre-crisis
housing boom (2002-2006) and the post-crisis housing bust/recovery (2007-2014). The second
and fifth rows of Table 13 present the results for the pre-crisis subperiod. During the pre-crisis
subperiod, I find that an increase (decrease) in homeownership has a positive (negative) effect in
all but the top quantile. Quantile effects are present as the magnitude of the coefficients decrease
in the upper deciles of the conditional house price distribution. Figure 4 displays a scatter plot of
the homeownership rate coefficients by quantile for the pre-crisis subperiod. Similar to Figure 3,
the magnitude of the homeownership’s effect on house prices decreases from the lower to the
upper deciles of the conditional house price distribution.
The third and sixth rows of Table 13 present the results for quantile regressions using the
post-crisis data subset. As noted earlier, the OLS homeownership rate coefficient estimate is
noticeably larger in the post-crisis subperiod compared to the pre-crisis subperiod (.4450 in row
3 versus .1963 in row 2). According to the OLS estimates, a change in homeownership had a
larger mean effect on house prices during the housing bust/recovery than during the housing
boom. Similarly, the quantile homeownership coefficients in rows 3 and 6 are also all greater
than the corresponding quantile coefficients in rows 2 and 5. Figure 5 displays a scatter plot of
the homeownership rate coefficients by quantile for the post-crisis subperiod. Similar to Figures
3 and 4, the distributional effect of homeownership decreases as you move from the lower to the
upper deciles of the conditional house price distribution.
4.3 Valuing the External Benefits of Homeownership
In this section, I calculate a back of the envelope estimate for the external benefits of
homeownership’s monetary value across the house price distribution. In Table 13, a 10% point
increase (decrease) in homeownership at the census block level has an average effect of a 2.0%
point increase (decrease) in pre-crisis house prices and a 4.5% point increase (decrease) post-
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crisis using OLS. Throughout the study period, the average housing stock in each census block
was approximately 33 houses. If I assume that 28 of the 33 houses in a census block were owneroccupied, then the transition of the 29th house from rental to owner-occupancy would increase
the homeownership rate in the census block by approximately 3% points. Using the OLS
estimate for the pre-crisis (post-crisis) dataset, the other 28 owner-occupied houses in the block
would increase in value by approximately 0.59% (1.34%) points. Following Coulson and Li
(2013), if the average sales price is approximately $307,000 in the pre-crisis period and $355,000
in the post-crisis period, the monetary value of the house’s tenure transition represents
approximately $1,800 per house or $50,400 (1,800 * 28) prior to the crisis and approximately
$4,730 per house or $132,440 (4,730 * 28) for the census block post-crisis. If a 3% annual
capitalization rate is applied (assuming an infinitely-lived asset), the homeownership externality
would, on average, yield an annuity of approximately $1,512 ($3,973) per year pre-crisis (postcrisis) for the owner-occupied properties.
The quantile regression results I report in the previous section provide additional insight
into the distributional effect of homeownership and suggest that the external benefits of
homeownership vary over the entire distribution of house prices (which serves as a proxy for
income). In the pre-crisis period I find that a 10% point increase (decrease) has a greater effect,
approximately 4.3%, on house prices in the lower decile compared to a 2.0% effect in the median
decile and no effect in the upper decile of the conditional house price distribution. Taking the
same approach as the previous paragraph, I estimate that the transition of one house would
increase the other owner-occupied house values by approximately 1.30% points in the lower
decile, 0.61% in the median decile, and have no effect in the upper decile. Taking into account
the fact that the typical house value in the upper, median, and lower deciles differ, I estimate the
monetary value of a house’s tenure transition from rental to owner-occupied to be approximately
$1,380 per house, or $38,640 per block, in the lower decile, and $1,480 per house, or $41,440
per block, in the median decile.29 Using a 3% annual capitalization rate and assuming an
infinitely-lived asset, the homeownership externality would, on average, yield an annuity of
approximately $1,159 in the lower decile and $1,243 in the median decile for owner-occupied
properties during the pre-crisis period. The homeownership externality has no effect on house
29

The estimation uses an average sales price of $106,000 for the lower decile and $244,000 for the median decile
during the pre-crisis time period.
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prices in the upper, Q(0.90), decile. The results demonstrate that using the mean effect
overestimates the monetary value of the external benefits of homeownership for both the lower
and median deciles prior to the real estate crisis. It also demonstrates that homeownership has
little effect on house prices in the upper deciles, despite the fact that they are the primary
beneficiaries of the federal government’s subsidization of homeownership in the United States.
Using the same approach for the post-crisis period, I estimate the annuity to be approximately
$1,050 in the lower decile, $2,822 in the median decile, and $1,806 in the upper decile.30
The estimates above provide insight into the distributional effect of homeownership on
house prices and suggest that the federal tax subsidies are ineffective instruments for promoting
homeownership. Households that rent, but would prefer to be homeowners are typically low
income households. However, the primary beneficiaries of the federal tax subsidies are high
income households who, as shown above, receive less homeownership externality benefits.
Instead of increasing homeownership, the federal tax subsidies likely increase the amount spent
on housing by high income households, subsidizing the amount spent on housing rather than
increasing homeownership.
5. Conclusion
Using microdata that includes information for the entire housing stock in Fulton County,
Georgia I isolate and examine the effect of homeownership on house prices. I exploit the
extended timeframe of the data using a research design that explicitly controls for the unobserved
quality of the individual house as well as time-varying neighborhood effects. I find that the
average causal effect of homeownership on house prices is much lower than previously reported
despite using a homeownership measure with a larger scale. I estimate that a 10% increase in
homeownership results in a 2.6% increase in surrounding house prices. Recognizing that
changing the scale of a measure alters findings in statistical tests, I run the analysis using areal
units of differing sizes and several continuous spatial measures. My findings are robust and show
a causal effect regardless of the homeownership measure employed. Although there are
limitations to the study as I cannot – due to data limitations – control for several potentially
endogenous factors such as the redistricting of school zones and crime.

30

The estimation uses an average sales price of $79,000 for the lower decile and $302,000 for the median decile,
and $600,000 for the upper decile during the post-crisis time period.

23

This paper also provides a first look at the distributional effect of homeownership on
nearby house prices. Proponents of subsidizing homeownership contend that homeownership
creates positive externalities and previous research supports the conjecture (see for example:
DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). I argue that the subsidization of homeownership is only
justifiable if the external benefits created exceed their cost. I measure the external benefits of
homeownership in the form of higher house prices over the entire distribution of house prices
and estimate the benefits from a marginal homeowner across the house price distribution. I show
that homeownership has a greater effect on house prices in the lower deciles of the conditional
house price distribution despite the fact that they benefit the least, if at all, from the federal tax
subsidies for homeownership. On the opposite end of the house price distribution,
homeownership has little to no effect on house prices in the top decile, despite the fact that they
benefit the most from the federal tax subsidies for homeownership.
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Figure 1: Homeownership Rate Change 2002 – 2014

% Change Homeownership
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Figure 2: Quantile Regression – Independent Variable Coefficients
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Figure 3: Census Block Homeownership Rate by Quantile (2002 – 2014)
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Figure 4: Pre-crisis Block Homeownership Rate by Quantile (2002-2006)
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Figure 5: Post-crisis Block Homeownership Rate by Quantile (2007-2014)
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Figure A1 – Continuous Spatial Measures of Homeownership
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Figure A2: Homeownership Rate Change 2002 – 2006
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Figure A3: Homeownership Rate Change 2006 – 2010
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Figure A4: Homeownership Rate Change 2010 – 2014
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Appendix B: Examination of Supply Shocks
Table 6 shows that some census blocks experienced large annual homeownership rate
swings. The large annual homeownership swings (greater than 10% - increase or decrease) were
often precluded by a large influx of newly developed single-family detached houses within the
census block. When estimating the effect of homeownership on house prices in an area that has a
large increase in newly developed houses it’s possible that the influx of new houses increases the
homeownership rate and house prices simultaneously. As such, it’s important that the two effects
are properly controlled for when estimating the effect of homeownership on house prices.
I identify 33 census blocks whose housing stock more than doubled in one year – which I
flag using an indicator variable (Shock). I then create a control sample whereby I identify census
blocks that (i) did not experience a supply shock (their housing stock did not increase by more
than 10 percent in any given year) and (ii) are located in the same census tract, but not in the
same census block-group (they are located in the same geographic area, but not in the immediate
area). After identifying the control group I then construct a matched sample that identifies
comparable properties that sold in the same calendar year, have the same number of bedrooms
and bathrooms, and were built within five years of at least one of the Shock records. After
dropping observations with no match - the control group of comparable properties (N=444) is
over twice as large as the Shock group (N=1,100).
Properties in the census blocks are matched both before and after the supply shock, so
that the control group’s house price trend serves as a counterfactual in the analysis. The approach
assumes that the neighborhood characteristics in the treatment and control groups do not differ
significantly. The approach also assumes that the control group’s house price trend is
representative of the house price trend that the treatment group’s house price trend in the absence
of the housing stock shock.31 I then modify equation (1) to include the Shock indicator variable
and two interaction terms: Shock*After and Shock*After*Trend. The coefficient on the Shock
indicator variable estimates the constant price difference between houses in the treatment and
control census blocks for the length of the study. The Shock*After interaction estimates a
“permanent” price difference after the shock and the Shock*After*Trend interaction estimates the
31

Wiley (2015) uses a similar approach to examine the impact of commercial development on surrounding
residential house prices.
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price difference after the shock over time. The Trend variable measures the number of years
relative to the occurrence of the shock {…,-3,-2,-1,0,+1,+2,…} where 0 represents the year that
the housing stock more than doubled.32
The results of the estimation are displayed in Table B1. Column 1 estimates the effect of
homeownership on house prices using equation (1) - providing a baseline estimate (without the
three additional variables) using the smaller subsample of data so that it can be compared to the
full sample estimates in Table 9. Column 2 includes both the local market controls (Turnover, %
Remodeled Houses, and Distressed Turnover) and the three additional supply shock variables.
Whereas, column 3 includes the three shock variables, but not the local market controls. The
results in both columns suggest that a supply shock does not have a significant effect on house
prices. Whereas, the coefficient on the homeownership variable remains positive and significant.

32

Only supply shocks that occurred in 2005 or later are included in the analysis in this section. Shocks that occurred
earlier are not included in either the treatment or control groups. The 2005 cutoff was chosen to allow a minimum of
three years of sales transactions in the “before” baseline trend.
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Abstract
I examine the recent rise of bidding wars and their effectiveness relative to traditional listing
strategies. A simple theoretical model predicts that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war
will be most effective in housing markets with high levels of latent demand. I use school quality
as a proxy for latent demand as households with children naturally want their kids to go to the
best school possible. I posit that the limited supply of housing within high quality school districts
creates latent demand for housing within those districts. Evidence from Atlanta supports the
model - I find that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war is more effective in markets with
latent demand. However, underpricing does not outperform traditional listing strategies.

1. Introduction
When a homeowner decides to list their house for sale they can choose either a
“traditional” or “bidding war” listing strategy. The seller sets a list price that serves as an upper
bound in a traditional listing strategy. The high list price is often adjusted downwards after a
series of negotiations between the buyer and seller. In a bidding war strategy the seller sets a list
price that serves as a lower bound. The low list price is meant to incite immediate activity and
multiple competing bids, thereby, pushing the sale price upwards. Han and Strange (2014)
estimate that a growing number of sales, over 30 percent in some markets, were involved in a
bidding war. The increasing prevalence of bidding wars raises several questions. What are the
underlying catalysts for bidding wars? Were the bidding wars intentional or unintentional? Can
house sellers and/or their agent intentionally underprice a house to incite a bidding war? When a
house is listed using a bidding war strategy (i.e. intentionally underpriced) does it outperform
traditional listings? The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that latent demand, as
proxied by school quality, along with supply constraints are two of the primary catalysts
underlying the seller and/or agent’s choice of listing strategy. While this is not the first to study
the link between house price and school quality, the link to bidding wars has not been studied
thus far and is one contribution of this paper.1
Any attempt to estimate bidding war’s market share or causal effect on house prices is
complicated by the fact that I do not know which listing strategy was employed or the number of
bids received for each sales transaction. Previous studies simply assume that any house that sold
for a price above its original list price was involved in a bidding war. Although the assumption
satisfies the requirement that the seller’s list price served as a lower bound, it does not identify
whether the seller listed the house using a bidding war strategy. Another distinguishing feature of
this study is the examination of whether the bidding war was intentional or unintentional. Sellers
that want to intentionally start a bidding war will list their house for less than their expected sales
price. Whereas, sellers that list their house above their expected sales price are not intentionally
trying to start a bidding war. The delineation is important because the recent rise in bidding wars
gives the impression that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war may be an effective listing
strategy. Although it may be a false impression if a large fraction of the recent bidding wars are
1

There is a rich literature that studies the link between house prices and school quality. See, for example, Black
(1999), Bogart and Cromwell (2000), Downes and Zabel (2002), and Figlio and Lucas (2004).
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unintentional. In addition, intentionally underpricing a house to start a bidding war may attract
multiple competing offers that push the transaction price above the list price, but still result in an
unfavorable outcome for the seller. In other words, underpricing a house may incite a bidding
war, but not maximize the transaction price.
In this study, I identify neighborhoods with high levels of latent demand as they, by
definition, contain multiple potential bidders who are waiting to purchase housing in that area. A
high level of latent demand is a vital component of a bidding war strategy - as its goal is to incite
immediate activity and multiple competing bids at the time of listing. Thus, neighborhoods that
have high levels of built up latent demand offer the ideal setting for bidding wars. I use school
quality as the primary measure of latent demand. School quality allows me to identify
neighborhoods with built up latent demand because in most MSAs only children who live within
a school’s attendance boundary can attend the local public school. Households with children
naturally want their children to attend the best school possible and are faced with two choices.
They can either purchase housing services in a high quality school district or purchase housing
services in a lower quality school district and send their children to a private school. For
households of more modest means, sending their children to a private school may not be an
option. The limited supply of housing in school districts that have the highest test scores creates
latent demand for housing within the school district.
The level of latent demand in a given neighborhood is also a function of the
neighborhood’s housing supply elasticity. If the neighborhood has a large number of
undeveloped residential lots, then a portion of the latent demand can be satisfied by building
additional houses. However, if the neighborhood is highly developed (i.e. there are few
undeveloped residential lots), then the latent demand for housing will persist as long as the local
school’s quality remains high relative to nearby school districts. Figure 1 presents a simple
visualization of the theory. In the figure there are three neighborhoods that differ only in terms of
school quality and housing supply elasticity. Each neighborhood’s local average school test score
is displayed in brackets and its housing supply elasticity is represented by the availability of
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undeveloped residential lots.2 In this simple example, I would expect Market A to have the
highest level of latent demand because it lacks developable lots and has the highest test scores.
Although bidding wars have received a good deal of media attention, some of which
attributes partial blame to them for the housing boom and bust cycle of the 2000s, little is known
about the forces that drive them or their effectiveness as a sales strategy. I show that built up
latent demand, as proxied by high quality school districts with inelastic housing supplies, is one
of the driving forces behind bidding wars. Additionally, real estate agents that advocate
underpricing a house to incite a bidding war have come under scrutiny as critics argue that it is
ineffective and constitutes a principal-agent conflict (Bucchianeri and Minson, 2013). The results
of this study confirm that underpricing a house to incite a bidding war is ineffective. Although, I
find that real estate agents use a bidding war listing strategy when selling their own house –
which contradicts the assertion that real estate agents advocate bidding wars purely out of selfinterest.
2. Background
Housing transactions are often modeled as a series of negotiations between buyers and
sellers using a standard search model (Yinger 1981). In a traditional housing search model a
seller hires a real estate agent to market their house for a given list price. The original list price
set by the seller is assumed to be the ceiling at which the property can transact (i.e. the highest
price the seller can possibly attain). When selecting a list price the seller faces a trade-off
between sale price and time on the market (TOM) (e.g. Trippi 1977; Yavas and Yang 1995;
Knight 2002).3 The trade-off is a function of the seller’s pricing strategy, as the house’s list price
directly affects the arrival rate of potential buyers. A low list price may increase the arrival rate
and encourage potential buyers to look at the house sooner. However, a seller may set a higher
list price as part of their bargaining strategy, because research shows that, on average, it produces
a higher selling price.4 Thus, the lower (higher) the seller lists their property, the more (fewer)
potential buyers the listing will attract, the shorter (longer) the negotiation process, and the
shorter (longer) the TOM.

2

An increase in the average test score displayed in brackets represents an increase in the quality of the local school.
Sirmans, MacDonald and Macpherson (2010) provide a detailed overview of previous studies.
4
See for example Yavas and Yang (1995)
3
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Anglin, Rutherford and Springer (2003) examine the degree to which a house is
overpriced – which they measure as the percentage difference between the actual list price and
the expected list price given the observable characteristics of the house. Anglin et al. (2003)
argue that setting the initial list price too high may discourage participation by potential buyers –
thereby increasing the property’s TOM. Whereas, setting the initial list price too low may result
in a quick sale – potentially lowering the sales price due to a lack of exposure. The degree of
overpricing (DOP) measure in Anglin et al. (2003) implicitly assumes that every house uses a
traditional listing strategy – where the list price is set higher than the expected sales price and
negotiated downwards. Although 9.3% of the properties in their study sold for more than their
list price Anglin et al. (2003) do not examine whether sellers intentionally underpriced their
house to start a bidding war.
A bidding war listing strategy contains elements of two of the more common real estate
sales approaches: standard search and auction. Similar to the traditional listing approach, a seller
lists their house with a real estate agent, but instead of setting a list price that serves as a ceiling
they intentionally list their house at a price below the expected sales price. The lower list price
signals that they are not only serious about selling their house but also, similar to a real estate
auction, attempts to attract multiple buyers that will bid the sales price higher than the original
list price. If successful, a bidding war listing strategy can minimize the property’s time-onmarket (TOM) and holding costs, while maximizing its sales price.
Despite the extensive literature on listing price strategies and their impact on the
relationship between sales price and TOM, there is a dearth of knowledge related to the
underpricing of real estate in a search market, especially in regards to strategically underpricing
real estate in an effort to create a bidding war. Bucchianeri and Minson (2013) examine the
optimal pricing strategy that sellers should pursue in a search market and find that there is little
or no benefit to underpricing a house, even in hot markets. They conclude that agents that
advocate a bidding war listing strategy do so out of self-interest because it increases the
probability of sale and their likelihood of receiving a commission. Han and Strange (2014) use
survey data from the National Association of Realtors (NAR) to examine the frequency of
bidding wars from 1986 – 2010. The authors document the rise of bidding wars, their
determinants at the MSA level, and the individual characteristics of both buyers and sellers that
4

participated in a bidding war. However, due to the nature of their data Han and Strange (2014)
do not evaluate whether the seller intentionally underpriced their house to start a bidding war or
if using a bidding war listing strategy is effective.
A related strand of literature on auction behavior is of particular interest to this study.
Bidding wars are similar to auctions in that they have low starting prices and are likely to
perform better in thicker markets with multiple known potential buyers. Recent studies on
auction behavior find that auctions which open with low asking prices attract more bids and
finish with higher prices (Simonsohn and Ariely 2007). Studies that examine auctions in a real
estate setting offer conflicting evidence. Mayer (1995) develops a framework to compare the
performance of auctions to negotiated sales (i.e. properties that were sold using the standard
search process). Mayer (1998) finds that auctions result in a poor match and a discounted price,
although he does note that auctions will perform worse in down markets with high vacancies.
Quan (2002) develops a model in which buyers and sellers can choose between a search market
and an auction. He then examines the two disposition alternatives and finds that vacant lots sold
for a premium when sold at auction. A recent study by Chow, Hafalir and Yavas (2015) finds
that auctions generate a higher relative price relative to negotiated sales when (i) demand for the
house is strong, (ii) the asset is more homogeneous, and (iii) the asset attracts buyers with higher
valuations.
In an efficient market, listing strategies should not affect house prices. However,
researchers have shown that real estate markets are inefficient. For example, Lambson, McQueen
and Slade (2004) find that out-of-state buyers paid a statistically significant and economically
meaningful premium for apartment complexes in Phoenix, Arizona. Price distortions also exist
when real estate agents sell houses that they personally own. Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas
(2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008) find that agent owned houses sell for approximately 4%
more compared to non-agent owned houses. This study is similar to the aforementioned
literature, in that I examine the inefficiency of real estate markets. However, I focus on listing
strategies and their effect on house prices.
3. Identification Strategy

5

One limitation of this study is that it is impossible to identify whether a property was
intentionally underpriced to incite a bidding war without contacting the previous owner or listing
agent, which is time and cost prohibitive given the large dataset and extended timeframe of the
study. Instead, I develop a detailed identification strategy based on several distinct criteria that
are intrinsic to bidding wars. Similar to previous studies, the first criterion I propose is that the
property must sell for more than its list price.5 Second, the property must be intentionally
underpriced. Third, the property must be listed in a thick market. Fourth, the property must not
be atypical to ensure it appeals to as many potential buyers as possible. Fifth, there must be a
high level of latent demand for the property.
The first criterion above identifies houses that were involved in a bidding war. The
underlying logic is that the house’s sale price was pushed above its list price by competing bids
from multiple buyers. The first criterion, however, does not identify whether the house was listed
using a bidding war strategy. The second criterion builds off the first and identifies houses whose
list price was set below its expected sales price. The second criterion assumes that sellers are
rational and set their list price based on recent comparable sales. Thus, if a seller sets their list
price above the expected sales price they choose a traditional listing strategy where the list price
is an upper bound and the final sales price is determined by a series of negotiations between the
buyer and seller. If a seller sets their list price below the expected sales price they choose a
bidding war listing strategy where the final sales price is determined by competition among
multiple potential buyers who bid against each other in a quasi-auction framework.
The third criterion, that the property must be listed in a thick market, is indirectly related
to the second criterion, as sellers must be reasonably confident in their sale price expectation to
choose a bidding war strategy. In thin markets sellers have fewer comparable sales to draw from
when setting their sales price expectations, so they are more likely to set a high list price. The
high list price allows them to extract information from the market that is currently unavailable in
the form of comparable sales. Additionally, thin markets, by definition, have fewer buyers so a
low list price may not attract the requisite number of buyers for a successful bidding war.

5

My approach differs slightly as I identify whether the transaction price is greater than both the original and
terminal list price. The property’s transaction price equals its sales price minus seller concessions. Previous studies
do not include seller concessions. A property’s terminal list price is its list price in the MLS when the buyer and
seller reached an agreement and the property was taken off the market.
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I draw the fourth criterion from previous research that finds that houses with atypical
features take longer to sell and that sellers of atypical houses tend to set higher original list prices
relative to the eventual sale price (Haurin 1988; Sass 1988). If a house is similar to recent
comparable sales I expect its seller to be more confident in their sales price expectation.
However, if the house is atypical the seller will not be as confident in their sales price
expectation and is more likely to set a high list price to extract information from the market.
Thus, I expect houses that are atypical to use a traditional listing strategy. Whereas, houses that
are more homogeneous will choose between a traditional listing strategy and a bidding war
strategy.
The fifth criterion, that the property is located in a neighborhood with a high level of
latent demand is a vital component of a bidding war because the goal of the listing strategy is to
incite immediate activity and multiple competing bids at the time of listing. A neighborhood with
a high level of built up latent demand offers the ideal setting for a bidding war. I identify the
level of latent demand in a neighborhood by identifying a strong positive externality. If a
neighborhood offers a strong positive externality that only benefits households that reside within
that neighborhood, then households who reside outside the neighborhood will compete for
housing units in that neighborhood when they are listed for sale. The more difficult it is to
reproduce the positive externality in surrounding neighborhoods, the higher the level of latent
demand. The level of latent demand for the positive externality is also a function of the
neighborhood’s housing supply elasticity. If a property is located in a neighborhood that has a
large number of undeveloped residential lots, then a portion of the latent demand can be satisfied
by building additional houses in the neighborhood. However, if the neighborhood is fully
developed then the latent demand for housing will persist over time as long as the positive
externality remains.
I use school quality as an instrument for the positive externality mentioned above because
it cannot easily be reproduced, its market delineations (i.e. school attendance boundaries) are
clearly defined, and previous research finds that it is one of the most important criteria in the
home buying process for households with children. For example, Black (1999) finds that parents
are willing to pay 2.5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in school test scores and Figlio and
Lucas (2005) find that families make location choices on the basis of school grades. School
7

quality allows me to identify markets with built up latent demand because parents naturally want
their children to attend the best schools possible and only children who live inside the school
attendance boundaries can attend the local public school. As such, parents can (i) purchase
housing services in a high quality school district or (ii) purchase housing services in a lower
quality school district and send their children to a private school. For households of more modest
means, private schooling may not be an option.
3.1 Implementation
I begin by identifying properties whose transaction price was greater than both its
original listing price and terminal listing price. To construct the above list price indicator
variable, 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖 , I define 𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 as the original list price, 𝐿𝑃𝑖 as the terminal list price, 𝑇𝑃𝑖 as
the transaction price, 𝑆𝑃𝑖 as the sales price, and 𝑆𝐶𝑖 as the seller concession for house i, where
𝑇𝑃𝑖 = 𝑆𝑃𝑖 - 𝑆𝐶𝑖 . I subtract seller concessions from sales price as concessions are often negotiated
between the buyer and seller and their inclusion in the sales price could misclassify transactions
as bidding wars.6 Using the definitions above, I then define the 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖 indicator variable as
follows:
0, 𝑖𝑓 max(𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑇𝑃𝑖
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 max(𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) < 𝑇𝑃𝑖

(1)

If 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖 = 1 the house was involved in a bidding war. Next, I identify whether the
seller used a traditional listing strategy – in which case the bidding war was unintentional – or if
the seller intentionally underpriced the listing to incite a bidding war. To construct the underprice
indicator variable, 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 , I define 𝐸(𝑇𝑃𝑖 ) as the expected transaction price when the
house was initially listed on the MLS.7
0, 𝑖𝑓 max(𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) ≥ 𝐸(𝑇𝑃𝑖 )
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 max(𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) < 𝐸(𝑇𝑃𝑖 )

(2)

Using (2) I further classify the bidding war transactions identified in (1) as intentional if
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 1 and unintentional if 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 0. As noted earlier, one drawback of this

6

Over 53% of the sales transactions in the dataset included a seller concession. Of the transactions that included a
seller concession the average concession was approximately 2.2%.
7
The steps taken to estimate the expected transaction price for each listing are detailed in Appendix A.
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study is that I do not know if houses that were underpriced (𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 1) and did not sell
above their list price (𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝐿𝑃𝑖 = 0) were involved in a bidding war that did not push their
transaction price above their list price.
After classifying the bidding war transactions I examine how thick the market was when
the house was listed. A bidding war requires multiple competing bids to push the sales price
above the original list price, so I argue that bidding wars will be more likely in thick markets.8
Additionally, sellers must be reasonably confident in their sales price expectation to be willing to
employ a bidding war strategy. I create several measures of market thickness. First, I create two
measures in the immediate vicinity of the subject property: competition and listing density. The
two measures are similar to those employed in Turnbull et al. (2006) and Zahirovic-Herbert and
Turnbull (2008). To construct the market competition variable I define 𝑙𝑖 as the listing date and
𝑠𝑖 as the sales date for house i. I then calculate house i's time-on-market as 𝑠𝑖 -𝑙𝑖 +1. If house j is
also simultaneously listed for sale, then the two houses have an overlapping time-on-market of
𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) = min[𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 ] – max[𝑙𝑖 , 𝑙𝑗 ] + 1. Using the definitions above, the neighborhood market
competition variable, C, measures the competition for house i as:
2

𝐶 𝑑 = ∑(𝑑 − 𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗)) 𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗)

(3)

where 𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) is the straight-line distance in miles between houses i and j. In this study, I measure
𝐶 𝑑 as the summation taken over all competing houses j within d miles of house i. I measure
competition at several continuous spatial distances (radiuses of .25, .50, and 1 mile).
The next market competition variable, L, represents the listing density for house i. Listing
density measures competing overlapping listings per day on the market. I estimate the listing
density using a numerator similar to the competition variable in (3) and a denominator that is
house i's time-on-market as:
2

𝐿𝑑 = ∑

(1−𝐷(𝑖,𝑗)) 𝑂(𝑖,𝑗)

(4)

𝑠(𝑖)−𝑙(𝑖)+1
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This sentiment is echoed and confirmed in Han and Strange (2013) and Liu et al. (2015). Liu et al (2015) find that
mansions, which have atypical features and trade in thin markets, never adopt a bidding war strategy. They argue,
similar to Han and Strange (2013) that mansions’ atypical features and thin market increases the risk that multiple
bids for the mansion would not arrive at the same time even if the original list price was set well below the expected
sale price.
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In addition to the market competition and listing density variables, I also include an
inventory and turnover variable at the elementary school level. Inventory measures the supply of
single-family detached houses available for sale in the elementary school zone. I calculate
Inventory as the total number of houses available for sale (i.e. listed on the MLS) during the
month that the house was listed divided by the average number of sales per month over the
previous year. Turnover measures the demand for housing over time within the elementary
school zone. I calculate Turnover as the annualized average number of sales transactions over the
previous three months divided by the housing stock.
Previous research finds that houses with unusual attributes sell for less and take longer to
sell (Haurin 1988) and that real estate auctions generate a higher price relative to negotiated sales
when the asset is more homogeneous (Chow et al. 2015). As such, I examine the atypicality of
each house because I expect that houses with fewer unusual features will appeal to a broader
market, thereby rendering a bidding war listing strategy feasible. Conversely, atypical houses
will appeal to a smaller market segment, so a bidding war strategy is not feasible. I estimate the
atypicality of each house following the framework in Turnbull et al. (2006) that measures
atypicality as the extent to which a given house is either larger or smaller, in terms of its square
feet of living area, relative to other houses in its surrounding neighborhood.9 To create the
atypicality measure, I index every house within a given radius of house i by J and estimate the
house’s relative size. The relative house size is estimated as follows:

Localsizei 

Livingareai   jJ Livingareaj N j



jJ

Livingareaj / N j

(5)

where Nj is the number of surrounding houses in the neighborhood J. I then define the relative
size variables A_Largeri and A_Smalleri as the absolute value of the positive and negative values
of Localsizei as follows:
A_Largeri = {

0
, 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ≤ 0
|𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|, 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 > 0

(6)

9

Turnbull et al. (2006) estimate the atypicality of a house relative to other houses that were listed for sale, as their
dataset did not include information on houses that were not listed for sale. If houses that are listed for sale are
significantly different than houses that are not listed for sale then the measure employed in Turnbull et al. (2006)
may be biased. The dataset includes information on houses that were and were not listed for sale, so I create the
atypicality measure using the entire single-family detached housing stock.
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A_Smalleri = {

0
, 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ≥ 0
|𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|, 𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 < 0

(7)

where the relative size variables allow for asymmetric relative house size effects on a house i’s
market outcome. Similar to competition, I measure the atypicality of a house using several
continuous spatial distances (radiuses of .25, .50, and 1 mile) and within elementary school
districts.
I expect more bidding wars to occur in neighborhoods with a high level of latent demand
because bidding wars require multiple competing bids to push the transaction price above its
original list price. Assuming a thick market and low level of atypicality, a house located in a
neighborhood with a high level of latent demand will, by definition, have multiple interested
bidders waiting to bid on it when it is listed. Thus, neighborhoods with high levels of latent
demand offer the ideal setting to employ a bidding war listing strategy. I estimate the latent
demand for housing in a neighborhood using local school quality.
To estimate the local school quality for each transaction, I identify and assign each house
to their local elementary school based on school attendance boundaries using a geographical
information system. After assigning each house to the appropriate school, I then merge the
transaction data with the average test score for the corresponding school. The local elementary
school’s average school test score serves as a proxy for local school quality.10 I also measure the
local housing supply elasticity as the percent of developed residential lots in the specified areal
unit in which the house is located. To construct the housing supply elasticity measure I define 𝑢𝐽
as the number of undeveloped lots and 𝑓𝐽 as the total number of developed lots in neighborhood
J. I then estimate the neighborhood’s housing supply elasticity as:
𝐸𝐽 = 𝑢𝐽 / (𝑢𝐽 + 𝑓𝐽 )

(8)

In the empirical analysis I expect to find the highest levels of latent demand in housing markets
that have high quality schools and are highly developed.
4. Data
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I describe the elementary attendance boundaries, redistricting of the boundaries, and school test score data in
Section 4.
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The dataset I employ in this study includes several data sources. The transaction level
data was provided by the Georgia Multiple Listing Service (GAMLS). The transaction data
includes every single-family detached house that was listed for sale on the GAMLS from January
1, 1997 to September 30, 2014, regardless of whether it sold or not. The data’s coverage area
includes four counties (Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett) that make up the core of Atlanta’s
metropolitan housing market. The GAMLS data contains detailed information on the property’s
location, lot size, age, structural characteristics (number of bedrooms, bathrooms, etc.), and sales
conditions (foreclosure, short sale, etc.). The GAMLS data also includes listing information
(listing date, list price, sales price, etc.) that I use to calculate time-on-market and identify houses
that were marketed using a bidding war strategy.
I supplement and validate the GAMLS data with parcel level information from each
county’s tax assessor office. The tax assessor data contains information for the entire singlefamily detached housing stock regardless of whether the house was listed for sale or not during
the study period. The tax assessor data was obtained from CoreLogic and includes additional
information such as the house’s square feet of living area that is not available in the GAMLS
dataset. After merging the GAMLS and CoreLogic datasets I geocode the entire housing stock
and identify the local elementary school that the occupant’s children are eligible to attend based
on the property’s address. I use School Attendance Boundary Survey (SABS) files that were
obtained from Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to
associate each housing transaction with its local elementary school and corresponding school
district. Similar to previous research that examines school quality’s impact on house prices I
focus on elementary schools because it is the only school-level that allows for enough withindistrict variation.
The SABS files only include the school attendance boundaries for 2014. After assigning
each house to its elementary school in 2014, I also identify whether the house is located in a
school attendance zone that has been affected by redistricting during the study period.
Redistricting is necessary in school districts where the school age population within the
attendance zone outgrows the occupancy capacity of the school that serves it.11 Information on
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This was a relatively common occurrence within in the metro-Atlanta area during the time period of this study due
to the rapid growth in the student population. For example, Gwinnett County School District grew from
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redistricting was obtained directly from the Atlanta Public School, City of Decatur, Cobb
County, DeKalb County, Fulton County, Gwinnett County, and Marietta City school districts’
planning departments.
Using data obtained from the Georgia Department of Education I create several measures
of school quality based on each elementary school’s average Criterion-Referenced Competency
Test (CRCT) scores.12 The CRCT was implemented in the spring of 2000 and retired in 2014
when it was replaced by the Georgia Milestones Assessment System. I create a static overall
average test score variable using each elementary school’s 2000 to 2014 CRCT test scores as
well as a non-static annual average test score variable. I use the static overall average variable as
a proxy for school quality when running the empirical analysis on the entire dataset (1997-2014).
An obvious drawback of the static measure is that elementary school test scores will vary from
year to year and the static measure does not take improvement (retrogression) into consideration.
As such, I also use annual CRCT score averages and restrict the data to a subsample that includes
the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2014.13
Students who take the CRCTs are not compared to each other based on their raw score,
but are measured based on whether they meet specific academic standards outlined by the
Georgia Department of Education. In addition to a raw test score, a student’s achievement in
each content area is classified into one of three performance levels: Student Met Standard,
Student Did Not Meet Standard, or Student Exceeded Standard. Students’ CRCT results are
made available to the public at an aggregated school and system level each year. The primary
test score variable used in the analysis is the average standard score for each elementary school
that I calculate by normalizing and averaging each school's test scores across grades three

approximately 110,330 students in the 2000-2001 school year to approximately 175,800 in the 2014-2015 school
year.
12
Georgia law, as amended by the A+ Education Reform Act of 2000, requires that all students in first through
eighth grade take the Reading, English/Language Arts, and Math CRCTs. Students in third through eighth grade also
must take the Science and Social Studies CRCTs. The CRCTs are administered in late spring each year and the
results are released prior to the end of the school year. The CRCT is designed to measure student achievement of
state-mandated content standards. Additional information is available on the Georgia Department of Education’s
website (http://www.gadoe.org/).
13
The CRCT test scores are typically released in June of the year they were administered. I associate the test scores
from the 1999-2000 school year to sales in the third and fourth quarter of 2000 and the first and second quarter of
2001. The 2000-2001 test scores are then associated to sales in the third quarter of 2001 and so on.
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through five.14 Similar to previous research I focus on the average Math and Reading test scores
for each elementary school.15
Seasonality variables are also included to examine school quality’s role in a seller’s
decision to use a bidding war strategy. Seasonality likely plays a role because homebuyers with
school-age children search within a narrow timeframe (i.e. spring and early-summer) – that way
their children’s education is not disrupted by a mid-year change of schools. To examine
seasonality’s role in bidding wars I create monthly and quarterly variables where Winter includes
houses listed in January, February and March; Spring includes houses listed in April, May and
June; Summer includes houses listed in July, August and September; and Fall includes houses
listed in October, November and December.
Finally, I match each house with its 2010 census block, block-group, and tract. The
predefined census groupings do not coincide with the school attendance boundaries. I use the
census block-group identifications to match the houses with census data. After merging the
datasets and removing records with missing fields there are 542,354 unique listing records, of
which 408,959 resulted in a successful sales transaction. Two key fields, Agent Owned and
Agent Related, are not populated for the entire length of the study so I parse the public remarks
section of MLS data to populate the fields.16 I also parse the public remarks section to identify
and update missing information for every field used in the empirical analysis. For example, if the
public remarks section states that the property is a “fixer-upper”, but the listing agent did not
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From 2000 to 2003, I only use fourth grade CRCT test scores because only grades four, six, and eight were tested
from 2000 to 2002. The test score variables from 2004 to 2014 include grades three through five.
15
I also create a variable based on the percent of students in the elementary school that met or exceeded the CRCT
standards. I create the variable by normalizing and averaging each school's percent of students that met or exceed
the standards across grades three through five. This measure is the same as the average standard score assigned to
each elementary school on the popular school ranking website schooldigger.com. As an additional robustness check
I also create a variable that includes the following test scores for grades three through five: CRCT Reading, CRCT
English Language Arts, CRCT Math, CRCT Science, and CRCT Social Studies. The findings are similar regardless
of the school test score measure employed.
16
The Agent Owned field is unavailable prior to 2006 and the Agent Related field is unavailable prior to 2009. I
populate the fields by parsing the public remarks section of the MLS. For example, if the public remarks states that
the “owner is agent”, “agent is owner”, “seller is agent”, “agent is seller”, “owner is real estate agent”, “seller is real
estate agent”, “owner is licensed agent”, “owner/agent”, “seller/agent”, or “seller is licensed agent” then I update
the Agent Owned indicator variable accordingly. A similar string of key words is used to populate the Agent Related
field.
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mark the “fixer-upper” box when filling out the MLS input sheet I update the indicator variable
accordingly.17
After updating the variables using the public remarks, I apply several filters to
systematically clean the data. I winsorize the top and bottom 1 percent of sale and list prices and
top 1 percent of time-on-market to remove potential outliers. I remove houses that were built
prior to 1900 and exclude houses that have less than 500 square feet of living area, more than 5
acres of land, more than 6 bedrooms or bathrooms, a negative time-on-market, or a seller
concession greater than 9 percent of the house’s sales price.18 I also remove listings that included
additional buildings/lots or were listed as a waterfront, rental, tear down, incomplete
construction, new construction, or fixer upper property. The cleaned dataset includes 283,622
unique listings that resulted in successful transactions, of which 214,697 were non-distressed
transactions. Summary statistics for the key variables of interest are available in Table 1. The
average transaction price for the entire sample was $198,243 which was approximately $7,608,
or 3.7 percent, less than the average list price at the time of sale. Approximately 9 percent of the
sample sold for more than their original list price (Above LP) and an additional 4 percent sold for
more than their reduced list price (Above Reduced LP).19,20
[Insert Table 1]
In the second and third sections of Table 1 the data is partitioned into non-distressed and
distressed subsamples to show that the subsamples’ listing strategies, sales processes, and market
outcomes differ. Houses in the distressed subsample were, on average, older, smaller, and in
neighborhoods with lower school test scores. The distressed subsample also had a lower average
sales price, took longer to sell, and were more likely to sell for more than their original list price.
Above LP transactions represented approximately 15 percent of the distressed subsample
compared to only 9 percent in the non-distressed subsample.
17

A complete list of the key words used when parsing the public remarks is available upon request.
I remove all records that have a seller concession greater than 9% as that is the upper limit designated in Fannie
Mae’s Interested Party Contributions (IPC) guidelines. FHA loans limit seller concessions to 6% of the sales price
and require that each dollar that exceeds the six percent limit be subtracted from the property's sale price.
19
Approximately 13 percent of the sample had a sales price that exceeded its original list price. The 4 percent
difference highlights the fact that not accounting for seller concessions would result in a large number of
transactions being misclassified as bidding wars.
20
The above reduced list price grouping includes all sales transactions where the transaction price was greater than a
list price that was reduced at least once over the course of its listing period.
18
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The time-on-market measure in Table 1 was constructed using both sold and unsold
listings where properties that were taken off the market and relisted within 60 days are treated as
a continuous listing.21 Approximately 4 percent of the transactions were relisted at least once
prior to their sale. The average time-on-market for the entire sample was just under 84 days. In
Figure 2 (3) I graph time-on-market kernel density estimates for all non-distressed sales
transactions (with a TOM less than or equal to 90 days).22 In both figures the transactions are
partitioned into six groups: above original list price, above reduced list price, above increased
list, below or equal to original list price, below or equal to reduced list price, and below or equal
to increased list. As expected, sales transactions with a reduced list price have a longer time-onmarket, as the list price reduction signals that the property did not transact earlier at the original
list price. Sales transactions whose list price increased also have a longer average time-on-market
compared to sales that did not change their list price.
[Insert Figure 2]
The two figures illustrate the fact that a high proportion of above original list price
transactions sold quickly. However, there are a large number of above original list price
transactions that took an extended amount of time to sell. If one of the primary goals of a bidding
war is to incite immediate activity then Figures 2 and 3 highlight the need to further refine the
proxy for bidding wars. As such, I create several bidding war measures using various TOM
cutoffs. My preferred bidding war measure includes all above original list price transactions that
sold within 28 days. The 28 day cutoff signifies that the listing incited immediate activity and
multiple bids. Although I do not have information on the number of bids received, it is more
plausible that a transaction price was pushed higher by multiple bids early in its listing cycle (i.e.
four weeks or less) compared to a house that was listed for ten weeks.
[Insert Figure 3]
4.1 Underpriced Listings and Bidding Wars

TOM = [Sale Date] – [Initial Listing Date] – [Days not on MLS]
90 days or 3 months represents the average length of a listing contract agreement between sellers and their agents
in the sample.
21
22
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Han and Strange (2014) classify a transaction as a bidding war if its sales price exceeded
its list price.23 Although this approach identifies houses that were likely part of a bidding war - it
does not identify if the house was intentionally underpriced to incite a bidding war. If a house
seller wants to start a bidding war the most effective strategy would be to set their list price lower
than their expected sales price – similar to an auction. The results in the top section of Table 2
examine whether underpriced houses sold for more than their list price (columns 3 to 6) and
expected transaction price (columns 7 to 10).
[Insert Table 2]
Underpricing a house results in a bidding war approximately 9 percent of the time –
although only 1 percent of the houses in the underpriced subsample sold for more than their
expected transaction price. The transaction price for the overpriced subsample was less likely to
result in a bidding war (~5%), but much more likely to exceed its expected transaction price
(~76%). The middle and bottom sections of Table 2 are filtered to only include houses that were
part of a bidding war. In the middle section, columns 1 and 2 show that 50 percent of bidding
wars, as proxied by Above LP transactions, were intentionally underpriced. The underpriced
transactions represent a subset of houses that used a bidding war listing strategy and were
successful in terms of inciting a bidding war. Of the houses that used a bidding war listing
strategy, only 13 percent sold for more than their expected transaction price. Using the preferred
proxy (Above LP [TOM ≤ 28 days]) in the bottom section, I estimate that 55 percent of the
houses that were involved in a bidding war were intentionally underprice – of which only 11
percent exceeded their expected transaction price.
The results in the top section of Table 2 suggest that bidding wars occur more often when
a house is underpriced and that inciting a bidding war by underpricing a house may come at the
expense of a lower than expected transaction price. This fact is further reinforced in the middle
and bottom sections of Table 2 - which only include transactions that involved a bidding war.24
Even when conditioning on a successful bidding war, only 11 to 13 percent of the underpriced
listings sold for more than their expected transaction price.

23
24

As noted earlier, this study uses transaction price instead of sales price.
In other words, underpriced houses that did not sell for more than their list price were removed.
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4.2 Bidding War Frequency
To examine the frequency of bidding wars over time I partition the dataset into annual
subsamples from 1998 to 2014 in Table 3. The average time-on-market, premium above list
price, inventory, turnover, and the number of transactions are displayed for the entire sample and
several distinct groupings. The number of houses that sold for more than their list price, which
has been used as a proxy for bidding wars in previous literature, increased during the early- to
mid-2000s, accounting for as much as 10.2 percent of the total non-distressed sales transactions
in 2001. Bidding wars are often anecdotally associated with the housing boom and I do find that
the number of sales that transacted above their list price decreased during the financial crisis.
However, Table 3 shows that the decrease in bidding wars was temporary and that their market
share started increasing back to pre-crisis levels in 2012. Bidding wars represented 7.5 percent of
the market prior to the real estate crisis (2003 – 2006), 3.0 percent during the housing bust
(2007-2011), and 7.1 percent during the housing recovery (2012-2014) in Atlanta.25 The
reemergence of bidding wars after the financial crisis suggests that they were not a temporary
byproduct of the housing boom.
[Insert Table 3]
The results in the top section of Table 3 also highlight the relationship between bidding
wars and market conditions. The time-on-market, inventory, and turnover measures represent the
average market conditions for the elementary school zones where the bidding wars took place.
When inventory decreased (increased), bidding wars’ market share increased (decreased).
Whereas, when turnover increased (decreased), bidding wars’ market share increased
(decreased). There was a relatively large increase in the premium above original list price from
2008 to 2012.26 From 1997 to 2007, the premium ranged from 2.8 to 3.7 percent. However, from
2008 to 2012 the premium ranged from 4.5 to 6.0 percent - averaging approximately 5.4 percent.
Although there were much fewer bidding wars, in terms of both volume and market share, from
2008 to 2012 - the houses that were involved in a bidding war benefited from a higher average

25

For comparison purposes, Han and Strange (2014) estimate that 11.4% (9%) of all non-distressed sales sold for
more than their list price during Atlanta’s housing boom of 2003 – 2006 (housing bust of 2007 – 2010).
26
Premium Above LP = [TP – max(OLP, LP)] / [max(OLP, LP)]
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premium above list. In 2013 and 2014, the premium above list price returned to pre-crisis levels
although the average TOM was considerably lower.
The average time-on-market for houses that were involved in a bidding war increased
leading up to and during the financial crisis, but dropped below pre-crisis levels soon after. The
high average TOM, especially from 2004 to 2008, does not seem plausible for bidding wars, so I
report similar descriptive statistics for a subsample of transactions in which transaction price
exceeded list price and the time-on-market was 28 days or less. As noted earlier, the 28 day
time-on-market cutoff represents the preferred proxy for bidding wars. Using ‘% Above LP
[TOM ≤ 28]’ as the proxy, bidding wars represented 2.7 percent of the market prior to the real
estate crisis (2003 – 2006), 1.6 percent during the housing bust (2007-2011), and 5.5 percent
during the housing recovery (2012-2014) in Atlanta.
Next I partition the Above LP [TOM ≤ 28] grouping into intentional and unintentional
bidding wars. A transaction is considered an intentional bidding war if (i) its transaction price
exceeded list price, (ii) the house had a time-on-market of 28 days or less, and (iii) the house was
underpriced. A transaction is considered an unintentional bidding war if its meets requirements
(i) and (ii), but it was listed for more than its expected transaction price. Intentional bidding wars
represented 1.5 percent of the market prior to the real estate crisis (2003 – 2006), 1.1 percent
during the housing bust (2007-2011), and 3.0 percent during the housing recovery (2012-2014).
Whereas, unintentional bidding wars represented 1.2 percent of the market prior to the real estate
crisis (2003 – 2006), 0.5 percent during the housing bust (2007-2011), and 2.5 percent during the
housing recovery (2012-2014).
4.3 School Quality, Housing Supply Elasticity, and Latent Demand
Table 4 provides summary statistics by school test score deciles for non-distressed sales
transactions. Columns 1 to 3 display the average, minimum and maximum school test score for
each decile.27 The deciles were created such that the elementary schools with the lowest average
school test scores are included in the 1st decile. As school test scores increase so too do their

27

The school test scores in Table 4 represent the static overall average Math and Reading CRCT scores for each
elementary school from 2000 through 2014.
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corresponding decile. There are 323 elementary schools in the metro Atlanta area, so each decile
represents 32 or 33 schools.28
[Insert Table 4]
Columns 4 to 10 of Table 4 display aggregated transaction level detail for each decile.
The transaction detail shows that the average annual sales volume per school district and the
average transaction price increase as the deciles increase. In contrast, the percent of above list
price sales transactions decrease as the deciles increase. The percent of above list price sales
represents all transactions in which the transaction price of the property exceeded both its
original and terminal list price regardless of property’s TOM. Whereas, the percent of bidding
wars represents all transactions in which the property’s transaction price exceeded its original
and terminal list price and the property sold in 28 days or less. The bidding war proxy is further
partitioned into intentional and unintentional bidding wars. Intentional bidding war shares exceed
unintentional bidding war shares in the upper deciles. Whereas, the unintentional bidding war
shares exceed or are on par with intentional bidding war shares in the lower school test score
deciles. Also, note that the average transaction price for the 5th through 8th deciles is not
monotonic which suggests that homebuyers may only be willing to pay a premium to live in
neighborhoods located in the top two test score deciles.
Each decile’s average housing supply elasticity is presented in the final section of Table
4. Column 11 represents the average number of single-family detached lots in each elementary
school zone. For each decile, column 12 (14) displays the average number of undeveloped lots in
an elementary school zone in 1997 (2014) and column 13 (15) displays the corresponding
average percent of undeveloped lots. In 1997, there was no clear pattern across the deciles. In
contrast, a clear pattern emerged over time and is visible in 2014. The percent of undeveloped
lots in the higher quality school deciles decreased over time as demand increased for housing in
neighborhoods with higher test scores. In 2014, the top two deciles had the lowest percentage of
developable lots. This stylized fact combined with the upper decile price premium lends
credence to the expectation that there is latent demand for housing in neighborhoods with higher
school test scores.
28

School quality is loosely correlated with median household income. High income neighborhoods generally have
high quality schools. However, high quality schools are also located in lower income neighborhoods.

20

4.4 Transaction to List Price Ratios by School Decile
In Figure 4 I graph the transaction to original list price ratios for the school test score
deciles presented in Table 4. Figure 4 includes all non-distressed sales in which the transaction
price did not exceed its list prices (max(𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑇𝑃𝑖 ) and was not underpriced
(max(𝑂𝐿𝑃𝑖 , 𝐿𝑃𝑖 ) ≥ 𝐸(𝑇𝑃𝑖 )). These transactions represent houses that were listed using a
“traditional” listing strategy in which the house seller sets a list price that serves as an upper
bound. Sellers who are uncertain about their expected sales price use the traditional listing
strategy to extract information from the market. They often set their list price above their
expected selling price by an amount that increases with their uncertainty about their home’s
market value (Liu et al. 2015). The high list price is then adjusted downwards after a series of
negotiations between the buyer and seller. Figure 4 shows that sellers in the upper school test
score deciles are more certain about their expected sales price, especially during the real estate
bust and subsequent recovery (2007 – 2014). This suggests that sellers in the upper test score
deciles are more likely to select a bidding war listing strategy because confidence in sales price
expectations is a necessary condition when selecting a bidding war listing strategy.
[Insert Figure 4]
4.5 Listing Agents and Agent Owned Sales
The seller’s decision to underprice their house in an attempt to start a bidding war was
likely influenced by the real estate agent they chose to list their house. Table 5 displays the
frequency in which bidding wars are employed by listing agents. Of the 23,340 distinct agents
with at least one listing in the dataset over one-fourth (27.4%) of the agents had a listing that sold
above its list price at least once – although that number drops to 16.7 percent when the using the
preferred TOM ≤ 28 constraint. Approximately 10.4 percent of the agents were involved in at
least one transaction in which they intentionally underpriced the house and it sold above the list
price within 28 days. Of the 2,437 agents that employed an intentional bidding war listing
strategy the majority (74.6%) only did so once. The frequency in which the bidding war listing
strategy is employed varies greatly by listing agent, but Table 5 shows that numerous listing
agents have repeatedly employed the strategy for their clients.
[Insert Table 5]
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Real estate agents that advocate underpricing a house to incite a bidding war have come
under scrutiny as critics argue that it constitutes a principal-agent conflict (Bucchianeri and
Minson, 2013). Next, I examine whether real estate agents use a bidding war listing strategy
when selling their own house – which would contradict the assertion that real estate agents
advocate the listing strategy purely out of self-interest. If real estate agents – who are often better
informed than their clients (Levitt and Syverson 2008) - advise their clients to use a bidding war
strategy, but do not employ the strategy themselves it may signal that the agents’ primary motive
is a quick sale and not the maximization of sales price for their clients. However, if real estate
agents use bidding wars when listing their own properties it may signal that they believe the
listing strategy is an effective option.
The top portion of Table 6 is stratified by the number of agent owned sales transactions.
Agents with a single agent owned sales transaction intentionally employed a bidding war listing
strategy 1.3 percent of the time – which is slightly less than the 1.8 percent average for the nonagent owned sample. However, if the agent owned and sold multiple houses they were more
likely to use a bidding war listing strategy. Overall, approximately 1.7 percent of the agent
owned transactions were sold using a bidding war listing strategy – which is in line with the 1.8
percent average for the non-agent owned sample.
[Insert Table 6]
I also created a subsample of agent owned sales that I filtered to only include agents that
used a bidding war strategy at least once for a client. After conditioning on the use of a bidding
war listing strategy for a client, 4.9 percent of the agents in the subsample also used a bidding
war strategy when they sold their own house.29 Thus, real estate agents that advocate the use of a
bidding war listing strategy for their clients are more likely to use the strategy themselves when
listing their own house.
4.6 Transaction Level Analysis of Bidding Wars

The subsample consisted of 628 agent owned sales transactions – of which, 31 were underpriced and sold for
more than their list price.
29
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To further examine the factors that influence bidding wars and a seller and/or agent’s
decision to use a bidding war listing strategy I estimate several linear probability models that
take the following form:
𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 = α + ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑡 + ε𝑗𝑡

(9)

where 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the probability that house i located in neighborhood j will (i) be involved
in a bidding war, (ii) involved in an intentional bidding war, or (iii) involved in an unintentional
bidding war at time t. 𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑡 represents a vector of K potentially related transaction level correlates,
𝛽𝑘 represents the corresponding coefficients, α is a constant, and ε𝑗𝑡 is the error term. In addition
to the three specifications above, I run a specification that examines a house sellers decision to
underprice their house and a specification the examines the transaction level correlates for
underpriced houses that result in a bidding war.
Table 7 presents the results for the five specifications - all of which include census tract
and time fixed effects in addition to the variables displayed. The first column presents the results
for bidding wars as proxied by Above LP [TOM ≤ 28]. The second column presents the results
for houses that used a traditional listing strategy that were involved in a bidding war (i.e.
unintentional bidding wars) and the third column presents the results for underpriced houses that
were involved in a bidding war (intentional bidding wars). The analysis was run using sales
transactions that occurred in elementary school zones that were not affected by redistricting
initiatives during the study period.
[Insert Table 7]
The results at the top of Table 7 show an interesting pattern among bidding wars and
school test scores. The results in column 1 suggest that bidding wars are not correlated with
school test scores. However, the results in column 2 suggest that an unintentional bidding war is
more likely to occur in a school district with higher test scores. Whereas, an intentional bidding
war is less likely to occur in a school district with higher test scores. Most of the physical
characteristics of the house produce mixed results across the three specifications or are
insignificant in all three – although larger houses are less likely to be involved in bidding wars.
Using survey data, Han and Strange (2014) find that younger buyers are more likely to have
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purchased their houses through bidding wars. I include an indicator variable that identifies
houses that were described as “starter homes” in the MLS listing. The indicator variable is
positive and significant in column 1. The result confirms the finding in Han and Strange (2014)
and suggests that “starter homes” – which are often marketed towards young, first-time
homebuyers – are more likely to be purchased through a bidding war.
An indicator variable for agent owned houses is insignificant in all three models –
although transactions in which the agent is related to the seller is significant and negative in two
of the three specifications. An increase in inventory reduces the likelihood of a bidding war in all
three specifications. Thus, when supply decreases (increases) bidding wars are more (less) likely
to occur. Along the same line, as turnover increases (decreases) the likelihood of bidding war
increases (decreases). Seasonality also plays a role in bidding wars. Houses are much more likely
to be purchased through a bidding war when they are listed in the first six months of the year.30
The dependent variable in column 4 is the Underprice variable from equation (2). Thus,
the estimates in column 4 identify the transaction level correlates for houses that were
intentionally underpriced. The coefficient on school test scores is negative, large, and significant
– which suggests that house sellers in high quality school districts are less likely to underprice
their house. The coefficients on the physical characteristics of the house are mixed. Larger
houses with more bathrooms are more likely to be underpriced. However, houses with five or six
bedrooms are less likely to be underpriced. Houses listed as estate owned or corporate
relocations are also less likely to be underpriced when they are listed. The decision to underprice
a house is not correlated with agent owned, agent related, or the level of inventory on the market
when the house was listed. It is, however, correlated with market turnover and the season in
which it is listed. A house is more (less) likely to be underpriced as recent market turnover
increases (decreases).
In column 5, the data is further partitioned to only include underpriced listings. The
dependent variable in column 5 equals 1 if the house was underpriced and resulted in a bidding
war and 0 if the house was underpriced and did not result in a bidding war. Although houses in
In unreported results – a linear probability model that incudes indicator variables for each month instead of the
seasons shows that houses listed in March, April, and May were more likely to be purchased through a bidding war
(compared to the omitted category of January). Whereas, listings in October, November, and December were less
likely to be purchased through a bidding war. Months not mentioned were insignificant in the model.
30
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neighborhoods with high school test scores are less likely to be underpriced – they are more
likely to result in a bidding war when they are underpriced. Smaller houses with three bedrooms
are more likely to result in a bidding war when underpriced. Agent owned houses are also more
likely to result in a bidding war when underpriced – which supports the narrative in previous
literature that agents are better informed than their clients (Levitt and Syverson 2008).
Surprisingly, underpricing a house to start a bidding war is not correlated to the inventory on the
market or recent turnover within the market when the property was listed.
One dynamic not explored in this study is the relationship between bidding wars and
redistricting of houses among the elementary school zones. If a house in a low (high) quality
elementary school zone is suddenly redistricted to a high (low) quality school zone it will impact
the demand for and value of the house (Bogart and Cromwell 2010; Ries and Somerville 2010).
Although I have information on what elementary school zones were involved in a redistricting
initiative, I cannot isolate the individual houses that were affected. To ensure the results reported
in Table 7 are not biased by redistricting initiatives I remove every elementary school zone that
was redistricted – simplifying the analysis to focus solely on bidding wars and latent demand, as
proxied by school quality, over time. Thus, I do not explore the link between bidding wars and
redistricting – primarily because of data restrictions – and leave it for examination in future
studies on the topic.
5. Empirical Strategy
I recognize that a house’s selling price and time-on-market are simultaneously
determined when a traditional listing strategy, in which the seller sets a high original list price
and the sales price is negotiated downward, is employed. As such I specify a joint determination
model similar to Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) as:
P = 𝜑𝑝 (T, X, A, C) + 𝜀𝑃

(10)

T = 𝜑 𝑇 (P, X, A, C) + 𝜀𝑇

(11)

where P is log of transaction price, T is time-on-market, X is a vector of property and location
characteristics, A represents the atypicality of the house, C is a measure of market thickness that
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represents the current local housing market conditions, and 𝜀𝑃 and 𝜀𝑇 are the stochastic error
terms.
As noted in Zahirovic-Herbert and Turnbull (2008) the sales price regression in (10)
would yield the estimated effect of competition C on price as the partial derivative 𝜕𝑃/𝜕𝐶 if
time-on-market were held constant. Whereas a change in competition while holding time-onmarket constant can be expressed as a change in listing density, such that 𝜕𝑃/𝜕𝐶 = 𝜕𝑃/𝜕𝐿. Thus,
I rewrite (10) and (11) as:
P = 𝜑𝑝 (T, X, A, L) + 𝜀𝑃

(12)

T = 𝜑 𝑇 (P, X, A, C) + 𝜀𝑇

(13)

The primary goal of the empirical analysis is to isolate the effect of bidding wars on real
estate market outcomes. Similar to previous research the joint determination framework in (12)
and (13) assumes that sellers face a trade-off between sale price and time-on-market. In other
words, the equations do not consider bidding wars. As such I modify the framework as follows:
P = 𝜑𝑝 (T, X, A, L, W, Q)

(14)

T = 𝜑 𝑇 (P, X, A, C, W, Q)

(15)

where W is an indicator variable for a property that was involved in a bidding war and Q is the
quality of the local elementary school.
I create several measures for the bidding war indicator variable as the original definition
includes sales transactions with long marketing periods. My preferred measure only includes
listings that have a time-on-market of 28 days or less.31 The local school quality variable, Q, is
created at the elementary school level based on local school boundaries and their corresponding
average test scores. I use the school test scores as a proxy for latent demand in the housing
market. I also include interaction terms between the underpriced indicator variable and the

31

I also use measures that include underpriced listings that sold within 14 days (2 weeks), 42 days (6 weeks), and 56
days (8 weeks). If one of the primary goals of a bidding war is to incite immediate activity then the preferred
measure of 28 days or less is the most appropriate. I report results for the 28 and 42 day cutoffs. The results for the
14 and 52 day cutoffs are similar – although the magnitudes of the coefficients differ.
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continuous school quality variable to examine the effectiveness of bidding wars across
neighborhoods of varying levels of latent demand.
5.2 Matched Samples
Prior to running the analysis I examine the data for potential sample selection biases. In
Table 8, the non-distressed subsample from Table 1 has been partitioned into a treatment and
control group – where Above LP is the proxy for the treatment group (i.e. bidding wars) in the
top section and Above LP [TOM ≤ 28 days] is the treatment group in the bottom section. Similar
to Table 7, the data only includes sales transactions from elementary school zones that were not
affected by redistricting. The t-test results in column 3, which compare the difference between
the means of the treatment and control groups, identify a potential issue. The list price and TOM
variables should differ based on the listing approach employed by the seller, but the house
characteristics should be similar – if not, the empirical analysis may be affected by sample
selection bias.
[Insert Table 8]
To address this potential issue I create two matched samples. The first matching process
identifies every unique combination of the following neighborhood and house characteristics in
the treatment group: elementary school zone, transaction year, number of bedrooms, and number
of bathrooms. I then limit the control sample to only include records that were not underpriced
and that match at least one of the records in the treatment group on every characteristic. When
creating the matched sample for the Above LP [TOM ≤ 28 days] treatment group I also remove
records that sold above their list price (i.e. were not involved in a bidding war). The process
matches transactions that were involved in a bidding war with transactions that were not.
The second matching process I employ matches each observation in the treatment group
with its nearest neighbor in the control group using a one-to-one propensity score matching
process with replacement.32 The second matching process requires an exact match on the
elementary school and transaction year fields – if there is no exact match then the treatment
record is dropped. Conditional on an exact match, the process then identifies the nearest
32

Propensity score matching techniques (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) have been been employed in residential
(McMillen 2012) and commercial (Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010; Wiley 2014) real estate studies.
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neighbor(s) based on the following fields: age, living area, lot size, bedrooms, bathrooms, and
the latitude and longitude coordinates of the house. The propensity score matching process
allows replacement - which increases the matching precision, but does so at the expense of
statistical power (Wiley 2014). The t-statistics for the matched samples in columns 6 and 9 are
smaller in magnitude which suggests that running the empirical analysis on the matched samples
will help address potential empirical problems resulting from sample selection bias.
6. Empirical Results
A question of primary interest to this study is whether properties that were involved in a
bidding war sell for a premium (discount) relative to properties that were not involved in a
bidding war. Table 9 presents the results from a 2SLS regression that controls for time-onmarket. I use houses that sold above their original listing price within 28 days [columns 1, 3, and
5] and 42 days [columns 2, 4, and 6] as proxies for bidding wars. In addition to the bidding war
indicator variables I include each school’s annual test score and an interaction between the two
variables. The results in the top section of Table 9 use the full sample, the middle section uses
the characteristic matched sample, and the bottom section uses the nearest neighbor matched
sample.
[Insert Table 9]
The results in the top section confirm my expectation that bidding war’s effectiveness
will vary across markets based on school test scores. Using the school test score data as a proxy
for latent demand – the results in the top section show that houses that were purchased through a
bidding war had higher prices neighborhoods with higher levels of latent demand. The results in
the top section are sensitive to the TOM constraint imposed on the bidding war indicator variable
and the market cycle. In column 1, I find that houses that were purchased through a bidding war
resulted in higher prices in neighborhoods with school test scores above 61.9% which, according
to the decile ranges in Table 5, would include all transactions that took place in neighborhoods in
the top four deciles and a large portion of the 6th decile. Based on the results I estimate that a
house in the top decile would, on average, sell for approximately 1.28% more if it was purchased
through a bidding war. The 1.28% increase represents a premium of approximately $3,868 based
on the decile’s average sales price of $301,500. Turning my attention to neighborhoods on the
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lower end of the school test score range, I find that houses involved in a bidding war sell for a
discount. A house located in a neighborhood in the bottom decile of school test scores would sell
for approximately 2.51% less if it was purchased through a bidding war. The 2.51% decrease
represents a discount of approximately $3,269 based on the decile’s average sales price of
$130,300. The results in column 2, which uses a TOM cutoff of 42 days are similar – although
houses in neighborhoods with a test score above 54.4% would sell for a higher price if it were
involved in a bidding war.
The extended time period of the study allows me to examine bidding war transactions
throughout the housing market cycle. In columns 3 to 6, I partition the dataset into two
subperiods that represent “up” and “down” markets. Columns 3 and 4 represent an up market in
which house prices were rising in the metro Atlanta housing market. The results in column 3 (4),
show that houses that were purchased through a bidding war sold for, on average, a 1.83%
(2.49%) premium from 2000 to 2006. Columns 5 and 6 represent a down market in which house
prices rapidly declined and then slowly recovered in the metro Atlanta housing market. The
results in columns 5 and 6 suggest that houses that were involved in a bidding war only sold for a
premium in neighborhoods that had a high level of latent demand from 2007 to 2014. . In column
5, houses that were purchased through a bidding war resulted in higher prices in neighborhoods
with school test scores above 80.2% which, according to the decile ranges in Table 4, would
include all transactions that took place in neighborhoods in the top two deciles and a portion of
the 8th decile.
In the middle and bottom sections of Table 9, I re-run the analysis using the characteristic
matched and nearest neighbor matched subsamples. The results in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 9
use the matched samples in the top section of Table 8. The results in columns 1, 3, and 5 of
Table 9 use the matched samples in the bottom section of Table 8. After controlling for potential
sample selection biases the results from the matched sample sections of Table 9 suggest that
houses that were purchased through bidding wars sell for, on average, less than houses that used
a traditional listing strategy. The results do, however, suggest that houses that were purchased
through a bidding war fared better in neighborhoods with higher levels of latent demand. For
example, in column 1 of the nearest neighbor matched section – houses that were purchased
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through a bidding war sold for a 7 percent discount. However, the interaction term shows that the
discount decreased as the school test score increased.
6.1 Repeat Sales Specification
Although the dataset includes detailed information on every parcel, it may still be subject
to an omitted variable bias - as it is impossible to include every physical attribute related to the
house in a hedonic model. One potential concern with the results in the previous sections is that
the houses that were purchased through bidding wars differed in quality relative to the houses
that were sold using a traditional listing strategy. This is particularly important given the
differing results in the full and matched sample analysis. In the next step of the analysis I address
these concerns by explicitly controlling for the unobserved quality of the individual house using
a repeat-sales specification with house fixed effects. In addition, I partition the bidding war
sample into intentional and unintentional bidding wars to examine their performance separately.
[Insert Table 10]
The results in column 1 of Table 10 are comparable to the full sample results in column 1
of Table 9. Houses that were purchased through bidding wars result in higher prices in
neighborhoods with school test scores above 61.8% which, according to the decile ranges in
Table 5, would include all transactions that took place in neighborhoods in the top four deciles
and a large portion of the 6th decile. Based on the results in column 1 of Table 10 - I estimate that
a house in the top decile would, on average, sell for approximately 1.79% more if it was involved
in a bidding war. The 1.79% increase represents a premium of approximately $5,387 based on
the decile’s average sales price of $301,500. Turning my attention to neighborhoods on the lower
end of the school test score range, I find that houses that sold through a bidding war fared much
worse. A house in the bottom school score decile would sell for a discount of approximately
3.46% if it was acquired through a bidding war. The 2.51% decrease represents a discount of
approximately $4,514 based on the decile’s average sales price of $130,300.
In column 2, I include indicator variables that identify whether the bidding war was
intentional or unintentional. A transaction is considered an unintentional bidding war if it was
listed using a traditional listing strategy (i.e. its list price exceeded it expected transaction price)
and it sold above its list price. A transaction is considered an intentional bidding war if its list
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price was set below its expected transaction price and it sold above its list price. Based on these
definitions alone, I expect that unintentional bidding wars will outperform intentional bidding
wars – in which case, unintentional bidding wars are likely biasing the coefficients in the earlier
analysis upwards. The results in column 2 show that unintentional bidding wars sell for a 9.8%
premium above traditional listings. Whereas, intentional bidding wars sell for a 1.3% discount
relative to traditional listings. The stark difference between the two coefficients highlights the
need to carefully delineate between the two types of bidding wars – especially when trying to
decide whether to list a house using a bidding war strategy (i.e. underpricing).
In column 3, I interact the intentional and unintentional bidding war indicator variables
with school test scores. Intentional bidding wars still sell for a discount, but that discount
decreases as the school test scores increase. In contrast, unintentional bidding wars sell for a
premium, but that premium decreases as school test scores increase. In column 4, I isolate the
effect of intentional bidding wars by removing unintentional bidding wars. The results, similar to
column 3, show that houses that are underpriced and purchased through a bidding war sell for a
discount relative to traditional listings. Thus, it appears that using a bidding war listing strategy
is ineffective – regardless of the latent demand within the market. This is especially true when
one considers the fact that the measure does not include underpriced houses that did not sell
above their list price.
6.2 Alternative Specifications
Up to this point, I’ve used school quality as the sole proxy for latent demand in the
analysis. In Table 11 I interact the bidding war indicator variables with three additional proxies.
In column 1 and 2, I use inventory as a proxy for latent demand. When inventory levels are low,
the likelihood of a bidding war increases (see Table 7) and houses purchased through a bidding
war sell at higher prices according to column 1. The results in column 2 suggest, similar to the
previous results, that unintentional bidding wars sell for a premium. Unlike previous results, the
results in column suggest that the effectiveness of bidding wars is tied to market inventory. As
inventory decreases (increases), house prices for intentional bidding wars increases (decreases).
Thus, column 2 suggests that underpricing to incite a bidding war may be effective in markets
with low inventory levels – although it’s important to note that houses that were underpriced and
did not result in a bidding war are not included in the measure.
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In columns 3 and 4, I interact the bidding war indicator variables with the turnover
measure. The interaction variables in both columns are insignificant. In column 3, houses that
were purchased through a bidding war sold for a premium. However, column 4 shows that the
positive coefficient is largely due to unintentional bidding wars. In columns 5 and 6, I interact
the bidding war indicator variables with a measure of the average time-on-market. The average
time-on-market variable is calculated at the elementary school level based on the last 12 months
of sales transactions. If there is latent demand for housing in the elementary school zone then the
average TOM should be lower. The results in column 5 show that houses purchases through a
bidding war sell for higher prices when the average time-on-market is lower. Interestingly, this
result carries over to intentional bidding wars in column 6 – suggesting that intentional bidding
wars are effective if the recent time-on-market within the elementary school zone was less than
55.2 days.33
7. Conclusion
Using transaction level data that accounts for seller concessions, I find that bidding wars’
market share increased over the past two decades; albeit at a slower rate than previously
reported. Despite bidding wars’ increasing prevalence little is known about the factors that drive
them or their effectiveness as a listing strategy. I develop a simple theory that predicts that
bidding wars will be more effective in markets with high levels of latent demand. I use school
quality as a proxy for latent demand because households with children naturally want their kids
to attend the best school possible. I argue that the limited supply of housing within high quality
school districts creates latent demand for housing within those districts. Sellers that list their
houses using a bidding war strategy attempt to incite immediate activity and multiple competing
bids. Thus, neighborhoods with known latent demand offer the ideal setting for a bidding war.
The results suggest that intentional bidding wars are more effective in neighborhoods
with latent demand. However, I show that intentionally underpricing a house to incite a bidding
war is risky and, on average, does not outperform houses that were sold using a traditional listing
strategy. I also find that a large fraction of the recent rise in bidding wars can be attributed to
unintentional bidding wars – in which the house seller did not intentionally underprice their
33

Approximately 328 of 1,022 intentional bidding war records had an average time-on-market less than 55.2 days in
the repeat sales subsample.
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house in an attempt to start a bidding war. Thus, although bidding wars market share has
increased over the past two decades – a large portion of the increase is not due to house sellers
using a bidding war listing strategy.
The results confirm previous research that that finds that underpricing a house is an
ineffective listing strategy – although I find some evidence that discredits the claim that real
estate agents advocate bidding wars purely out of self-interest (Bucchianeri and Minson 2013). I
show that real estate agents are just as likely to use a bidding war listing strategy when selling
their own house and after conditioning on the real estate agent using a bidding war listing
strategy for a client - they are actually more likely to use the strategy themselves when selling
their own house. While this study focused primarily on latent demand and its impact on bidding
wars, additional research that examines the effectiveness of bidding wars warrants further
exploration. For example, the examination of bidding wars in a less elastic, supply constrained
market may find that bidding wars are even more effective than reported in this study.

33

References
Anglin, P., R. Rutherford, and T. Springer (2003). The trade-off between the selling price of
residential properties and time-on-the-market: the impact of price setting. Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics 26: 95-111.
Black, S. (1999). Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 577-599.
Bogart, W. and W. Cromwell (2000). How Much Is a Neighborhood School Worth? Journal of
Urban Economics 47: 280-305.
Bucchianeria, G. and J. Minson (2013). A homeowner’s dilemma: Anchoring in residential real
estate transactions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 89: 76-92.
Chow, Y., I. Hafalir, and A. Yavas (2015). Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real
Estate Sales. Real Estate Economics 43: 432-470.
Downes, T. and J. Zabel (2002). The impact of school characteristics on house prices: Chicago
1987–1991. Journal of Urban Economics 52: 1- 25.
Eichholtz, P., N. Kok, and J. Quigley (2010). Doing Well by Doing Good? Green Office
Buildings. American Economic Review 100: 2492-2509.
Figlio, D. and M. Lucas (2004). What's in a Grade? School Report Cards and the Housing
Market. American Economic Review 94: 591-604.
Han, L. and W. Strange (2013). What is the Role of the Asking Price for a House? Working
Paper.
Han, L. and W. Strange (2014). Bidding Wars for Houses. Real Estate Economics 42: 1-32.
Haurin, D. (1988). The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing. Real Estate
Economics 16: 396-410.
Knight, J. (2002). Listing Price, Time on Market, and Ultimate Selling Price: Causes and Effects
of Listing Price Changes. Real Estate Economics 30: 213-237.
Lambson, V., G. McQueen and B. Slade (2004). Do Out‐of‐State Buyers Pay More for Real
Estate? An Examination of Anchoring‐Induced Bias and Search Costs. Real Estate Economics
32: 85-126.
Levitt, S. and C. Syverson (2008). Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The
Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions. The Review of Economics and Statistics 90:
599-611.

34

Liu, C., A. Nowak and S. Rosenthal (2014). Bubbles, Post-Crash Dynamics, and the Housing
Market. Working Paper.
Mayer, C. (1995). A model of negotiated sales applied to real estate auctions. Journal of Urban
Economics 38: 1-22.
Mayer, C. (1998). Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions. Real Estate Economics
26: 41-66.
McMillen, D. (2012). Repeat Sales as a Matching Estimator. Real Estate Economics 40: 745773.
Quan, D. (2002). Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Search versus
Auction. Real Estate Economics 30: 365-384.
Ries, J. and T. Somerville (2010). School Quality and Residential Property Values: Evidence
from Vancouver Rezoning. The Review of Economics and Statistics 92: 928-944.
Rosenbaum, P. and D. Rubin (1983). The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational
Studies for Causal Effects. Biometrika 70: 41-55.
Rutherford, R., T. Springer and A. Yavas (2005). Conflicts between principals and agents:
evidence from residential brokerage. Journal of Financial Economics 76: 627-665.
Sass, T. (1988). A Note on Optimal Price Cutting Behavior Under Demand Uncertainty. Review
of Economics and Statistics 2: 336-339.
Simonsohn, U. and D. Ariely (2007). When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buyers: Evidence
from Herding on eBay. Management Science 54: 1624-1637.
Sirmans, G., L. MacDonald and D. Macpherson (2010). A Meta-Analysis of Selling Price and
Time on Market. Journal of Housing Research 19: 140-52.
Trippi, R. (1977). Estimating the Relationship between Price and Time to Sale for Investment
Property. Management Science 23: 838–42.
Turnbull, G. and J. Dombrow (2006). Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence
from the Housing Market. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 32: 391-408.
Turnbull, G., J. Dombrow and C. Sirmans (2006). Big House, Little House: Relative Size and
Value. Real Estate Economics 34: 391-408.
Wiley, J (2014). Gross Lease Premiums. Real Estate Economics 42: 606-626.
Yavas, A. and S. Yang (1995). The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate:
Theory and Evidence. Real Estate Economics 23: 439-456.
35

Yinger, J. (1981). A Search Model of Real Estate Broker Behavior. American Economic Review
71: 591-605.
Zahirovic-Herbert, V. and G. Turnbull (2008). School Quality, House Prices and Liquidity.
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 37: 113-130.

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

Figure 1: Example of Latent Demand for Housing
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Figure 2: TOM Kernel Density by Listing Strategy

Figure 3: TOM Kernel Density by Listing Strategy (TOM < = 90 days)
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Appendix A: Expected Transaction Price
When a homeowner lists their house for sale they can choose either a “traditional” or
“bidding war” listing strategy. If the homeowner chooses a bidding war listing strategy, they
intentionally underprice their house below their expected transaction price in an attempt to incite
a bidding war. However, if the homeowner chooses a traditional listing strategy they set their list
price above the expected transaction price. To identify which listing strategy the seller chose I
estimate the expected transaction price for each listing when it was listed given the property’s
physical and location characteristics. To do so, I first estimate a standard hedonic model for all
transactions:
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = α + ∑𝐿𝑙=1 𝛽𝑙 𝑋𝑗𝑙𝑡 + ε𝑗𝑡

(A1)

where 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the log of transaction price for house i located in neighborhood j. 𝑋𝑗𝑙𝑡 represents a
vector of L property and location characteristics, 𝛽𝑙 represents the corresponding coefficients, α
is a constant, and ε𝑗𝑡 is the error term. Census tract and quarterly time fixed effects are also
included.
The results of estimation process from equation (A1) are displayed in Table A1. The
adjusted R-squared for the estimation is .86 and the signs and significance of the variables are all
as expected. Using the coefficients, 𝛽̂𝑙 , from Table A1 - I estimate the expected transaction price,
E(TP), when the property was listed by updating the quarterly time fixed effect to reflect the date
the property was listed instead of when it was sold.
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Figure B1: Location of Bidding Wars

56

